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Playing the Drug-Testing Game:
College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, and the
Structures of Constitutional Argument
JomHr A. ScAzaN, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
A. The Game
Like any other phenomenon that raises complex legal issues in the context
of real-world choices, the mandatory drug-testing of college athletes can be
compared to a game. Perhaps more accurately, it can be compared to a set
of closely related games, each part of the broader "law game" which val-
idates (and helps implement) certain claims to resources or power, and refuses
to validate others. The various subordinate contests waged between colleges
and athletes, legally trained proponents of contradictory "authoritative"
precedents (including attorneys for the parties, judges, and legal scholars),
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and men and women in the public arena who either advocate drug-testing
or oppose it all have ethical roots, since they are waged to determine whose
values will prevail, and have as two related objects the promulgation of,
and adherence to, behavioral norms. Like all games, these contests are also
governed by a set of conventions or rules. At least to the extent that the
players are seeking a specific "legal" outcome (e.g., an official and binding
settlement of a dispute between an athlete and a college or a favorable
decision by a court of law), those rules are unusually formal, those con-
ventions, unusually explicit. Unlike many games, however, law games are
also inherently "political," since they involve various interests competing to
have their preferences and values adopted by the State, and since they depend
on the threat (or actual use) of governmental power to insure "victory."
Thus, every contest about collegiate drug-testing which involves lawyers or
courts of law is fought against the backdrop of real-world possibilities,
including injunctions, money judgments, the loss of scholarships, physical
eviction from the field of play, expulsion from school, or-somewhat more
remotely-criminal prosecution for violation of state or federal narcotics
laws. In each instance, "the law" stands between the athlete and the school.
What that law is, and-to the extent that the issue is distinguishable-how
it is interpreted, will determine whether the law can be used by the athlete
as a shield, or employed by the institution as a sword.
Of course, the possible availability of law as a shield is no guarantee of
its efficacy. The existence of legal norms is not always going-to mean that
they are going to be followed. To the extent that the current contest about
the drug-testing of college athletes is fought in the public arena, and reflects
the rawest of political emotions-fear in the electorate, demands that leg-
islators and administrators "do something" about drugs-legal rules limiting
the authority of institutions to act are likely to come under considerable
pressure, and, in some instances, at least, will be ignored. When legal rules
are ambiguous-as seems often to be the case in the drug-testing contro-
versy-it can safely be predicted that some institutions desiring to test will
seize on those interpretations most favorable to their cause, and discount
the risks of eventually being proven wrong.1 Although they are governed by
their own, largely separate, set of rules, law games are part of a broader
policy process. As this Article will demonstrate, it is always a serious mistake
to ignore the imperatives that drive that policy process. Not only can those
imperatives lead to illegal behavior (or highly selective, non-authoritative
interpretations of the law), but they can also contribute to the creation of
new legislation and new judicial doctrine that change at least some of the
rules of the on-going legal game.
1. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975).
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Nevertheless, my principal focus in this Article is on the various legal
games that are played by those interested in testing athletes. Chief among
the interested parties are the institutions which seek to test, and the athletes
who stand to be tested. Because the legality of testing is at stake, these
parties ordinarily do not participate in the game directly. Instead, they hire
attorneys to counsel them, and, on occasion, to represent them in admin-
istrative proceedings, or in litigation. Legal games are thus lawyers' games-
and judges' games. Judicial interpretation provides the essential content of
a counselor's advice, and the basic frame of reference for a litigator's
arguments. For this reason, the Article approaches drug-testing from three
perspectives: that of the counselor giving advice to an institution intent on
testing about "what it can safely get away with" ("Counselor's Rules");
that of the litigator seeking to defend the interests of an athlete who has
been, or stands to be, tested ("The Litigator's Role"); and that of the judge
who, upon hearing a case, issues an opinion which not only disposes of the
issue for the contending parties, but also frames the applicable rule of law
("Judicial Choices"). By analyzing each of these legal games, I intend to
show what the present state of drug-testing law is. Beyond this, however, I
also intend to show the relationship of that law to the society-and the
social values and political order-that such law serves.
B. On Liberty-and Privacy, and Social Order
The ethical dimension of every contest about drug-testing is an underlying
conflict of values about "privacy," broadly construed. Persons generally
opposed to testing, whether they are politicians, lawyers, or athletes, char-
acteristically argue that the private use of drugs, if not knowable from its
visible public manifestations, 2 should be immune from intrusive institutional
acts aimed at its discovery and control-although some would argue that
intrusion by the government is more dangerous than intrusion by a "private"
institution. Implicit in this argument are beliefs about the presumptive "right"
of individuals to be free from institutional intrusion which are similar to
those expressed by John Stuart Mill:
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others .... He cannot rightfully be compelled to do
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would
2. E.g., arrest while purchasing cocaine from a dealer; overt possession of drug-para-
phernalia; public utterances about use; behavior that is characteristic of use and that cannot
be plausibly explained on other grounds.
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be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but
not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do
otherwise.,
Those generally favoring testing, on the other hand, value privacy differ-
ently. While perhaps acknowledging that certain behavior (such as sexual
intimacy between a husband and wife)4 should ordinarily be free from gov-
ernmental (and presumably, other institutional) oversight, they are less willing
to extend a presumptive right of privacy to conduct, such as the use of
drugs, which arguably endangers health, offends against community values,
or is patently illegal-even if such conduct appears to pose demonstrable
risk of direct harm only to the drug-user, and even if evidence of drug use
can be obtained only through scientific analysis of urine or blood samples
of the user obtained coercively by the state.5 Emile Durkheim, writing about
the legitimacy of laws prohibiting suicide, presents what well might be the
strongest argument for state intervention where the personal abuse of drugs
is concerned:
A man who kills himself, the saying goes, does wrong only to himself
and there is no occasion for the intervention of society; for so goes the
ancient maxim Volenti non fit injuria. This is an error. Society is injured
because the sentiment is offended on which its most respected moral
maxims rest today.... From the moment that the human person is and
must be considered something sacred, over which neither the individual
nor the group has free disposal, any attack upon it must be forbidden.
No matter that the guilty person and the victim are the same; the social
evil springing from the act is not affected merely by the author being
the one who suffers. If violent destruction of a human life revolts us as
a sacrilege, in itself and generally, we cannot tolerate it under any
circumstances. A collective sentiment which yielded so far would soon
lose all its force. 6
At its most extreme, this conflict of values pits those who would permit
testing under almost no conceivable circumstance against those who would
permit it routinely. In fact, however, most people who are interested in
drug-testing probably occupy some middle position-due in part, I believe,
3. J.S. MiLL, ON LIBERTY, in CLAssics OF WEsTRN PmLosoPHY 934, 939 (S.M. Cahn ed.
1977).
4. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (unwillingness of Supreme Court to
extend this presumption of privacy to homosexual lovers).
5. Such coercion could be physical (e.g., a doctor, assisted by the police, draws a blood
sample from the arm of a struggling patient). In the context of almost any imaginable drug
testing program, however, it is almost certain to be achieved by threat rather than by violence
(e.g., "Notice to an athlete: If you refuse to sign this form consenting to testing, or refuse to
be tested, you will be dropped from the squad, lose your athletic eligibility, and will automatically
not have your scholarship renewed when it expires at the end of this acidemic year.").
6. E. Du miHm, SUICmE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (1952), excerpted as The Legal Prohi-
bition of Suicide, in S. LUKES & A. SCULL, DuRunsmm AND THE LAW 144 (1983).
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to the fact that ethical choices are always made within a social context, and
that that social context includes a legal tradition which conditions us to
relativize individual privacy claims and to balance them against the asserted
interests of the state. Lending support to this legal tradition-which tends
to focus on the specific facts of particular cases, rather than on broad
expressions of ethical principle-are the inherently uncertain limits of the
"liberal" (or even "libertarian") position exemplified by Mill, and the "con-
servative" (or even "authoritarian") position exemplified by Durkheim. In
Mill's case, drawing the line between society's "self-protection," and its
assertion of an illegitimate authority to interfere with "private life" is ren-
dered difficult, perhaps impossible, by the many subterranean connections
between an individual's actions and milieu. Snorting cocaine does not have
the same readily apparent effect on others as shouting "Fire!" in a crowded
theater. Yet who is to say that it cannot, under some circumstances, endanger
others on the playing field, or in the stands? If college basketball players
are "role models" for many of America's young people, and if their lives
are customarily subjected to intense scrutiny by the press, who is to say that
their "private" vices will not eventually surface as well-publicized behavior
with considerable normative impact?7
On the other hand, Durkheim's argument has ethical and political impli-
cations that should, I think, cause us to treat it with equal skepticism. The
obvious point is that smoking a joint a week before the college football
season begins8 is in no sense the moral equivalent of suicide-or even the
7. All of the publicity devoted to celebrated instances of drug use that has any moral tinge
to it, such as much of the press coverage devoted to the deaths of Len Bias and John Belushi,
apparently has shared the assumption that such coverage, by playing up harsh facts, will
discourage use. But is that assumption warranted? No serious attempt that I am aware of has
addressed the possibility that when an adolescent discovers that a "role model" is a "user,"
he may be encouraged to emulate his idol's self-destructive behavior.
8. Marijuana is a substance that is included on the list of prohibited substances that most
collegiate drug-testing programs are designed to discover. The chemical and spectroscopic
methods used to reveal traces in the urine are sensitive enough to uncover evidence of occasional
use weeks before the test is given. The problem is likely to arise because marijuana is fat-
soluable.
EMIT tests are based on the principle that the use of particular substances will produce
antibodies in the body of the user that can be chemically detected. According to one source:
[O]ne of the strengths of immunoassay causes one of its weaknesses. The strength
is that the more modern immunoassay techniques are extremely sensitive; they
can detect very small, trace quantities of the drug. This strength gives rise to a
weakness ... that a suspect can have trace amounts of the drug metabolite in
his urine even when he did not unlawfully ingest the drug. For instance, several
studies suggest that a person may have trace quantities of the metabolite of
marijuana ... in his urine even if he has not smoked a marijuana cigarette.
P. GIAN, Li & E. IMWRINKLRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 956-57 (1986). According to one source,
"THC [the active ingredient] ... remains in fatty tissues of the body for a relatively long
time. One dose can take weeks, maybe months, to eliminate completely. Thus a regular smoker
may never be free of cannabinoid." H. JONES & P. LovINGER, THE MARIJANA QUESTION 5
(1985).
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moral equivalent of "free-basing" cocaine. Although we may be able to
argue that society, by its very nature, has a strong interest in thwarting any
behavior that is immediately life-threatening, that argument hardly compre-
hends situations where the risk to an athlete (or to any third party) engendered
by particular behavior is demonstrably slight. The typical response of con-
servative theorists to objections of this sort is that the "social bond" between
the individual and society is much more comprehensive than a generalized
concern for physical welfare, and that the state-assuming its government
and its judicial system are reasonably representative of its resident popula-
tion-is therefore entitled to stipulate and defend a broad range of normative
interests when it forbids certain behavior, or declares it to be "illegal" or
"criminal.'' 9 Yet at least to the extent that those who make this argument
recognize that "individuality" and "moral choice" are values that should
be protected against the claims of a totalitarian state,'0 they have also to
acknowledge that interventions by the government and "the law" into the
personal lives of the citizenry must be limited according to some principle.
It is precisely that principle of limitation, however, that appears to be absent
when universal, mandatory, and apparently indiscriminate drug-testing is
required of athletes-or of members of virtually any other diverse social
group.
Today, there is probably greater general acceptance in the United States
of broadly intrusive governmental regulation of "private" conduct than there
has been since at least the 1950's." Nevertheless, there is little evidence that
9. See, e.g., E. DuRKHan,, DE LA DrvISION Du TRAvArL SocIAL, (W. Hall trans. 1984)
excerpted as Crime and Punishment in S. LuIrEs & A. SCULL, supra note 6, at 59-75. According
to Durkheim:
[punishment] does not serve, or serves only incidentally, to correct the guilty
person or to scare off possible imitators .... Its real function is to maintain
inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common consciousness in all
its vigour .... [Punishment] is a sign indicating that the sentiments of the col-
lectivity have not changed, that the communion of minds sharing the same beliefs
remains absolute .... [S]ince there caniot be a society in which individuals do
not diverge to some extent from the common type, it is also inevitable that some
assume a criminal character. What confers upon them this character is not the
intrinsic importance of the acts but the importance which the common conscious-
ness ascribes to them.... By reacting against the slightest deviation with an
energy which it elsewhere employ[s] against those [that] are more weighty, it
endues them with the same gravity and will brand them as criminal.
Id. at 73.
10. From the time of Aristotle to Burke to Durkheim, a common concern of conservative
theorists of the state has been the over-reaching tyrant. Illustrative of this point of view is
F.A. Hayek's assertion that even within the modern "liberal" political order, "we have been
moving away from [the] ideal of individual liberty," and "that unlimited democracy is riding
for a fall." 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LEBERTY 3 (1973).
11. The tendency to recognize a significant state interest in regulating activities that tra-
ditionally have been regarded as "private," or as matters of "individual right," has not been
restricted to drug-use issues, nor has it been confined to the rightwing of the political spectrum.
[Vol. 62:863
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those who have taken an interest in drug-testing have committed themselves
to absolute positions. Instead, it appears certain that many with serious
doubts about the wisdom of testing in general would permit the limited
intrusion implied by a urine test in particular cases if conducted "with
appropriate safeguards," and for intelligible and convincing reasons. By the
same token, some who are generally predisposed to favor testing demand
that it be done "fairly" and "accurately," and sometimes express reserva-
tions about its use in particular circumstances.
The relativism of these positions reveals something about the uncertain
value accorded to "privacy" today. It also reveals something about mediated
ethical choices in a society that relativizes rights as a matter of course, and
accords the government at least some presumptive right to regulate almost
any behavior.
C. Mediated Choices: "Due Process"
and "Equal Protection of Law"
In conventional legal terminology, the "right of privacy," to the extent
that it has been recognized as existing at all,' 2 has been characterized as a
"substantive due process" right.13 The cases are somewhat equivocal on the
point, but generally hold that the sorts of substantive interests that can be
singled out for protection under the fifth and fourteenth amendment due
process clauses, either because they are specifically mentioned in the Bill of
Rights, or because they are in some other sense regarded as being "fun-
damental," are either immune from any "prohibition or interference,"'' 4 or
can be regulated or abridged only upon a showing of some "compelling"
state interest. 15
However, when any person within the United States has a recognized
"liberty" or "property" interest adversely affected by governmental action,
the "procedural due process" guarantees of the fifth amendment will come
For example, a substantial attack on unrestricted "freedom of speech" has been launched by
feminists and others who believe that the first amendment should not afford as protection to
pornography because of the degraded image of women it conveys, and the consequent sexism
it encourages. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 H. v. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985); Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUrKE L.J. 589
(1986).
12. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
13. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to
marry); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of related family members to
share living quarters). But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (sub-
stantive due process protection not available for illegal homosexual acts).
14. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497; Roe, 410 U.S. at 55.
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into play.' 6 Such an interest, it is important to note, is protectable even
though it may not be recognized as "fundamental." (For instance, an athlete
subjected to mandatory drug-testing might stand to lose an athletic schol-
arship as the result of a "positive" urine assay revealing probable marijuana
use. The scholarship probably would constitute a recognized property inter-
est, at least during its current term. 7 But it would not have the special
dignity of the "rights" recognized in substantive due process cases.) In such
cases, the severe strictures on state conduct enunciated in cases such as
Lochner v. New York"8 and Griswold v. Connecticut9 will not apply. Instead,
courts will employ the interest-balancing standard enunciated in Mathews v.
Eldridge:
'[D]ue process', unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 365 U.S. 471 (1961).... [O]ur prior decisions
indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.-
Consideration of these factors will not obviate the requirement that the
government provide certain procedural protections, irrespective of the private
and public interests involved, and the cost of accommodating them. Thus,
''some sort of hearing" is probably always required when the government
deprives someone of a protected interest-although that hearing need not
(and cannot) always take place before the deprivation occurs. 2' As a mini-
mum, due process also requires that a person who stands to be disadvantaged
by the state because of something that he or she has done be notified of
the relevant charges, and given some opportunity to produce countervailing
evidence. 22 When an adverse decision is made, the governmental decision
maker will be required to demonstrate that the conclusion reached was based
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. . . ."; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law ......
17. See infra text accompanying note 87.
18. 198 U.S. 45.
19. 381 U.S. 479.
20. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
21. Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See generally K. DAVIs, ADMiNISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE §12 (1982).
22. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254; Goss, 419 U.S. 565; see also K. DAvis, supra note 21, at
§13:2.
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on-or at least was not contradicted by-the evidence it had before it.2
Finally, the procedures employed 24 and the penalties assessed 25 will have to
be consistent with the decision maker's legal mandate, which can be estab-
lished by statute26 or by regulation. 27
These minimal due process prerequisites are expanded when the govern-
ment's action is directly regulated by the procedural requirements set forth
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, or is indirectly regulated through the "in-
corporation" of those requirements by the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. In a criminal proceeding, for example, the accused need not
testify against himself, 28 and is entitled to a "speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury. ' ' 29 And, subject to a number of exceptions (some of which
will be analyzed below), every unit of government (or every "state actor")
will be required to obtain a warrant before engaging in any "search" or
"seizure" of the people's "persons, houses, papers, and effects." '30
The restrictions on the arbitrary exercise of state power evidenced by these
examples convey an attitude about the nature of "good" government that
is every bit as ethical-and every bit as political-as the attitudes that are
reflected when a state chooses to intervene in a particular area of human
conduct, or chooses to avoid involvement because of a respect for "liberty"
or "privacy." Arguably, the policy choices that are reflected in such re-
strictions are fundamental. (For example, we could argue that the concept
of a limited and accountable state is central to any liberal or democratic
theory of government, and that no limitation or accountability is possible
without procedural due process.31 Thus, we could argue that, in any practical
23. Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1929); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270, citing Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
24. United States v. Florida E. Coast R.R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 241-46 (1973).
25. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938).
26. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 303-04 (1944); see also Greene, 360 U.S. 474; Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (agencies held to specific terms of delegation).
27. Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 23, 39-41 (1964).
28. U.S. CoNsT., amend. V. "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... .
29. U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
30. U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
31. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Procedural due process has the purpose of establishing the framework required for the "pro-
tection of ultimate decency in a civilized society." Id. at 61.
Under the "due process" model of government, the "consent" of the governed (which is
the necessary pre-condition for a constitutional democracy) becomes, in the final analysis,
consent to be governed according to a set of pre-determined electoral and procedural rules,
which, because they are the product of a "social contract," cannot be challenged as being
unfair when they promote one substantive result rather than another. For a relatively "liberal"
version of this argument, which imposes certain distributional constraints on what we can
logically infer might have been consented to, see J. RAwLs, A THoRY OF JuSTIc. 86-87 (1971).
In order.., to apply the notion of pure procedural justice to distributive shares
it is necessary to set up and to administer impartially a just system of institutions.
19871
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sense, the right of privacy in fact depends on a prior elaboration of rules
governing how that right can be claimed and must be evaluated.) Neverthe-
less, to the extent that procedural guarantees are variable, and depend on
"balancing" the interests of the individual against those of the state, the
courts will not presume that rights are absolute-or even that they are so
"heavy" that they can be outweighed only by some fundamental interest of
the state-such as survival 2-which would be directly threatened if the
asserted right were to be protected. Thus, balancing-as Mathews v. Eldridge
clearly shows-ordinarily involves a cost-benefit analysis, and values are
protected only to the extent that they pass through a utilitarian filter.
That filter assumes considerable importance when evaluating the legality
of drug-testing. Questions of privacy, for reasons that will be explained
below, are frequently presented in explicit "due process" terms. Even when
they are presented in substantive fourth amendment terms, "balancing" often
occurs. As a consequence, every player in the drug-testing game is involved,
not only in asserting the general priority of one set of values over another,
but also in characterizing them either in particular, situational, and utilitarian
terms, or in fundamental, unchangeable terms. Two examples will illustrate
this point. An athlete kicked off a team because he tests positive for mar-
ijuana will probably argue that his privacy is absolute, at least where Mill's
central "harm to others" condition is absent. His school, however, will
argue that whatever "expectation of privacy" he has, it is only protectable
if "reasonable," and probably will try to convince a court that it is "un-
reasonable" for any participant in a big-time college football program to
expect any privacy whatsoever. Similarly, a fencer asked to sign a "consent"
form permitting testing on pain of losing her scholarship might argue that
the consent is illusory, and that the legality of the school's "request" should
be determined by looking at the request's effect on the underlying privacy
(or fourth amendment) value. Her university, however, can be expected to
counter by arguing that consent is a procedural matter, entirely separate
from privacy, and thus amenable to validation under a wide-ranging bal-
ancing test.
Similar mediation-and very similar "balancing" -is also likely to occur
when an athlete challenges a drug-testing program on the grounds that it
Only against the background of a just basic structure, including a just political
constitution and a just arrangement of economic and social institutions, can one
say that the requisite just procedure exists.
Id.
For a considerably more conservative elaboration of the model, in which the only rules for
obtaining consent are derived from the operations of a totally competitive market, see J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITu-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
32. See B. AcxEREAN, SoCIAL JusncE IN THE LIERAL. STATE 80-95 (1980). Ackerman argues
that the only justification that the liberal state has for excluding aliens is the maintenance of
"liberal conversation," which can be directly threatened by excessive population.
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applies only to athletes, or applies to athletes in a special way. Thus, a good
argument can be made under liberal theory that a legal system must treat
everyone within the law's jurisdiction with equal respect. Yet even within a
Rawlsian analytical framework, "equal respect" does not translate into
identical treatment on every matter for every person subject to the law.3 3
Within other, more overtly "realistic" or positivistic frameworks-including
those customarily used by judges who do ordinarily employ explicitly phil-
osophical arguments to decide cases or to justify the decisions they reach-
questions of "equality" are likely to invite even more open-ended and
context-determined answers.
"Equal protection" challenges to drug-testing programs, perhaps even
more than "due process" challenges, are thus likely to be passed through
a utilitarian filter before being decided. In only a few instances will the
imposition of special burdens on athletes by a state institution (or another
"state actor") lead to a strong (and perhaps irrebuttable) presumption that
the classifications elaborated in a testing program, or employed in its selective
application, are inherently "suspect." Testing on the basis of the race-and
perhaps the nationality 4-of the athlete will require the testing body to
demonstrate that some "pressing public necessity" justifies its program, 35
and will also require that the program actually adopted or implemented
promote a "permissible and substantial" public objective, and in fact be
"necessary" to the accomplishment of that objective. 36 Testing that specially
burdens any "fundamental" right recognized by the courts will be subjected
to similar "strict scrutiny," and will require the demonstration of a similarly
"compelling" governmental interest.37 (An imaginable instance of a testing
program that impermissibly burdens such "fundamental rights" would be
one that required only out-of-state residents to submit to testing. Less likely
would be programs imposed only on married student-athletes, or athletes
professing a particular religion.) Programs that distinguish between men and
33. Thus, when "primary social goods" are at stake, and when those goods are "basic
liberties," Rawls argues that they cannot ordinarily be exchanged by the state for "economic
and social benefits." J. RAwis, supra note 31, at 149-51. See also B. AciiRuAN, supra note
32, at 243-51, 541-48. The athlete will of course argue that drug-testing constitutes a denial of
the "basic liberty" (or "fundamental right") of "privacy." The institution will argue the
reverse, thus seeking to justify its utilitarian arguments for testing.
34. NCAA rules aimed at foreign athletes have been subjected to demanding scrutiny. See
Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973) (NCAA enjoined from declaring
Canadian student-athletes ineligible to play intercollegiate hockey, since eligibility rules with
respect to financial aid discriminated against foreign athletes and violated equal protection
clause); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (NCAA "foreign student"
rule subjected to "strict scrutiny" under equal protection clause, and invalidated); see also
Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975) (American student not a member of "suspect
class").
35. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
36. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
37. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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women, either with respect to the obligation to submit to testing, or with
respect to the consequences that will be mandated by "positive" results, will
be subjected to a less-exacting, but still stringent, standard of review. Pro-
grams classifying by gender will be required to demonstrate that such clas-
sification "serve[s] important governmental objectives and [is] substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives." 38 They -will also have to
demonstrate that gender is not "an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane
bases of classification. "3 9
In the great majority of cases involving college drug-testing, however, the
only grounds for distinguishing those to be tested from those to be left alone
will either be that the former are athletes (or athletes in a particular sport)
and the latter are not, or that the former are athletes who have tested
"positive" before whereas the latter have been "clean" in earlier testing.
Similarly, different consequences imposed on those testing "positive" or-
dinarily will depend-at least as testing programs are designed to operate-
solely on the results of previous tests. Thus, no special scrutiny is likely to
be exercised by reviewing courts hearing "equal protection" claims. Instead,
the great variety of practical reasons proposed by institutions for testing
their athletes will all be given weight, and will, as the discussion below
indicates, sometimes be deferred to quite uncritically.
D. Law, Politics, and the Choice of Values
The preference for privacy over social order, or its reverse-or the sort
of mediated and generally quite pragmatic preference that emerges when
choice is filtered through legal categories-necessarily has political impli-
cations. Overt choices about public policy are made whenever the govern-
ment, through its political branches or through the judicial system, takes
notice of the drug-testing issue, and either promulgates or abrogates a drug-
testing program conducted by the state or one of its agencies or instrumen-
talities, or approves (or fails to disapprove) the continuance of a "private"
testing program. Covert choices are made when the government considers-
even if it does not adopt-any substantive or procedural limitation on "pri-
vate" or "public" programs. By definition, these policy choices are political
in the strictest sense of the word since they involve both a recognition that
different segments of the population (those favoring testing, those disap-
proving of it, those somewhere in the middle) have different (and sometimes
conflicting) interests, and that a governmental decision (even if to refrain
from acting) inevitably favors one interest over others.
Nevertheless, when society's executive, legislative, and administrative in-
stitutions consider drug-testing, or take steps to implement it, ethical mo-
38. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
39. Id. at 198.
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tivations-which can be "utilitarian" or prudential, rather than strictly
"moral"-and their political consequences, while not absolutely transparent,
are generally quite overt.40 It is frequently asserted by liberals (and liber-
tarians) that it is inappropriate for the government "to legislate morality."
Yet if the morality is popular enough, advocating it publicly and making it
part of a legislative agenda are hardly "bad politics." Such advocacy is
likely to remain politically advantageous even if the goal that is presented
in moral terms is impossible of achievement, has a variety of hidden social
and economic costs, and may in the not-so-distant future run into serious
legal difficulties.
Perhaps the best example of risk free propaganda was afforded in 1986
by the "Ron and Nancy Show," a nationally-televised speech in which the
President and his wife expressed their hope for a "drug-free America" and
their "program" for achieving that goal. Given the national preoccupation
with drugs, it was not only possible to express support for wide ranging
drug-testing and for some combination of rehabilitation and punishment for
those exposed by that testing,4' but was probably also politically expedient
to do so. Today, violators of drug laws are among the most visible offenders
of public morality in America, and are probably the most universally re-
viled. 42 As Niccolo Machiavelli stated nearly five hundred years ago:
it greatly profits a Prince... to follow striking methods... whenever
the remarkable actions of anyone in civil life, whether for good or evil
afford him occasion; and to choose such ways of rewarding and punishing
as cannot fail to be much spoken of. But above all, he should strive by
his actions to inspire a sense of his greatness and goodness.43
40. Justifications for drug-testing programs are frequently offered in the alternative: "we're
concerned about student health" and "we don't want people who are violating the law com-
peting;" "we want to equalize competition" and "this drug use is giving college athletics a
bad name." To the extent that law-and-order or reputational concerns can be identified as
paramount (a methodologically difficult proposition to prove), yet are represented as secondary
to concerns about health-and-safety or "performance enhancement," the ethical-or utilitar-
ian-motives for action are of course disguised.
41. See Address to the Nation, 22 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1183-87 (1986). The President's
"national crusade" included six "initiatives" or goals: "a drug-free workplace;" "drug-free
schools;" "public protection and available treatment ... for substance abusers and the chem-
ically dependent;" "international cooperation [in dealing with] drug trafficking;" "strengthen[ing]
law enforcement activities;" and greater "public awareness and prevention." Id. at 1183-87.
Punitive provisions, at least for federal employees required to undergo mandatory drug-
testing, were announced in a related executive order. See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg.
32,889 (1986). See generally id. sec. 5 Personnel Actions, at 32,891-92.
42. Indicative of the amount of attention paid to the topics of "drug addiction and abuse"
and "drug traffic" and the concern they had aroused are the 21 columns of annotated citations
to stories on these subjects that appeared in one major newspaper, the New York Times, in
1985. See N.Y. Tims INDEx 387-94 (1985).
For a critical account of the amount and type of reporting, see Henry, Reporting the Drug
Problem: Have Journalists Overdosed on Print and TV Coverage? 128 Tnm 73 (1986).
43. N. MAcmAvWLaI, Tim PRnIcE 158 (H. Thompson trans. 1954).
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The realms of legislative and administrative action are no less political;
yet in both, political choices are more clearly constrained by the legal and
institutional frameworks in which members of Congress and administrators
work. Whether the issue is the passage of new legislation having the object
of catching and penalizing drug smugglers and drug vendors, the adoption
of new administrative measures designed to identify drug users, or the
implementation of existing legislative and regulatory rules, those officially
involved with "doing something about the drug problem," whatever their
personal views, will always have two concerns. One will be with the attitudes
of the constituency which elects legislators, and which is served, at least
theoretically, by every justice department official, school board member,
prosecutor, and policeman on the beat. Those attitudes, it has already been
noted, reflect broad ethical objections to drug use. Yet legislators-and to
a much greater extent, administrators-must also be concerned with the
attitudes and potentially adverse rulings of the judiciary, which is formally
vested with a broad power of judicial review, and serves as an institutional
superego to the id of public opinion.
Thus, if the "Ron and Nancy Show" plays well in Peoria-not only
because the President and his First Lady are a Charming Couple, but also
because the people of Peoria are worried sick about cocaine in their school-
yards-we can safely predict that the Republicans and the Democrats in
Congress will engage in a game of political poker, with the purpose of
convincing the electorate that they (and not the members of the other party)
are truly concerned about the issue. Yet as the stakes grow larger, with
billion dollar appropriations for stricter enforcement piled on top of long
prison sentences, and provisions for inflicting the death penalty on dealers
piled on top of plans to use the military to catch civilian offenders, we can
also predict that some congressional voices will begin murmuring about the
Constitution and the limits it puts on legislative power. Similarly, when the
public expresses its dismay about the incidence of drug abuse among athletes,
detailed in media reports, it is predictable that the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association (NCAA) and several hundred colleges and universities will
announce drug-testing programs to demonstrate that their athletes are "clean."
Events such as the well-publicized death of Len Bias will strengthen that
resolve, and add medical grounds to a case that is rooted in moral and
public-relations concerns. But it is also predictable that institutions, when
designing those programs, will realize that the programs can give rise to
legal problems, and will make at least some attempt to avoid litigation. If
the schools are also playing public opinion poker, they face the risk of heavy
losses, yet they start with a very limited stake." They are also less sure of
44. E.g., The University of Georgia Jan Kemp case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, §3, at 1,
col. 1, or the exposed situation of the administrators at the University of Maryland as a result
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the relative value of their cards, and are more in need of advice about
minimizing risk. Thus, the schools will attempt to discover what they can
do safely by consulting legal counsel, and will feel significant-although not
necessarily dispositive-pressure to follow the legal advice they receive.
However, when the issue of testing is taken up by lawyers who base their
recommendations on what courts have done in the past and what they believe
courts will do in the future, the ethical foundations of choice ordinarily are
buried under a massive superstructure of statutes, Constitutional provisions,
and authoritative cases, all tied together by the characteristic rhetoric of the
law, which uses a selective logic and a selective approach to history to justify
any present or predicted decision as a necessary consequence of the past.
Assumptions about the relative value and scope of privacy vis & vis the
State's interest in regulating the moral conduct of its citizens do not entirely
disappear; but when these assumptions surface, they cannot always be iden-
tified easily, since they are frequently draped in the language of reported
cases, assuming a protective coloration which makes it difficult to distinguish
them from the backdrop of precedent.
Attorneys giving advice about what "the law" is, and about what colleges,
universities and athletic associations can "probably get away with" are
therefore important participants in the overall drug-testing game, since their
advice is frequently solicited and can influence the play of others. Yet the
rules that a counselor plays by-which are extensively illustrated below in
a sample interpretation of the current state of drug-testing law as it applies
to intercollegiate athletics-are quite different from those of the politician
fettered only by public opinion, the congresswoman playing high-stakes poker
with only a mild fear that her bluff might be called, 45 or even the more
cautious college administrator. Unlike all of the other players in the game,
the moves the lawyers are allowed to make are exclusively interpretative.
Maintaining for the moment the poker analogy, the lawyer acting as coun-
selor is required to evaluate the strength of the client's hand in a game where
the face cards are blurred, and where there are questions about the relative
ranking of hands which cannot be answered without recourse to arcane and
sometimes contradictory texts written in a dialect which is only partly com-
prehensible to the client.46
of the Len Bias episode, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1986, §1, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1986, §3, at 8, col. 3.
45. The choice of gender here is not only a response to the demands of a non-sexist
language; it also reflects the fact that the principal sponsor and floor manager of the Senate
drug-control legislation in the 99th Congress was Sen. Paula Hawkins, a Republican from
Florida in the middle of a tough re-election campaign. Whatever the long-term effect on her
reputation of the proposed bill, it seemed a good bet that her sponsorship would not hurt her
with the electorate in the pending election.
However, it apparently did not provide enough help. Sen. Hawkins was not re-elected.
46. Here, a chess analogy might profitably be substituted for the poker analogy we have
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Undoubtedly, the counselor in his choice of clients can reflect something
of his own ethical, economic and political preferences-although it is clear
that financial and career considerations will often lead attorneys to represent
clients whose positions they do not personally favor. And given the inherent-
although not equal-ambiguity of legal sources (including the central am-
biguity of which sources actually "control" the issue at hand), there is no
way of guaranteeing or demonstrating that the interpretation the counselor
makes is not reflective of his or her own ethical or political biases. Thus,
an ACLU attorney in California writing a memorandum on the extent of
fourth amendment protections to tested athletes might unconsciously accord
more weight to "liberal" decisions than would his counterpart representing
a small state school in the rural South. Despite the possibility (and perhaps
inevitability) of such bias, however, the counselor's task is confined, and
his or her discretion limited, by a clear set of expectations which are probably
general to all clients-including law review editors who are seeking a "good
precis" of applicable law. 47 Those expectations include thoroughness in re-
search, confinement of that research to "authoritative texts" (viz., statutes
and judicial or administrative opinions, with heavy emphasis put on the
output of appellate courts), understanding of and adherence to a general
method of drawing inferences from judicial opinions which is common to
the profession (or at least to those members of the profession doing frequent
counseling on controverted and difficult matters), conscious suppression of
personal biases in the interest of "objectivity," and a willingness to "discuss
both sides of the question" and present the "worst-case scenario." Expec-
tations of this sort are integral to a lawyer's education, and are reinforced
in subsequent practice by the concrete negative consequences of deviant
behavior. The effect of these expectations is thus to impose a set of profes-
sional rules on a counselor which are antecedent to the legal rules which
the counselor is expected to announce. These professional rules cannot insure
complete disinterestedness, but they can insure that counselors will con-
sciously distance themselves from their "personal" judgments about values
and the appropriateness of governmental action. As a consequence, "coun-
been using. Counselors are similar to the advisors who gather when a chess match is adjourned.
They are not permitted to move the pieces, nor may they change the rules-although unlike
real chess advisors, they cannot presume that their principals know the rules, and are obligated
to explain them. But by analyzing the board, they can tell their principal what historical game
(e.g., Karpov playing a Sicilian defense against Spassky in 1979) the present contest most
resembles, what moves are likely to put the most pressure on the opponent, and what the
outcome of the present contest is likely to be.
47. That desire, of course, is not the only thing that a law review editor might want.
Nevertheless, despite the spread of "critical" approaches to the law-many of which are in no
way connected to the Critical Legal Studies movement-descriptive accounts of what the law
is remain understandably popular. There is, of course, an audience of practitioners which
constitutes a significant portion of every review's clientele, and which wants a counselor's
answers to its legal questions.
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selor's rules" are likely to be narrowly drawn, and to present interpretations
(and options) to clients with no apparent ethical or political content.
There are two apparent justifications for playing the drug-testing game
by "counselor's rules." The first is entirely negative, and is explicable on
"risk-avoidance" grounds. From the perspective of an educational institution
or association which is considering imposing a drug-testing program, or is
considering employing an existing one to deprive an athlete of some right,
privilege, or opportunity (a place on the football team, for instance, or an
athletic scholarship), "objective" legal answers to questions about the pos-
sible constitutional or statutory rights of athletes are useful. Such answers
tell the testing institution how a judge-the ultimate arbiter in the imaginary
game of cards I am describing-is likely to value the institution's hand.
They say nothing about the utility, much less the necessity, of the testing
program. Nor do they say anything about its moral wisdom. Instead, they
give a reasonably reliable estimate of the economic or reputational costs of
adopting or implementing it. The second justification is related to the first,
but reflects a different conception of the counselor's social role. Thus a
technical exegesis explaining why it is legal to test (or, as appears sometimes
to be the case, why it is illegal) may be interpreted by the client as a more-
than-legal affirmation (or disapproval) of her proposed action. More pre-
cisely, it may be interpreted as lending not only "legality" to a proposed
course of conduct, but also "legitimacy." (Or conversely, it may suggest
that such conduct is not only "illegal," but also "illegitimate.") Such con-
fusion of description with evaluation can be decried as "unsophisticated;"
yet it is not patently unreasonable, given the normative dimension of the
law, which clearly has as one of its principal functions the elucidation of
behavior that society, through its formal institutions, chooses either to permit
or to limit-in both cases, with at least some appeal being made to the
"common good" which the laws are said to promote.
Legal involvement in the drug-testing game frequently does not go beyond
the recommendations of institutional counsel. College athletes are not ap-
parently predisposed to levy legal challenges against drug-testing programs, 48
and such challenges, even if filed in court, do not necessarily lead to litigation.
Nevertheless, the existence of such programs-particularly when used to
penalize athletes who have been found by testing to have used prohibited
substances-is certain to prompt some of those at risk to seek their own
legal counsel. In the initial stages of representation, that attorney is in all
likelihood going to fulfill a role almost identical to that of the institution's
counselor. Again, the counsel will identify the salient features of "the law,"
48. The first suit filed by an American college athlete objecting to mandatory testing was
prepared by the ACLU, which had to wait nearly two years before it was able to find an
athlete plaintiff willing to -challenge the University of Colorado's program. Chron. Higher
Educ., Oct. 29, 1986, at 37, col. 2; see also Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 8, 1986, at 45.
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and measure the specifics of the athlete's situation against them to determine
if an arguably "winnable" case exists. If there appears to be a sufficient
probability of success, the athlete may authorize counsel to initiate litigation.
Litigators, of course, can and do represent all parties, including institutions
intent on imposing or implementing drug-testing programs. However, I will
focus only on litigators defending athletes, since I believe that they play a
distinctive role in the ongoing contest about ethical choice (and state power)
that constitutes the "drug-testing game." That role, in both the pragmatic
and the ideological sense, is dialectical. The institution, armed with a par-
ticular version of what the law will permit, takes specific action, requiring
an athlete, for example, to submit a monitored urine sample for analysis,
on pain of loss of athletic scholarship. The athlete's attorney attacks that
action on procedural and substantive grounds. To support that attack, she
introduces another, more limited version of what the law will permit. On
both levels, she ordinarily will make provisional concessions: "even if the
law might, under some circumstances, permit drug-testing, those circum-
stances are not present here." Yet those concessions serve as prologue to
her own construction of the law: "before the University can establish a valid
testing program, it must secure approval from a faculty oversight committee.
This step was not taken; because the testing institution is a state university,
it is required to provide all students with due process of law. Threatening
to revoke a scholarship unless consent is given constitutes a denial of due
process;" or perhaps, "taking a urine sample without genuinely voluntary
and informed consent violates an athlete's right to privacy protected by the
fourth and fourteenth amendments." Statements such as these are supported
by references to favorable precedent and other authoritative sources whenever
possible. Yet when existing law appears unfavorable, when it appears am-
biguous, or even when it appears to be favorable but open to plausible
attack, the litigator is forced to supplement her rhetoric with overt appeals
to principle. Assertions about what the law should be, in other words, either
contradict or reinforce what various interpretative traditions teach that the
law is. Looking at the same cards that are laid out in front of the university's
counsel, the litigator for the athlete well may be confronted with a reasonably
strong hand. She will then be forced to tell the court-either in her brief
or in her oral argument-why the given law (at least in some of its particulars)
is defective. Relying on "liberal" perspectives about privacy (and about
"due process," which is paired with privacy in every drug-testing case), and
relying on non-legal sources (such as the arguments of John Stuart Mill),
she will demand that courts go beyond precedent to justify the sort of
intrusion that drug-testing actually entails.
Judges, then, are the last group of participants in the "drug-testing game."
They are not empowered directly to make the last moves in the game, since
whatever rules they establish will either be followed or ignored, and whatever
sanctions they impose will be mediated by the enforcement agencies of
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government. Yet institutionally, they are given the last word. Their say
determines the valne of the particular hands that the institution and the
athlete each hold. In making that determination, they are bound at one level
by what legislatures-or agencies with delegated legislative powers-have
decided. Thus, under certain circumstances, a statute may permit certain
tests or forbid such tests, or place limits on the distribution of the test
results. Even here, however, judges have considerable-and generally non-
reviewable 49-leeway to decide if the circumstances that bring a legislative
rule 0 into play in fact exist. Yet issues of privacy and due process also exist
at a second, constitutional level where the judiciary, under established doc-
trines of judical review, is subject to no legislative oversight, and has nearly
total freedom to interpret-and even negate-legislative and administrative
rules. 51
Virtually all litigation on drug-testing probably will call upon the courts
to exercise statutory (or administrative) review. Whether the testing institution
is a "private" or a "public" institution, athletes will search for some leg-
islative or regulatory ground to challenge the program it decides to adopt,
or to challenge the manner of its implementation. In describing how the
drug-testing game is actually played out, I will pay some attention to statutes,
such as the Buckley Amendment to the Education Act of 1972, and to
internal regulations, such as those adopted by the District of Columbia
Public Schools, which can and do impose some limitations on testing pro-
grams.
Yet the limitations imposed on colleges and universities-or on the NCAA-
by statute or regulation are likely to be relatively slight. However, for those
49. Of course, the judgment of an inferior court can be reversed by the subsequent action
of an appellate panel. In this sense, only the highest appellate court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the dispute is institutionally immune from further review. Even when
such institutional immunity exists, subsequent legislative action may have the effect of overruling
the judicial decision. But see Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951)
(despite federal legislation modifying antitrust laws in response to earlier Supreme Court de-
cision, Court manages to reach same result in subsequent case).
50. Rules governing the testing of athletes are frequently going to be promulgated by
administrative bodies with rule-making authority, rather than by legislatures acting directly.
The judicial role in interpreting the meaning and reach of such administrative rules is roughly
equivalent to its role in determining the meaning and reach of legislation, although courts
frequently accord special deference to the prior interpretations of the administrative body,
which is generally credited with having a special "expertise" developed, in large part, by its
interpretative experience in the area covered by the rules. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). See generally K. DAvIs,
supra note 21, at §5.03, 298-306.
51. According to Alexander Hamilton, "[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice
is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." TE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton)
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Such assertions of independence (as Hamilton recognized) are, of course,
subject to political pressures, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "court packing" plan in
1937, the "impeach Justice Douglas" movement in the 1960's. and 1970's, and the successful
electoral attempt in 1986 to remove three justices of the California Supreme Court, including
Chief Justice Rose Bird, all illustrate.
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parties whose activities are regulated directly by its provisions, the federal
Constitution, with its specific guarantees of "due process of law" and
freedom from "unreasonable searches and seizures," and its implicit rec-
ognition of a "right to privacy," is much more likely to pose significant
barriers to indiscriminate testing-and perhaps, to any testing at all. Thus,
constitutional issues-including the threshhold question of whether certain
testing (or test mandating) institutions, such as the NCAA, are amenable at
all to constitutional constraint-will be dealt with more extensively.
I. Two PLANs/Two HADS
Exercising an author's prerogative, I will not make the choice between
describing a drug-testing plan which clearly involves "State action" or one
which clearly involves only "private" institutional conduct. Nor will I choose
between a program ostensibly concerned with health, safety, or competitive
equality and another committed to barring athletes who use "street drugs"
from competition. Instead, in order to develop the legal analysis more fully
and to make distinctions useful to those approaching a variety of possible
drug-testing programs, I will outline two rather different drug-testing plans
here, and tie my later analysis to the pertinent features of each. That analysis
will follow through with the game metaphor by evaluating each as a poker
hand of varying strength.
The first plan I will describe is the one adopted by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA). The second is the one adopted by Indiana
University. With minor variations (some of which will be considered in the
text), these plans reasonably can be said to represent virtually every drug-
testing plan being considered or being implemented at the college level today.
A. The NCAA Plan
At its annual meeting in January 1986, the NCAA, a "private voluntary
association" of some 900 colleges and universities which regulates men's and
women's intercollegiate athletics at those schools, conducts championships
in all the sports it regulates, and sanctions some two dozen post-season
football "bowl games," adopted a number of amendments to its Consti-
tution, Bylaws, and Executive Regulations that had the effect of instituting
a limited drug-testing program. Under the new NCAA program,
[tihe student-athlete shall annually, prior to participation in intercollegiate
competition during the academic year in question, sign a statement in a
form prescribed by the NCAA Council in which the student-athlete...
consents to be tested for the use of drugs prohibited by NCAA legislation.
Failure to complete and sign the statement annually shall result in the
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student-athlete's ineligibility for participation in all intercollegiate com-
petition.z
The Executive Committee of the NCAA, pursuant to the organization's
amended bylaws 53 has authorized the testing of student-athletes "who com-
pete in NCAA Championships and certified post-season football contests." '54
Eighty substances, and additional "related compounds," falling into seven
broad categories, are listed as "banned drugs." The categories of banned
drugs include: "psychomotor stimulants" (such as cocaine and ampheta-
mines); "sympathomimetic amines" (such as ephedrine); "miscellaneous cen-
tral nervous system stimulants" (such as caffeine); "anabolic steroids" (such
as testosterone); "diuretics" (such as metolazone); "street drugs" (such as
heroin and marijuana); and "substances banned for particular sports" (such
as timolol, which reduces muscle tremors, and therefore might give an athlete
competing in riflery a competitive edge). 5
Athletes who test positive for any banned drug "in preparation for or
participation in an NCAA championship or certified postseason football
contest" ordinarily are subject to specific penalties:
[Such a] student-athlete ... shall not be eligible for postseason com-
petition .... A student-athlete who tests "positive" in accordance with
the testing methods authorized by the Executive Committee shall remain
ineligible for postseason competition for a minimum of 90 days after
the test date. If the student-athlete tests "positive" after being restored
to eligibility, he or she shall be charged with the loss of one season of
postseason eligibility in all sports and shall remain ineligible for post-
season competition at least through the succeeding academic year.56
A first "positive" finding for marijuana, however, generates a warning,
with more stringent sanctions imposed if subsequent testing reveals additional
use.1
7
The NCAA's testing methods are modeled on those employed by the
United States Olympic Committee. Testing teams consisting of university-
associated physicians and trainers are dispatched to college campuses and
to competition sites to collect urine samples from selected athletes. 8 A
52. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 9(i), quoted in NCAA, The NCAA Drug-Testing Program:
1986-87 2 [hereinafter NCAA PAMPHMET] (pamphlet printed and distributed by the NCAA to
its member institutions).
53. NCAA Bylaw 5-2-(c), quoted in NCAA PAmpHLET, supra note 52, at 2-3.
54. NCAA Exec. Reg. 1, §7(a), quoted in NCAA PAMPHET, supra note 52, at 2.
55. NCAA Exec. Reg. 1, §7(b), quoted in NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 52, at 3, 9-10.
56. NCAA Bylaw 5-2-(a),(b), quoted in NCAA PAMPmET, supra note 52, at 2-3.
57. Telephone conversation with Frank Uryasz, Assistant Director of Research and Sports
Sciences, NCAA, (Dec. 17, 1986); see also NCAA Exec. Reg. 1, §7(b), n.3 (list of "banned
drugs" includes "marijuana-based on a repeat testing"), quoted in NCAA PAMPinET, supra
note 52, at 9.
58. See NCAA News, Dec. 23, 1986, at 1, col 4; id. at 4, col. 3; Chron. Higher Educ.,
Oct. 1, 1986, at 39-40.
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specified number of athletes with the most playing time in team sports are
tested automatically, as are a specified number of additional players who
are randomly selected. A specified number of randomly selected competitors
are also tested in individual championships. The samples that are collected
are divided into two sub-samples, each of which is labeled with an identi-
fication number. To establish chain-of-custody for any subsequent admin-
istrative or legal action, care is taken at every stage of processing to keep
the identification number with the sub-samples, and to record their dispo-
sition. The first sub-sample is subjected to an assay. If it tests "positive"
for a "banned drug," the second sub-sample for the athlete in question is
subjected to gas chromatography or mass spectrometry, which are more
expensive but considerably more accurate procedures. If the second procedure
"confirms" the "positive" registered by the assay, the athlete's institution
is notified that the athlete is in violation of NCAA rules and is subject to
the "ineligibility" sanctions mandated by the drug-testing plan.
The college or university notified that a student-athlete is ineligible because
of a "positive" test result may appeal to the NCAA Eligibility Committee.
The Eligibility Committee has authority-but is not required-to restore
eligibility "if the institution concludes that circumstances warrant restora-
tion."5 9 In the event that eligibility is not restored by the NCAA and the
athlete's institution refuses to remove the athlete from the squad or takes
other action inconsistent with the finding of ineligibility, the institution-
but not, it is important to note, the athlete-becomes directly accountable
to the NCAA for its actions, and faces the prospect of being sanctioned by
the NCAA under pre-existing policies and regulations governing other rules
infractions. Those policies and regulations, and the limited opportunity they
provide for a hearing, the presentation of evidence, and administrative re-
view, will be addressed below in discussions of the "State action" and "due
process" issues raised by drug-testing. 60
B. The Indiana University Plan
Complying with the mandate of the NCAA, and also responding to local
pressures that the Athletic Department run a "clean" program, Indiana
University adopted a mandatory drug-testing program at the beginning of
the 1985-1986 academic year. In so doing, IU committed itself to a course
59. NCAA Bylaw 5-2-(b), quoted in NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 52, at 3.
60. The NCAA Program also contains language subjecting the staff of "member institu-
tions" to "disciplinary or corrective action" if they "have knowledge of the use ... by a
student-athlete of a substance on the list of banned drugs" and "fail to follow institutional
procedures dealing with drug abuse." NCAA CONST. art. III, § 6(b), quoted in NCAA PAm-
PrLET, supra note 52, at 2. Although this provision also raises "State action" and "due
process" questions, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
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of action that has been adopted by over one hundred colleges and universities
over the last three or four years. 61 Although the program was phased in,
and initially applied only to athletes engaged in intercollegiate football, by
its explicit terms it covers all student-athletes engaged in any intercollegiate
sport. Like most such programs, it announces the University's "purpose"
for testing, lists a variety of substances that will be tested for, prescribes a
testing method, makes some provision for maintaining a "chain of custody"
for specimen samples, makes some provision for insuring the confidentiality
of those tested, discusses the frequency of proposed testing, establishes a
series of graduated "disciplinary actions" that will result upon confirmation
of a "first," "second," or "third positive," links discipline to "counselling,"
and makes provision for securing the "consent" of the student-athletes who
are covered by the program. Except as noted below, all of the provisions
of the Indiana University plan are quite typical of the provisions to be found
in other collegiate programs.
1. Purpose
In a short prologue, the IU plan recites the belief of the athletic department
that the use of drugs (excluding those drugs prescribed by a physi-
cian...) can be detrimental to the physical and mental well-being of
its student athletes; can seriously interfere with the performance of in-
dividuals as students and as athletes; and can be extremely dangerous to
the student-athlete and his/her teammates participating in athletic com-
petition and practice.
These concerns give rise to seven stated "purposes" or "specific goals":
A. To generally educate Indiana University student-athletes concerning
the problems of drug abuse;
B. To educate any student-athlete identified with a problem regarding
the use of drugs as it may affect the athlete and his/her team and
teammates;
C. To provide a common mechanism for the detection, sanction and
treatment of specific cases of drug abuse;
D. To provide reasonable safeguards to insure that every student-athlete
is medically fit to participate in athletic competition;
E. To prevent any drug use by Indiana University student athletes;
61. No reliable estimate has been made of the number of colleges at all levels of competition
which have introduced drug-testing programs since 1985, when the issue became a matter of
broad concern among college administrators. According to one estimate, as of October 1986,
"about 130 major-college athletic departments now conduct tests." Chron. Higher Educ., Oct.
8, 1986, at 45, col. 2.
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F. To identify any student-athlete who may be using drugs and to
identify the drug, and
G. To encourage the prompt treatment of drug dependency.62
These purposes can be summarized as detection of drug use, prevention
of such use through sanctions, treatment, and counseling, and education of
users and non-users about the adverse personal and social effects of drugs
(including their adverse effects on athletic teams). A stated reason for de-
tection and prevention is concern about the "medical fitness" of student
athletes. Nothing is said explicitly about the relationship between the testing
program and concerns about illegal conduct, violations of customary social
(i.e., "moral") norms, or the various adverse effects that publicity about
student-athlete drug use could have on the University's athletic program.
Nor is any reference made to the NCAA requirement that its member
institutions participate with the NCAA in the testing of athletes preparatory
to "NCAA championship[s] or certified postseason football contest[s],"' 3
or that its staff members are subject to NCAA disciplinary action if they
know of student-athlete use of banned substances and "fail to follow in-
stitutional procedures" for dealing with it.64
2. Prohibited Substances
The Indiana University list of prohibited substances is more generic than
its NCAA equivalent (which lists many more specific substances within its
several broad categories). The Indiana University list is also not as compre-
hensive, but does include one item-alcohol-which is not on the NCAA
list, and is not generally tested for at other institutions. It is important to
note that the list of prohibited substances varies from program to program;
nevertheless, the IU list can be taken as reasonably representative. It provides
for testing for the following substances: "Amphetamines, Barbiturates, Me-
thaqualone (quaalude), Phencycledine (PCP), Marijuana/THC, Cocaine,
Benzediazepam (Librium), Anabolic Steroids, [and] Alcohol. ' '65
3. Testing Method and Frequency; Chain of Custody
The Indiana University program provides for the collection of urine sam-
ples "under the supervision of a laboratory technician." "Student-athletes
62. INDIANA UNiV. DEP'T OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, INDIANA UNIV. DEP'T OF INTER-
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS DRUG SCREENING PROGRAM AND POLIcIEs I (emphasis added) [hereinafter
IU PROGRAM].
63. NCAA Bylaw 5-2-(a), quoted in NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 52, at 2.
64. NCAA CONST. art. III, §6(b), quoted in NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 52, at 2.
65. IU PROGRAM, supra note 62, at 2.
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will be tested at the beginning of the school year, at the annual physical.
Thereafter, tests will be administered on a random basis, and may, or may
not be announced in advance." 66 Athletes who test "positive" will be subject
to additional mandatory testing: "[they] will be required to ... re-test until
clear." 67
After the sample has been taken, the IU plan stipulates that "[a]ppropriate
precautions will be taken to assure and maintain the accuracy ... of the
test results including the maintenance of a documented chain of specimen
custody to insure the proper identification and integrity of the sample
throughout the collection and testing process." '6 After collection, the sample
will be submitted to a laboratory to be analyzed "using the EMIT Drug
Test or such other test as the University may deem appropriate, for the
presence of screened drugs." No specific procedure for confirming a "po-
sitive" result is spelled out, although the portions of the Indiana University
plan detailing how the University will respond to "positives" implies that
some method of confirmation will be employed. 69
This testing regime is quite typical of those announced or used by other
institutions. 70 Its combination of scheduled initial tests, random follow-ups
for the general student-athlete population, and targeted follow-ups for those
who test "positive" is used by most colleges and universities. Some, however,
provide only for scheduled testing,71 and others limit the number of random
tests an athlete might be subject to. 72 Many institutions spell out their "chain
of custody" procedures in more detail. Initial reliance on the EMIT test is
common, but some academic institutions, conforming their practices to those
that are common in public employment settings, also specifically require that
a "positive" obtained from the EMIT test be confirmed by subjecting another
portion of the sample to testing by another method.
4. Disclosure and Confidentiality
All drug-testing programs are premised on the notion that some use will
be made of the information obtained by those requiring the testing. Only
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Thus, language exists speaking of disciplinary measures "[i]f a positive result is con-
firmed." Id. at 3.
70. Under the Indiana program, additional testing, not governed by any existing written
guidelines, is also done to determine if athletic administrators or coaches have been using
prohibited substances. Since this additional testing is atypical, and does not implicate the same
legal issues as the testing of student-athletes, it will not be analyzed in this Article.
71. E.g., UNvm'.srrY OF IOWA DEPARTMENTS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS DRUG EDU-
CATION AND TESTING PROGRAM 2 (May 13, 1986) (only testing will be that imposed on athletes
"who will (or appear likely to) compete in NCAA championships or post-season competition;"
testing will be done "prior to" such competition).
72. E.g., KANSAS STATE UNrVERsrrY EDUCATION AND SCREENING PROGRAM FOR SUBSTANCE
ABUSE 2 (annual maximum of four randomly scheduled tests).
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"positive" results, however, are of major interest. Thus, an athletic de-
partment may "feel good" if urinalysis fails to reveal that any student-
athletes are using prohibited substances, and may also want to use that
information for public relations or recruiting purposes. Arguably, such in-
formation will also be of benefit in "educating" athletes about drug abuse-
or, at least, about the potential effectiveness of drug abuse prevention
programs. But the preventive goals of drug testing (as well as any punitive
goals that are implied by "sanctions") can only be achieved if, through
testing, university officials discover that students have been "using," discover
something about what has been used, and take specific actions to change
the users' behavior. Further-and this point, for reasons that will become
immediately apparent, is not made explicitly in the IU plan or in any other
plan I have seen-spreading the news that a particular athlete has tested
"positive" and has been disciplined for drug use is, intuitively at least, likely
to be the most effective way of influencing the behavior of other athletes.
The problem for the institution, however, is that quite apart from any
"privacy rights" that a student-athlete might be able to legally invoke to
avoid being tested at all, there are other "confidentiality" rights, created
by statute or case law, that place definite restrictions on how much infor-
mation the institution can release about its students, and that also place
restrictions on the type of information that can be released, the circumstances
under which such information can be released, and the parties to whom
such information can be given. These limitations will be discussed more fully
below. It can be stated here that the IU program reveals an awareness of
lurking confidentiality problems, and attempts to deal with them in two
ways: (1) by restricting information about test results; and (2) by seeking to
obtain formal, written consent for certain disclosures.
The IU written policy with respect to the dissemination of test results is
more cursory than that employed by many other institutions, but appears
to be consistent with the general policy of the testing schools. It provides
that the student-athlete be informed of "initial" and "confirmed" "posi-
tives," and that the athlete's parents, or legal guardians, or spouse be
informed after a second or subsequent "positive," which is the point when
sanctions will be imposed. The Administrator of the testing program will be
informed immediately of test results; after any confirmed "positive," the
head coach, the athletic director, and the team physician will also be in-
formed.7 3
5. Consent
As is probably the case in every collegiate drug-testing program, the IU
plan outlines specific procedures for documenting the student-athlete's "con-
73. IU PRoGRAm, supra note 62, at 2-3.
[Vol. 62:863
DRUG-TESTING GAME
sent" to two practices which, in the absence of an explicit waiver of rights,
might be construed by the courts as illegal. Thus, IU asks its student-athletes
and their parents or legal guardians-"requires" might be the better word-
to sign a pre-printed form permitting the disclosure of test results to those
persons specified by the testing plan, and also absolving from "legal re-
sponsibility or liability" the "Trustees of Indiana University, its officers,
employees and agents" for any "release of... information and records as
authorized by [that] form." 74 If such "consent" is valid-an issue that will
be addressed below-potential "confidentiality" problems posed by privacy
statutes (and perhaps by arguably related tort principles) probably will be
overcome.
Similar written "consent" is also elicited for the testing which the student-
athletes will be asked to undergo, and for the various steps the University
will take if "positive" results are obtained. Thus, the IU Department of
Intercollegiate Athletics gives its student-athletes a copy of its "Drug Screen-
ing Program and Policies" memorandum and requires them to sign an
attached sheet that reads: "I have carefully read the foregoing policy and
know the contents thereof, and I understand that by my signature, I agree
to abide by the policy .... ",75 The University also requires them to sign
(with their parents or legal guardians) an additional form prior to the
academic year when they expect to participate in intercollegiate sports that
states:
For the academic year, [date], I hereby consent to have a sample of my
urine collected and tested during my annual physical examination and
at such other times as necessary or required, for the presence of certain
drugs or substances in accordance with the provisions of the Indiana
University Department of Intercollegiate Athletics Drug Screening Pro-
gram.
The evident purpose of these required signatures is to defuse any legal
challenge to the testing program itself by providing evidence that student
participation is "voluntary." The question of voluntariness will be dealt
with below in sections of the Article addressing the constitutional issues of
fourth amendment expectations of privacy, and fourteenth amendment guar-
antees of "procedural due process."
6. Education and Counseling
Unlike some drug-testing programs, the IU plan, as announced, makes
no specific provision for the education about drug abuse that is enunciated
as one of the primary purposes of the program. Nevertheless, the Department
74. Id. (Consent Form Appendix).
75. Id. at 4.
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of Intercollegiate Athletics, through its Student Athlete Assistance Program,
has established a mandatory lecture program for athletes that covers a variety
of medical, psychological, and nutritional topics, and which also brings
speakers to campus to discuss various issues associated with drug use.7 6
Individual coaches have also brought their own speakers in to discuss drug
issues with the athletes on their squads. 77
The IU program's stated goal of encouraging "prompt treatment of drug
dependency" is amplified by a description of the procedures that will be
followed when an athlete tests "positive." Different versions of the IU
program employed by different coaches give an athlete evidencing drug use
a differing number of chances to remain on the athletic squad-a practice
that will be discussed more thoroughly below. However, for those athletes
who are given a second or a third chance, a condition for remaining on the
squad is attendance at "mandatory drug counselling sessions. '7 8 The IU
plan states that these sessions will be provided through "the Student Athlete
Assistance Program. ' 79 In fact, student-athletes who have been required to
undergo counseling to date have been referred to the University's Office of
Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS), and have been referred through
CAPS to other off-campus counseling services as the individual case de-
mands.8 0
7. Sanctions; Disciplinary Procedures
As is the case in virtually all drug-testing programs, the IU plan in both
of its versions specifies penalties which are designed to discourage drug use.
The first version of the plan, which is formally applicable to all sports except
intercollegiate football, states:
All student athletes whose positive test result is confirmed will be
subject to, but not limited to, the following disciplinary actions. These
actions are required throughout the Athletic Department and are not
intended to replace or affect the normal disciplinary measures of head
coaches in their respective sports.
A. FIRST POSITIVE.... The student-athlete will be required to at-
tend mandatory drug counselling sessions ... and re-test until clear ....
Refusal to participate in the counseling program ... will be treated and
handled as a second positive.
76. Interview with John Schroeder, (Dec. 12, 1986); interview with Elizabeth ("Buzz")
Kurpius, (Dec. 15, 1986) (all freshmen athletes have session with Judge John Baker on legal
aspects of drug use in Indiana; other sessions devoted to medical aspects of drug testing).
77. Id. (football program brought Carl Eller, a former NFL player with a well-publicized
drug problem to speak to squad).
78. IU PROGRAM, supra note 62, at 3.
79. Id.
80. Interview with Elizabeth ("Buzz") Kurpius, (Dec. 15, 1986).
[Vol. 62:863
DRUG-TESTING GAME
B. SECOND POSITIVE.... [In addition to the disclosures mandated
by the plan,] the student-athlete will be required to participate in con-
tinued and further counseling ... and will be suspended from play until
[the] counseling program is completed and [the athlete's] system is clear.
REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COUNSELING PROGRAM,
AS SET FORTH IN THIS PARAGRAPH [,] WILL BE TREATED
AND HANDLED AS A THIRD POSITIVE.
C. THIRD POSITIVE.... [In addition to the disclosures mandated
by the plan, and after a hearing,] [t]he athletic director or his designee
may apply whatever sanctions are deemed appropriate including suspen-
sion from participation in athletics for one calendar year and may rec-
ommend the revocation and nonrenewal of financial aid in accordance
with the provision of the Big Ten Conference Rules and Regulations.
Reinstatement of the student-athlete to participation may be made only
after the student-athlete provides satisfactory proof of the successful
completion of a certified drug rehabilitation program and proof that his/
her system is tested clear of drugs.81
An alternative version of the plan, which has been adopted by the football
squad, subjects an atfilete who demonstrates a second "positive" to the
same sanctions under the same conditions that an athlete who registers a
third "positive" in another sport would receive. 2
The only procedures specified in the plan that take "due process" into
account (other than those governing the dissemination of test results to
various university officials and relatives of the athlete) are those available
to the athlete after a third "positive" under the general version of the plan,
or after a second "positive" under the alternative football version. In both
instances, "the student-athlete will be provided an opportunity to fully
discuss the matter with the athletic director or his designee, and present
evidence of any mitigating circumstances which he/she feels appropriate. ' s3
Under the general version of the plan, no provision for a hearing or the
offer of mitigating evidence is made after a second "positive," although a
confirmed second "positive" will lead to temporary-but perhaps fairly long-
term-"suspension from play." This lacuna in the IU program appears to
be somewhat unusual. When hearings are available, many institutions also
provide a more formal and more extensive hearing procedure, which often
includes a right to appeal an initial adverse athletic department decision to
another university body. 4
81. IU PROGRAM, supra note 62, at 3.
82. Id. (alternative football version). It should be noted that the coach of at least one team
is apparently willing to suspend first offenders from his squad, although no version of the
stated policy provides for that result.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., TEMPL UNrvERsrrY, POLICY AND PROGRAM FOR DRUG EDUCATION AND THE
PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUSE, INCLUDING THE TEsTING AND REHABILITATION OF STUDENT-ATH-
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The IU plan also makes no specific provision in either version of the plan
for challenging the accuracy of test results, their relevancy to the University,
or the underlying authority that the University implicitly claims to conduct
mandatory, random testing. These omissions appear to be common to most
drug-testing programs.
II. COUNSELOR'S RULES
A. The Maze
In describing the drug-testing game as a species of legal and political poker
with indistinct cards and ambiguous and incomplete rules, I have attempted
to highlight the central role that the lawyer, as interpreter, plays. To get a
better sense of that role, it is necessary to flesh out the poker analogy a
bit. Drug-testing poker characteristically comes in two versions. The basic
version is "showdown," and involves only two parties: the athlete and the
testing institution. In this version-and here the analogy with real-world
poker breaks down a little-the "winner" can ordinarily be determined
through the close examination of only one hand: that held by the institution. 85
Thus, the fundamental question is not whether the institution's program is
the best one possible, but whether it passes minimal legal muster. From the
counselor's perspective, determining whether it does is accomplished by
uncovering all of the overt and hidden legal issues raised by the institution's
program, mapping those issues so that their hierarchical relationship is clear,
discovering the relevant legal standards that govern each issue, and applying
those standards to determine whether the program, in any of its particulars,
poses an unacceptable legal risk. Ordinarily only if the program appears
deficient in some way will the counselor look to the strengths or weaknesses
of the athlete's hand.
The other version of the drug-testing game resembles stud poker (all or
most cards face-up on the table), and involves at least three players: the
LET]ES 4 (July, 1985):
Pre-Sanction Appeal Procedure. 1. A pre-sanction appeal procedure will be avail-
able to any student athlete found to have a prohibited substance in his or her
urine sample; 2. An appeal will be heard by a five-member Appeal Panel, consisting
of the Chair of the University Disciplinary Committee (UDC), the faculty rep-
resentative to the National Collegiate Athletic Association . . ., the two student
members of the athletic council, and a physician appointed by the President; 3.
The Chair of the Appeal Panel will be appointed by the President.
85. Blackjack perhaps provides a better analogy. A player betting against the dealer receives
all of his cards first. He wins outright if his hand totals exactly 21 points, or the first five
cards he receives do not exceed 21 points. He loses if his hand exceeds 21 points. Only when
he chooses to "stand pat" with fewer than five cards and fewer than 21 points does it become
necessary to compute the value of the dealer's hand and compare it to that of the player he
is betting against.
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institution, the athlete, and one or more athletic associations or athletic
conferences (or both) pressuring the institution to test athletes or to subject
them to test-related sanctions. In this version, the counselor is under im-
mediate pressure to estimate the strength of all the hands in the game, even
though there are a few cards he may not be able to see and can only estimate
the value of. The process of estimation is more complicated because it forces
the institution to analyze the situation explicitly fom several points of view,
and because the situation being analyzed requires the consideration of factors
not found in the ordinary drug-testing situation, such as the legal standards
governing the conduct of "private" voluntary associations, and the nature
and legal force of the "contract" governing the relationship between the
institution and such associations. Yet the analytical method employed by
the counselor is identical to that employed in the less complex situation.
B. Constitutional Issues
1. State Action
Only the federal government, individual states, the various "arms" of
state government, and subordinate political units (including counties, cities,
and local school boards) are required by the federal Constitution to provide
"equal protection" and "due process of law." '86 (State constitutions all
contain provisions that are either identical to, or essentially equivalent to,
the federal "due process" and "equal protection" clauses. Some have been
construed by state courts to reach private conduct that is immune from
constitutional scrutiny under the federal "state action" doctrine.87) Under
federal law, certain ostensibly "private bodies" that are deemed by the
courts to be "state actors" are held to the same constitutional obligations,
but others that are not deemed to be agents of a state, or to be involved
in a "symbiotic relationship" with a state, or to be performing some es-
sentially "governmental" function are not. Indiana University, like most
publicly supported educational institutions, is clearly an official "arm" of
state government. As such, it must conform its dealings with athletes to the
requirements of the federal Constitution. However, the NCAA, like other
"private" athletic associations that regulate intercollegiate and interscholastic
athletic competition, stands on a very different footing from Indiana Uni-
versity. The NCAA receives all of its funding from the contributions of its
86. "[Ihe Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the states from denying federal con-
stitutional rights and which guarantees due process, applies to the acts of the states and not
to acts of private persons or entities." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982) (citing
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
87. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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membership and the sponsorship of various championship events, and makes
no direct financial demands on any state or on the federal government. Its
constitution, its by-laws, and the various other rules it has adopted that
govern the conduct of its members are all the result of agreement by those
members, and do not derive from any legislative enactment. Its executive
director and its governing board are also appointed (or elected) by the
membership, rather than by the state. Yet a substantial percentage of its
members consists of public institutions, and those institutions probably play
the predominant part in setting NCAA policy. Thus, the NCAA is clearly
not a government agency, as state colleges and universities are. Yet a coun-
selor advising it about any potential problems with its drug-testing program
will have to ask the threshold questions: "Is the NCAA a 'state actor' under
federal law?" and, "Under state law, is the NCAA required to provide 'due
process' or 'equal protection' to athletes adversely affected by its drug-
testing program?"
a. Is the NCAA a "State Actor" Under Federal Law?
Until 1984, precedent existed in almost every federal circuit indicating that
the NCAA was a "state actor." Several recent decisions, however, appear
to be more compatible with recent Supreme Court holdings on "state action"
than these dated precedents. It seems probable that the Supreme Court will
eventually conclude that the NCAA, at least where disciplinary regulations
are concerned, is not a "state actor." A counselor, even in jurisdictions
where "state action" has been found in the past, will probably be safe in
advising the Association that whatever other problems there might be with
its current testing program, that program is probably immune from direct
constitutional attack.
Although the NCAA is technically a "private association," the mode of
judicial analysis until recently almost guaranteed that the NCAA would not
be considered a purely private party by the courts when its role in a man-
datory drug-testing program was challenged. The issue of the NCAA's role
as a "state actor" was litigated dozens of times from the early 1970's until
1984, 88 when Arlosoroff v. NCAA s9 was decided. In only one-McDonald
v. NCAA9°-did a federal court hold squarely that the NCAA was not a
"state actor." At least 100 other cases, establishing controlling precedent in
nearly every federal circuit, 9' ruled the other way. Thus, the weight of the
88. A representative sampling of these cases is discussed in Buss, Due Process in Enforcement
of Amateur Sports Rules, in LAw & AMAT uR SPoRTs 1, 14-19 (R. Waicukauski ed. 1982).
89. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
90. 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
91. For partial listings, see Buss, supra note 88, and Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1078 (5th
Cir. 1975).
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decided cases until very recently gave overwhelming support to the view that
"equal protection" or "due process" claims lodged against the NCAA would
require it to give a full constitutional justification for its actions. However,
no Supreme Court case ever directly confronted the "state action" issue as
it involves the NCAA or any other similar multi-state umbrella association.
Nor were any of the cases decided in the lower federal courts firmly grounded
in the recent '"state action" doctrine of the high court. Thus, almost none
carefully evaluated the ties between the NCAA and specific governmental
entities, 92 and most relied heavily on a theory of "state action" that the
Supreme Court has all but abandoned over the last decade.
The questionable theory has usually been labeled the "public function"
or "government function" test. Essentially, it looks to the involvement of
a private party in an activity which traditionally has been exercised by a
state and recognized by the legislature and the courts as the prerogative of
that state. Hence, in Marsh v. Alabama,93 a restriction imposed by a company
town, forbidding a Jehovah's Witness to distribute literature without per-
mission on pain of criminal prosecution was ruled unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court found that except for private ownership, the company town
"ha[d] all the characteristics of any other American town," 94 was "built
and operated primarily to benefit the public, '95 and thus performed an
"essentially ... public function. ' 96 Constitutional limits on the right of an
"ordinary" town to curtail freedom of speech and of religion were thus
imposed on a privately owned and operated municipal entity because the
latter's "function" was essentially identical to the former's. Later cases used
the "public function" theory to determine that a shopping center was func-
tionally equivalent to a municipal business district, where free speech would
be constitutionally protected, 97 and that a "private" political organization
which in fact chose a political party's candidates for public office was subject
to the same constitutional constraints on racial discrimination as the political
party itself.98 In a dictum in another case, Justice Douglas suggested that a
private parcel of land opened up to the public by its owner for use as a
park was also subject to constitutional limits on the restriction of its use
because "the predominant character and purpose of this park are munici-
pal."
92. For a number of years, in NCAA cases, courts relied heavily on the precedent of earlier
decisions. Virtually no analysis of underlying Supreme Court theory appeared in any case
decided between 1978 and 1984 holding that the NCAA was a "state actor."
93. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
94. Id. at 502.
95. Id. at 506.
96. Id.
97. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968).
98. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
99. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
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Had this line of cases continued to develop, it might have given adequate
support to the contention that the NCAA, because it regulates intercollegiate
athletics, is fulfilling a traditional governmental role and should be governed
by constitutional standards. Such reasoning was specifically adopted by the
Fifth Circuit in Parish v. NCAA, '0 and has been assumed sub silentio in
dozens of other cases. But it is not compatible with the recent "public
function" jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Thus, instead of continuing
to expand upon the analogical relationship between certain private entities
and the government, and to attach legal obligations as a result of such
analogies, the Court has restricted "public function" analysis to a few narrow
areas. In 1974, in a case involving a service cut-off by a heavily-regulated
power company, the Court asserted:
We have, of course, found state action present in the exercise by a private
entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State .... If we
were dealing with the exercise by [the company] of some power delegated
to it by the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty, such
as eminent domain, our case would be quite a different one. But while
[state law] imposes an obligation to furnish service on regulated utilities,
it imposes no such obligation on the State. 101
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in 1978, in a case involving
an ultimatum by a storage company demanding payment and threatening to
sell goods in its possession pursuant to a provision in state law permitting
self-help. It rejected the owner's claim that the storage company was a "state
actor" because it sought to perform a traditional governmental action.
According to the Court, "[w]hile many functions have been traditionally
performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the
State."' 02 It found the requisite degree of exclusivity in the private primary
cases, and in the situation which occurs when a private corporation "per-
form[s] allthe necessary municipal functions [of a town]." 10 3 But despite a
series of precedents finding "state action" in a variety of other statutorily
authorized creditor self-help contexts, the Court found that "the settlement
of disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive
public function."' 1 4 And it reserved judgment on the constitutional impli-
cation of a city or state delegating to private parties such functions as public
"education, fire and police protection, and tax collection,"'' 05 which it con-
cluded "have been administered with a greater degree of exclusivity by states
and municipalities than has the function of so-called 'dispute resolution." ' ' 10
100. 506 F.2d 1028.
101. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (citations omitted).
102. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1956).
103. Id. at 159.
104. Id. at 161.
105. Id. at 163.
106. Id.
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Underlying its desire to limit the public function doctrine, the Court also
expressly overruled its earlier holding that a "shopping center is the func-
tional equivalent of a municipality"'07 in 1976, and in 1978, in dicta, rejected
its previous view that a privately owned park could be identified with "an
exclusively public function."' '0
8
Finally, in 1982, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,1°9 a case involving a first
amendment claim brought by teachers at a nominally "private" school for
"problem children" and others with "special" educational needs, the Su-
preme Court affirmed a determination by the First Circuit rejecting the
district court contention "that although education was not a uniquely public
function, it is a primarily public function," and therefore covered by the
"state action" doctrine. It did so even though in the community where the
action arose, special education was provided exclusively by the "private"
defendant." 0 The defendant, not incidentally, was state regulated, and re-
ceived over ninety percent of its funding from public sources."' Explaining
its affirmance, the Court stated:
our holdings have made clear that the relevant question is not simply
whether the private group is performing a "public function." We have
held that the question is whether the function performed has been "tra-
ditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State"...... There can be no
doubt that the education of maladjusted high school students is a public
function, but that is only the beginning of the inquiry. Chapter 766 of
the Massachusetts Acts of 1972 demonstrates that the State intends to
provide services for such students at public expense. That legislative policy
choice in no way makes these services the exclusive province of the State.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals noted that until recently the State had not
undertaken to provide education for students who could not be served
by traditional public schools .... That a private entity performs a func-
tion which serves the public does not make its acts state action.112
While nbne of these cases addresses the specific issue of athletic regulation,
taken together they demonstrate that the "public function" argument will
probably be accepted only when: (1) state control over a particular type of
enterprise has been longstanding and exclusive; (2) the delegation of authority
to govern that type of enterprise to private parties threatens to deprive other
107. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (distinguishing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972)).
108. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161.
109. 457 U.S. 830.
110. Id. at 836.
111. Id. at 832-33, 837.
When students are referred to the school by Brookline or Boston under Chapter 766 of the
Massachusetts Acts of 1972, the School Committees in those cities pay for the students'
education.... In recent years public funds have accounted for at least 90%, and in one year,
9907o, of respondent school's operating budget. There were approximately 50 students at the
school in those years and none paid tuition. Id. at 832.
112. 457 U.S. 'at 842 (citations omitted).
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citizens of necessities or generally recognized rights; and (3) adequate, non-
constitutional remedies at law for such citizens do not exist. Under such an
analysis, the delegation of virtually all responsibility for the operation of
public elementary and secondary schools from statutorily-mandated school
boards to a private educational association might support a finding that the
rules of the private association constitute "state action." But given that the
NCAA is responsible only for intercollegiate athletics, that the educational
interest of a student in attending college may well be less compelling than
the right to receive a public secondary education," 3 that the interest of an
athlete in competition has generally been regarded by the courts as less
significant than the athlete's interest in substantive course-work," 4 that state
schools which belong to the NCAA retain the right in most instances to
exercise concurrent control over athletic contests and athletic eligibility,",
and that the tradition of delegating rule-making authority to the NCAA is
a longstanding one," 6 it is almost certain that the Supreme Court, if asked
to decide the issue, would not find athletic regulation to be an "essential"
or an "exclusive public function."
If an organization is not regarded as a "state actor" under the "public"
or "governmental function" test, it can still be deemed to be a "state actor"
because of the "encouragement" or the "participation" of the government
in its specific activities. Thus, to take the simplest case, if a local school
board, enjoined by the courts from racially segregating its schools, was to
lease its buildings at a nominal fee to an ostensibly private corporation,
which then organized a private school restricted exclusively to white students,
the private school in such a case would certainly be deemed the equivalent
of the state if sued by the parents of black applicants for admission."
7
113. See Buss, supra note 88, at 23-25, for an exposition of the opposite view, namely, that
the due process rights found by the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975),
are directly relevant to intercollegiate athletics. This position ignores the emphasis in Goss on
the compulsory education laws at issue in Goss, which the Court concluded established a
"property interest" in education. Such an interest has generally not been found in athletic
participation, and absent a scholarship which is being terminated, or a state provision guar-
anteeing tertiary education, appears not to apply to colleges at all.
114. See J. WEiSTART & C. LOWELL, Tn LAW OF SPORTS § 1.11 (1979) ("The 'Right' to
Participate").
115. Member institutions of the NCAA commit themselves to "apply[ing] and enforce[ing]
[NCAA] legislation." NCAA CONST. art. II, § 2(b). Yet the NCAA Constitution also provides
that "[tlhe control and responsibility for the conduct of intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised
by the institution itself and by the conference, if any, of which it is a member." Id. at art.
III, § 2.
116. Eligibility rules for athletes were first drafted for athletes by the NCAA in 1906, the
year of its creation. Compliance by institutions, however, was voluntary. In 1939, member
institutions were obliged for the first time to comply with explicit "Standards for the Conduct
of Intercollegiate Athletics" as a condition of NCAA membership. F. MENKE, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF SPORTS 311 (rev. 2d ed. 1960).
117. Cf. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455 (1973); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 911 (1962).
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Ordinarily, however, the relationship between the private entity and the
government is more tenuous. Addressing situations involving more limited
"participation" or encouragement, the Supreme Court has established the
following benchmarks:
(1) "Private conduct abridging individual rights does not do violence to
the Equal Protection Clause [and the Due Process Clause] unless to some
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to
be involved in it.''" s
(2) It is not sufficient grounds for finding "state action" if all that can
be shown is that "the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service
at all from the State, or is subject to state regulation in any degree what-
soever."" 9
(3) Instead, if "state action" is to be based on a general relationship,
the degree of contact between the private entity and the state must approach
the sort of "symbiotic relationship" found by the Court in Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority.120
(4) Alternatively, direct state support or "encouragement" of a particular
initiative may convert that initiative into "state action," even though the
private ertity responsible for it is not "symbiotically" related to the state.' 2'
Dicta in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis'2 indicates that in such a case, the
Court will look for a relationship between the private entity and the State
which is analogous to that of a partnership or a joint venture. 2 1 Clearly,
as the Court has indicated in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,24 "a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action" of the
nominally private party will not be found if the "initiative" for that action
comes from the private party, and the State's only involvement is a grant
of permission to proceed in a manner generally authorized by law.'25
(5) Finally, any determination of the "state action" question must depend
on a careful evaluative process: "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing cir-
cumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance."12 6
Nearly all of the decisions that have identified State "support" or "en-
couragement" as the basis for determining that the NCAA is a "state actor"
118. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (emphasis added).
119. Moose Lodge No. 117 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
120. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357 (citing Burton, 365 U.S. 715).
121. Id. at 357; see also Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
122. 407 U.S. 163.
123. Id. at 177.
124. 419 U.S. 345.
125. Id. at 354-57. But see Shelley, 334 U.S. 1. See also Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164-66
(1978). ("This Court has, however, never held that a state's mere acquiescence in a private
action converts that action into that of the State.").
126. Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
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have done so without "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" to any
significant degree. Fairly typical of the prevailing approach is the Fifth
Circuit's assertion in Parish v. NCAA that:
[we] see no reason to enumerate again the contacts and degree of par-
ticipation of the various states, through their colleges and universities,
with the NCAA. Suffice it to say that state-supported educational in-
stitutions and their members and officers play a substantial, although
admittedly not pervasive, role in the NCAA's program.2'1
Other cases which have addressed the question of encouragement or sup-
port more directly have focused on the fact that approximately fifty percent
of the NCAA member-institutions are "public" rather than "private;' x2
that representatives of those institutions sit on various NCAA policy-making
boards; that NCAA regulations have the effect of determining the rights
and responsibilities of employees and student-athletes at public colleges; 129
and that the grant of rule-making authority by these public institutions to
the NCAA makes the NCAA their agent in fact, if not always in name. 30
Even when the revenue generated by NCAA-regulated sports and received
by its member schools is loosely analogized to the rent which the Supreme
Court took into account in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,''
public-private ties such as these appear to fall considerably short of the sort
of "symbiotic relationship" described in that case. That conclusion is but-
tressed by the increasingly restrictive approach to "state action" which the
Court has taken since Burton was decided. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, for
instance, virtually total financial support of the "private" school by the
state was held to be insufficient to establish "state action:" "the school's
fiscal relationship with the State is not different from that of many con-
tractors performing services for the government. No symbiotic relationship
such as in Burton existed here." 132 And in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 33 and Blum v. Yaretsky, 3 4 the Court rejected the argument that ex-
tensive state regulation of a private enterprise automatically converts that
enterprise into something reachable by the fourteenth amendment, stating:
"[the complaining party must also show that 'there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity
127. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032.
128. Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1156-57 (D. Mass. 1973).
129. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032; see also University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d 1159 (Nev.
1979).
130. Parish, 506 F.2d. at 1033: "It would be strange doctrine indeed to hold that the states
could avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the Constitution by bonding together to form
or support a "private" organization to which they have relinquished some portion of their
governmental power."
131. 365 U.S. at 720.
132. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843.
133. 419 U.S. at 350.
134. 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
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so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.'" 35
In the later case, in fact, the Court arguably placed new barriers on finding
"state action" by asserting:
[t]he purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards
are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for
the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.
... Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private
party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those
initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36
In the light of this precedent, the sorts of contacts between the NCAA
and the various states enumerated in Parish appear to fall well short of
those required to establish the "symbiosis" necessary for "state action."
But even if contacts such as these could be regarded as "significant" enough,
it is clear that their significance derives, not from the NCAA's link to any
particular state, but from its broader, collective relationship with all fifty
states and with the federal government, each of which supplies the NCAA
with public-institution members. Thus, as the Fifth Circuit noted in the
Parish case, it is ordinarily not possible to characterize the NCAA's conduct
as a reflection of control by "any one state or governmental body.' 1 37 This
fact distinguishes the NCAA cases from others which have found various
state high school athletic associations to be "state actors."' 38 It also makes
it difficult to demonstrate that particular actions by the NCAA, including
the promulgation of drug-testing rules can be attributed properly to the
"encouragement" or "support" of any governmental body, rather than to
the general will of the NCAA's mixed membership.
Thus, despite the overwhelming weight of early precedent, as a result of
recent Supreme Court action, the "encouragement" or "support" argument
appears to be nearly as weak as the "public function" argument. A series
of recent cases decided in the lower federal courts, beginning in 1984 with
Arlosoroff v. NCAA, "I have therefore concluded that as a matter of federal
constitutional law, the NCAA (at least in its promulgation of various eli-
135. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004) (emphasis added).
136.- Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05.
137. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1033.
138. See Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F.2d 3552 (8th Cir. 1977);
Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1968).
However, in a recent case decided in the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner intimated that the
issue was still open, and that a court might be willing to hear arguments again about the
existence of "state action" in cases involving rules promulgated by state high school athletic
associations. Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir. 1982).
139. 746 F.2d 1019.
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gibility and disciplinary rules) is not a "state actor."140 Nothing in the current
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court suggests that this result is incorrect.
b. Is the NCAA Bound to Provide "Due Process" or "Equal
Protection" as a Matter of State Constitutional Law?
A determination that the NCAA (or, for that matter, a "private" college
or university following NCAA rules) is not a "state actor" for federal
purposes still leaves open the possibility that an athlete might prevail against
the NCAA (or institution following NCAA rules) in an action alleging a
deprivation of a right guaranteed by the relevant state constitution. To
address this question adequately, the counselor representing the NCAA or
the institution would have to familiarize himself with state doctrines of
"state action" in the particular jurisdiction where the complained of testing
occurred, or where some other asserted test-related deprivation of rights
occurred. 41
Such a survey is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is appropriate
to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has permitted states to impose con-
stitutional restrictions on "private" conduct more restrictive than those
imposed by the federal Constitution, and that as a result, the law in at least
one state could give the NCAA (or a "private" institution following its
rules) trouble. Thus, the Supreme Court of California determined in 1979
that state constitutional claims could be asserted against a privately-owned
shopping center, 142 even though similar claims asserted under the federal
Constitution would founder because of a lack of "state action.' ' 43 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehn-
quist observed:
[o]ur reasoning in Lloyd [finding no "state action" under the Fourteenth
Amendment in a similar shopping center case]... does not ex proprio
vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its
140. See Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Educational Testing
Serv., 754 F.2d 20 (Ist Cir. 1985) (dictum); Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill.
1987); McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Ponce v. Basketball
Fed., 760 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1985).
141. Since an athlete deprived of eligibility as the result of a "positive" NCAA-administered
test would suffer the consequences of that deprivation at her home institution, she could
probably invoke the state constitutional law prevailing in the state where that institution is
located. See Levant v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara Cty., Cal., Mar. 10, 1987).
However, if the actual testing takes place in another locale (e.g., a football "bowl" or NCAA
championship site), she might also be able to invoke whatever state constitutional protections
are available in that locale.
142. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
143. See Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569; Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507 (overruling Food Employees
v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)).
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sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution. l-
c. What Consequences Follow if the NCAA Is Not A "State Actor," or
Is Not Required to Observe State Constitutional Rules?
A finding that the NCAA is not a "state actor" for the purposes of
federal law, and is not obliged by state constitutional law to afford athletes
"due process" or "equal protection," will immunize the NCAA from suits
claiming that its actions in promulgating, implementing, or enforcing its
drug-testing program were unconstitutional. But such a finding will not
necessarily immunize those institutions that cooperate with the NCAA by
requiring that their athletes submit to NCAA testing or by subjecting athletes
that refuse to be tested to suspension from athletic participation or other
sanctions. Nor will it necessarily immunize those same institutions from
federal or state lawsilits if the institution suspends or otherwise disciplines
an athlete because she tests "positive" on a test administered or required
by the NCAA. Instead, a separate inquiry, conducted along the lines indicated
in the previous two sections of this Article, will have to be made to determine
if the institution cooperating with the NCAA is either a "state actor" under
federal law, or, under state constitutional law, is required to afford athletes
"due process" and "equal protection."
If the answer to either question is "yes," then the NCAA program,
although not reviewable directly, will become in effect unenforceable, since
any institution cooperating with the NCAA in its enforcement will be in
violation of state or federal law.
Thus, any success the NCAA has almost certainly will not prevent all
constitutional review of its drug-testing plan, although it well may preclude
holding the NCAA liable for that plan. The argument made in Parish to
the effect that states should not be permitted to avoid legal responsibility
for their acts by delegating them to a private association is likely to be heard
sympathetically by the courts. 45 Even if it is determined that the NCAA is
not a "state actor," it is clear that public colleges and universities which
are NCCA members are state actors. 46 In addition, at least some nominally
"private" members of the NCAA are likely to be held accountable under
state, if not federal, constitutional standards. Any action that these insti-
tutions take in the furtherance of NCAA drug-testing rules is likely to involve
144. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 81.
145. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032-33.
146. The application of the fourteenth amendment to institutions of public education at
every level has been clear since the 1930's, when the Supreme Court began ruling on racial
discrimination in state universities and professional schools. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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them, either as sole defendants, or as joint defendants with the NCAA, in
lawsuits brought by athletes. In the event that the schools' actions pass
constitutional muster, the NCAA's plan will continue to be dispositive in
drug-use situations. If, however, a court should determine that the sanctions
which any college or university imposes is violative of "due process" or
some other constitutional rights, it has the clear power to enjoin the insti-
tution from imposing that sanction, even if failure to do so is a clear violation
of the agreement between the institution and the NCAA. Thus, case law
supports the contention that a state university has a "superior legal duty"
to observe the requirements of the constitution whenever they come into
conflict with contractual obligations to the NCAA, even though such ob-
servance could jeopardize the university's good standing in the Association. 47
2. "Due Process"-In General
An athlete required to submit to a drug-testing program by any "state
actor" may object to the testing, or to the uses to which the testing is put,
by alleging generally that the procedures used, or the penalties exacted, or
both, deprive the athlete of various procedural or substantive rights guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution. With the exception of claims
alleging a denial of "equal protection of the laws" (which are treated
separately below), all such objections-including those involving such issues
as "privacy," "unlawful search and seizure," and "compelled self-incrim-
ination"-will depend on demonstrating that the guarantees provided by the
"due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment have not been afforded.
In its simplest application, the "due process" clause is invoked in its own
name, and monitors the "fundamental fairness"'1 4s of institutional proceed-
ings and procedures to which athletes contesting drug-testing must submit.
For example, objections to the sort of hearing an athlete might be afforded
to rebut a "positive" test result-or to the failure to afford the athlete any
hearing at all-as well as objections to certain "consent" forms that are
required by the typical testing program depend exclusively for their resolution
on judicial interpretation and application of the "due process" clause itself.
In all such cases, the plaintiff will be required to demonstrate the deprivation
of "life, liberty, or property" that triggers "due process" inquiry before
challenging the governmental conduct which has contributed to that depri-
vation.
147. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'g 422
F. Supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976). Cf. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d at 1164. See also Kentucky High
School Athletic Ass'n v. Hopkins City Board of Educ., 552 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Ky. App. 1977)
(school cannot be disciplined by athletic association for complying with court order).
148. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (19xx) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
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Yet "due process" also has another dimension that does not require this
preliminary showing. That dimension becomes apparent when an athlete
challenges a drug-testing program on constitutional grounds that are not
contemplated directly by the "due process" clause. Because the Bill of Rights
places direct limitations only on the activities of the federal government, the
process of making virtually all of its terms applicable to states (and "state
actors") depends on the judicial "incorporation" of its various guarantees
into the meaning of "due process of law," as that term is employed in the
fourteenth amendment.' 49 Some of those guarantees, such as the fifth amend-
ment right of a criminal defendant not to testify against himself in a criminal
proceeding, are essentially "procedural," while others, such as the first
amendment right to free speech, are essentially "substantive." In addition
to these enumerated rights, other substantive guarantees have been read into
the Bill of Rights by the courts, including the "right to privacy" enunciated
in Griswold v. Connecticut,50 and Roe v. Wade."5 All of these procedural
and substantive rights, both enumerated and implied, establish interests that
the government is constitutionally forbidden to deprive any "person" resident
in the United States of, except under narrow and well-defined circumstances.
In other words, they largely define-and clearly fall within-the sort of
"liberty" interest that the fourteenth amendment's "due process" clause
protects. As a consequence, an athlete claiming, for example, that a drug-
testing program has deprived her of "due process" by subjecting her to a
warrantless, non-consensual, and "unreasonable" search, in violation of the
express terms of the fourth amendment, need not demonstrate the existence
of any "liberty" or "property" interest independent of the one established
and protected by the fourth amendment itself.
The counselor seeking to advise a university or athletic association about
the legality of its drug-testing plans, if aware of this distinction between the
two types of "due process," will probably first want to address the legal
implications of constitutional guarantees which operate in and of themselves,
and are in no way dependent on incidental factors, such as the athlete's
scholarship status or potential to become a professional star.
a. The Fifth Amendment Protection Against Self-Incrimination
The third clause of the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." ' '5 2 The
fifth amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination has been
149. J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTnUTIONAL LAW 315 (1986).
150. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
151. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. V., cl. 3.
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incorporated into the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment,'53
and thus applies against all "state actors," including all public colleges and
universities, and the NCAA in some jurisdictions. If the NCAA and other
athletic associations are deemed to be "state actors," their fifth amendment
concerns are virtually identical to those of public educational institutions.
All must be careful not to compel student-athletes to "testify against them-
selves" in some manner which will subject them to probable "criminal"
proceedings.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the protection afforded by this
clause is available in civil proceedings if the testimony which the government
seeks to compel would incriminate a party in a later criminal proceeding.1 54
Similar considerations have led the Court to forbid compelled self-incrimi-
nation during grand jury proceedings,1 5  congressional investigatory hear-
ings, 56 and juvenile delinquency proceedings denominated "civil.' ' 57 However,
as long as the testing institution does not require a written or verbal statement
from athletes detailing their drug use, similar protection is not likely ever
to be available to an athlete whose drug use is revealed by a mandatory
testing program, even if the evidence obtained by that program later becomes
available to law-enforcement authorities.
i. The "Testimonial" Threshold
The fifth amendment affords no protection to individuals who are com-
pelled to produce non-testimonial evidence, although, as later parts of this
study will show, such compulsion may be violative of other constitutional
or statutory rights. In the landmark case of Schmerber v. California, '58 the
Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate the constitutionality of a blood
test which a driver involved in a traffic accident was forced by police to
undergo, despite his express refusal to grant consent. The Court, following
the lead of an earlier case, 59 first concluded that forcibly extracting a blood
sample did not fall within the scope of general violations of "due process"
occasioned by official behavior "that shocks the conscience" and "afford[s]
brutality the cloak of law."''6 It then examined the reach of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and asserted: "We hold that the privilege protects
153. Id.
154. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
155. See Boyd, 116 U.S. 616; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1914).
156. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
157. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
158. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
159. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
160. Rochin v. California, 432 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcible use of stomach pump to obtain
evidence violated "due process" clause of fifth and fourteenth amendments).
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an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise
provide the state with evidence of a testimonial nature .... ,,6 Interpreting
the italicized phrase, the Court added:
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's
communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of
responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with
a subpoena to produce one's papers. On the other hand, both federal
and state courts have held that it offers no protection against compulsion
to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write
or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which
has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a
bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony," but that com-
pulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of "real or physical
evidence" does not violate it.162
The holding in Schmerber has been followed consistently to permit the
use of "breathalyzers" to determine the alcohol content of drivers' blood,63
and the testing of urine to determine if military personnel have taken pro-
hibited substances.'6 Any drug-testing programs, such as the ones being
analyzed here, which rely exclusively on urinalysis, or even blood-testing
should not encounter constitutional problems with compulsory self-incrim-
ination.
ii. The "Criminal Case" Threshold
It is conceivable that a drug-testing plan could include, either as an
alternative to chemical analysis of blood or urine, or as a supplement, a
required statement by athletes that they have not used certain prohibited
substances within a specified period of time. In such a case, the plan will
cross the testimonial threshold. Nevertheless, unless the testimonial evidence
obtained is likely to be used in a future criminal proceeding, the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination will not apply. Unlike the "due process"
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and the entire fourth amend-
ment, the "self-incrimination" clause is available only to shield a current
or potential criminal defendant from undue pressures. The mere possibility
that a compelled disclosure could lead to criminal prosecution is not sufficient
to invoke the clause. Thus, a four justice plurality of the United States
Supreme Court in California v. Beyers161 stated:
161. 384 U.S. at 761 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 763-64 (the court indicated that lie detector tests, because used to "elicit responses
which are essentially testimonial," would be covered by the privilege) (citation omitted).
163. See State v. Quaid, 172 N.J. Super. 533, 412 A.2d 1087 (1980); Welch v. District Court
of Vt., 461 F. Supp. 592 (D. Vt. 1978).
164. Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
165. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
1987]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
An organized society imposes many burdens on its constituents. It
commands the filing of tax returns for income; it requires producers and
distributors of consumer goods to file informational reports on the man-
ufacturing process and the contents of products, on the wages, hours,
and working conditions of employees....
In each of these situations there is some possibility of prosecution-
often a very real one-for criminal offenses disclosed by or deriving
from the information that the law requires compels a person to sup-
ply .... But under our holdings the mere possibility of incrimination is
insufficient to defeat the strong policies in favor of a disclosure called
for by statutes like the one challenged here....
In order to invoke the privilege it is necessary to show that the com-
pelled disclosures will themselves confront the claimant with "substantial
hazards of self-incrimination. '66
It should be noted, however, that certain aspects of the Beyers case
predisposed the plurality to find no "substantial hazards of self-incrimina-
tion." First, the statute asked a driver involved in a traffic accident only
for "[d]isclosure of name and address," which the Court concluded, was
"an essentially neutral act." 16 7 Second, the focus of the inquiry-the identity
of a motorist-was distinguished from the focus of other inquiries where
unconstitutional compulsory self-incrimination had been found. Thus, the
Court distinguished the California statute at issue in the case from statutes
requiring members of Communist organizations and gamblers to register
with a governmental agency, noting that the latter statutes compelled dis-
closure only from a "highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities," and involved governmental inquiry into "area[s] permeated with
criminal statutes," and not into "essentially noncriminal and regulatory
area[s] of inquiry."168 Another possible factor in the decision was the fact
that the compelled disclosure was required by statute, and that statute ful-
filled a strong regulatory purpose.
Thus, if testimonial disclosure of drug use is required under a drug-testing
plan, it is likely that a student challenging the plan will argue:
(1) that strong public policy reasons for compelling testimony do not
exist;
(2) that the inquiry being made is squarely within an "area permeated
by criminal statutes;"
(3) that one purpose of the testing plan-particularly if it seeks to uncover
use of "street" as well as "performance enhancing" drugs-is to identify
a group of actual or potential violators of those criminal statutes; and
consequently,
166. Id. at 427-29.
167. Id. at 432.
168. Id. at 430.
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(4) that a "substantial hazard of self-incrimination" exists.
The likelihood that such an argument will succeed depends on a separate
consideration of each argument, and on judicial balancing of the "public
interest" associated with such compulsion of testimony against the likelihood
of criminal proceedings. If those eliciting the testimony are acting on behalf
of the police, or in close cooperation with them for the purpose of initiating
a criminal proceeding, a clear problem of possible compelled self-incrimi-
nation arises. Otherwise, it appears far less likely that the fifth amendment
will provide a remedy for the tested athlete. The reasons given by the NCAA
and Indiana University in testing athletes for drug use are treated elsewhere
in this Article. 69 Clearly, that interest is especially significant when drug use
poses a clear health or safety hazard, or when it appears to enhance per-
formance to such an extent that it interferes with fair competition.
Yet it is by no means certain that such an interest outweighs the genuine
possibility-which may, however, fall short of a "substantial hazard of self-
incrimination"-that test results will be released to law enforcement au-
thorities investigating violations of laws limiting the possession or use of
drugs. Given this possibility, which is analyzed below,1 70 any competent
counsel would probably advise the athletic association or college it repre-
sented not to compel any testimony, verbal or written, concerning an athlete's
drug use.
b. The Constitutional Right to "Privacy"
In addition to alleging that mandatory drug-testing violates fifth amend-
ment rights, an athlete is likely to argue that such testing violates a consti-
tutional "right of privacy." The classic formulation of this right is contained
in Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold,7' which stated:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 516-522 (dissenting opinion). The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers
"in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create
a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to
his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in
169. See infra text accompanying notes 884-86.
170. See infra text acompanying notes 282-342.
171. 381 U.S. 479.
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the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions
"of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." We recently
referred in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, to the Fourth Amendment as
creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right
carefully and particularly reserved to the people." See Beaney, The
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold, The
Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960).' 72
Despite the open-ended language employed by Justice Douglas, the Su-
preme Court has been extremely reluctant to construe the "right to be left
alone" broadly. Griswold involved a Connecticut statute which made it a
criminal offense for anyone, including married couples, to use contraceptive
devices. The majority of the Court accepted the view that the marital re-
lationship either lay "within a zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees,"'17  or involved "basic values 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty," ' 74 which would be violated by prosecutorial prying
into "marital intimacy." Other cases where a constitutional privacy right
has been found have involved unreasonable restrictions on the right to
marry; 75 on the distribution and sale of contraceptives to adults and children
under sixteen; on the right of a woman to receive an abortion during the
early months of pregnancy; 7 6 or on the right of individuals related by blood
or marriage to define their own family unit for the purpose of finding
housing. 77 In the housing case, the Supreme Court indicated that "freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by [due process]," 178 and suggested that any regulation
unduly burdening family life would require a close examination of the
governmental interests which the government claimed to be advancing through
its regulations.
To this list could perhaps be added cases involving parental choices on
the education of children. 7 9 Yet the general principle appears clear: although
the Supreme Court frequently uses the term "privacy," it only affords
individuals sweeping protection from governmental intrusion in very limited
contexts, seldom invoking privacy per se as a constitutional principle. For
172. Id. at 484-85.
173. Id. at 485.
174. Id. at 500.
175. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
176. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
177. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
178. Id. at 499.
179. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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example, while the courts will frequently speak of a "reasonable expectation
of privacy" in search and seizure cases8 0 the criminal cases employing that
term all "involve affirmative, unannounced, narrowly-focused intrusions into
individual privacy during the course of criminal investigations,"'' and all
evaluate such intrusions according to the specific language of the fourth
amendment.
As the next section of this study shows, significant problems deriving from
the text of the fourth amendment can arise from a non-consensual "search"
for drug use undertaken via mandatory drug-testing. Yet it appears highly
unlikely that such problems will arise under any analysis which seeks to
identify a general privacy right, deriving (as was the case in Griswold) from
the "penumbra" of various provisions in the Bill of Rights, and which seeks
to immunize an athlete from a drug-testing program on the basis of that
right.
This appears to be true despite the decision in Merriken v. Cressman,82
a 1973 federal district court case which invalidated a procedure employed
by a high school to generate a profile of potential drug abusers. Although
the court employed a "penumbral" analysis, its apparent reason for doing
so was the requirement of the defendant school district that its students
submit a detailed questionnaire that intruded into areas of familial life where
a special privacy interest is now recognized. Other factors which permit
distinguishing the Merriken survey from current drug-testing programs in-
clude the youth of the children questioned, the school district's failure to
elicit valid consent from the students involved in the profile program, and
its failure to demonstrate that the profiles generated were in any sense valid
indicators of drug abuse.
Yet it must be noted that the Court in Merriken was also concerned about
the "stigma" that labeling a student as a "drug abuser" might entail, and
believed that the lack of confidentiality in the program was a definite prob-
lem., 83
However, a much stronger case exists which should alleviate any lingering
concern that a mandatory drug-testing program will impinge upon a student
athlete's "penumbral" privacy rights. That case is Whalen v. Roe,'8 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1977. In Whalen, physicians and patients affected
by provisions of the New York Controlled Substances Act of 1972 challenged
its constitutionality. The Act set forth a schedule of dangerous prescription
drugs, required copies of such prescriptions to be put on computer file and
180. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976).
181. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977).
182. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
183. Id. at 920-21.
184. 429 U.S. 589.
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saved for five years, and put stringent limits-backed by criminal penalties-
on the disclosure of file contents. Under the Act:
Public disclosure of patient information can come about in three ways.
Health Department employees may violate the statute by failing, either
deliberately or negligently, to maintain proper security. A patient or a
doctor may be accused of a violation and the stored data may be offered
in evidence in a judicial proceeding. Or, thirdly, a doctor, a pharmacist,
or the patient may voluntarily reveal information on a prescription form.,,
According to the Whalen Court:
There is no support in the record, or in the experience of the two
States that New York has emulated, for an assumption that the security
provisions of the statute will be administered improperly. And the remote
possibility that judicial supervision of the evidentiary use of particular
items of stored information will provide inadequate protection against
unwarranted disclosures is surely not a sufficient reason for invalidating
the entire patient-identification program.1 86
Thus, the Whalen Court assumed that the New York law adequately
protected confidentiality, although it acknowledged the remote possibility
that such confidentiality could be breached, and it recognized that a specific
statutory provision excepted judicial proceedings for alleged violations from
the confidentiality provisions. Premising its decision at least in part on these
assumptions, it concluded:
Even without public disclosure, it is, of course, true that private
information must be disclosed to the authorized employees of the New
York Department of Health. Such disclosures, however, are not...
meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions
of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care. Unques-
tionably, some individuals' concern for their own privacy may lead them
to avoid or to postpone needed medical attention. Nevertheless, disclo-
sures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel,
to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an
essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such dis-
closures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health
of the community does not automatically amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy.187
It must be emphasized that Whalen dealt with the storage and possible
distribution of drug possession information, rather than with a procedure
designed to determine if particular individuals had in fact used those drugs.
Clearly, additional issues, such as valid consent under the fourth amendment,
are raised at the point where an institution attempts to elicit a blood or
urine sample from an athlete.
185. Id. at 608.
186. Id. at 601-02.
187. Id. at 602.
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c. The "Right to Privacy" Under State Constitutional Law
A university or athletic association attorney needs to concern himself not
only with "privacy" claims arising under the U.S. Constitution, but also
with those claims that might arise under the explicit or implicit terms of the
several state constitutions.'88 California law is likely to prove particularly
troublesome to counsel for three reasons: a large number of colleges and
universities are located in California; the state is the site of many athletic
competitions, including the Rose Bowl game, which pits champion football
squads from the Big Ten and Pac Ten football conferences against each
other every January 1; and the state also has a specific constitutional pro-
vision guaranteeing "privacy" which probably is the most liberal in the
country. For these reasons, this brief discussion of constitutional privacy
under state law is confined to California law.
"Privacy" was made an explicit constitutional right in California in 1972.
The state Constitution now provides: "All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.'89 A detailed
exegesis of the right that has been recognized by the California provision,
which "reaches" beyond the interests protected by the common law right of
privacy, and may be protected from infringement by either the state or by
any individual,"' 90 is beyond the scope of this Article.' 9' However, the aware-
188. At least eleven states, including Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington "have explicit privacy guar-
antees in their state constitutions." M. Crosby, Rights of Privacy, P. BAMBERGER, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONsTITUTIoNAL LAW 234, 331 (1985).
Capsule descriptions of representative privacy case law are contained in the Crosby article.
For a more general account of state constitutional law, see B. McGRAw, DEVELOPMENTS IN
STATE CONsTrrToNAL LAW (1985).
189. CAL. CONsT. art. I (1974) (emphasis added).
190. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 842, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (1986).
191. Among the important issues that an attorney contemplating defending a drug-testing
program in California would have to examine, two stand out:
1.) the sorts of privacy claims that the state will in fact recognize. The California consti-
tutional provision was adopted principally to avoid four "mischiefs":
(1) "government snooping" and the secret gathering of personal information; (2)
the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by
government and business interests; (3) the improper use of information properly
obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose
or the disclosure of it to some third party; and (4) the lack of a reasonable check
on the accuracy of existing record.
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975).
None of these categories are self-defining; but the first (which probably provides the strongest
basis for attacking most drug-testing programs) is particularly vague. Clearly, not all govern-
mental or private intrusions are a violation of the California Constitution. Two recent cases
illustrate this fact. In one, a Californian challenged the requirement of the public school system
19871
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
ness that Simone Levant, a college athlete attending Stanford University,
successfully used the privacy clause of the California Constitution in a suit
against the NCAA challenging its mandatory drug-testing program will inev-
itably be of concern to the testing institution. 192 In the Levant case, the trial
court judge, while acknowledging that the use of drugs did create under-
standable concerns for the NCAA, laid heavy emphasis on the indiscriminate
nature of the testing and on the ability of the institution conducting it to
learn an almost unlimited amount about the subject's lifestyle, "including
deeply personal matters such as the use of birth control medication."' 193
At a minimum, similar results in other jurisdictions could prevent athletic
associations and colleges from continuing to test for a wide variety of
she worked for that she provide an annual chest x-ray. The court rejected her contention that
she had a protectable privacy claim. Garrett v. Los Angeles City Unified School Dist., 116
Cal. App. 3d 472, 172 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1981). In the other, the court rejected a claim by a
petitioner who sought to avoid submitting a photograph with his driver's license application.
The court found "no reasonable expectation of privacy in that which is already public."
Robinson v. Superior Ct. of Sacremento County, 105 Cal. App. 3d 249, 164 Cal. Rptr. 389
(1980).
On the other hand, a successful suit has been brought against an employer by employees
resisting the requirement that they submit to polygraph tests as a condition of continuing
employment. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937, 719
P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986). And a number of lawsuits brought under the California
Constitution by employees challenging mandatory urinalysis are apparently still wending their
way through the California courts. See K. Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work: Employees'
Assertion of Privacy Rights is Giving Employers Legal Hangovers, 6 CAL. LAW, Apr. 1986,
at 29-32.
2) The appropriate standard of review is problematical. When a protectable privacy interest
is found, it is not clear whether the California courts will subject the intrusion to "strict
scrutiny," or will merely "balance" the interests of the intruder-regulator against the interests
of the individual asserting the claim. Recent case law suggests that there is growing support
for "balancing," particularly when "privacy" is divorced from other assertions of right. See
Cutter, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 550 n.7. Nevertheless, because the courts
in California have emphasized the "fundamental" and "inalienable" nature of the privacy
right, they have generally taken a strong position. Indicative is the following statement of
California law:
The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and, Ninth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This right should be abridged only when
there is a compelling public need ...
City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130, 610 P.2d 436, 439, 164 Cal. Rptr.
539, 542 (1980). See also White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774-75, 533 P.2d at 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
105-06.
As is argued elsewhere in this Article with reference to federal constitutional law, the standard
of review employed can be decisive in determining whether the testing agency has an interest
sufficient to justify its testing program.
192. Levant, No. 619209 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara Cty., Cal., Mar. 10, 1987).
Levant did not sue Stanford University, which has not instituted its own drug-testing program.
However, the California privacy clause has been interpreted to reach the conduct of private
universities. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 842 (1976).
193. Trial transcript at 3-4, Levant, No. 619209 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cty., Cal., Mar.
10, 1987).
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substances without "individualized suspicion" that those substances had been
used by the particular athlete, and without a showing of more significant
institutional need to conduct testing than has generally been shown thus far.
d. Protection Against "Unreasonable Searches and Seizures" Under the
Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment's general requirements that governmental searches
be "reasonable," and be undertaken only after a valid warrant has been
obtained, presents the counselor for an institution seeking to test athletes
with significant legal difficulties.
First, it is cleat that testing the athlete's urine (or blood) for the presence
of proscribed substances can "constitute" a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. Searches can occur even when the use to which the
evidence found will be put is "administrative" or "regulatory," rather than
for the purpose of proving criminal conduct.
Second, the literal requirement of the fourth amendment that individuals
be required to submit to searches only if a warrant has issued upon a showing
of probable cause has clearly not been met in either of the testing programs
being considered.
Third, the right of the athlete to be "secure in his person ... and effects"
is not dependent upon any claimed right to athletic participation.
Fourth and finally, although the law recognizes that the athlete may waive
fourth amendment rights by freely consenting to a search, there are consti-
tutional limits on what a governmental institution can do to "compel"
consent.
Plunging into the legal maze, the counselor will therefore look for judicial
doctrines that alleviate the apparent stringency of the amendment itself,
permitting the sort of general, warrantless, and mandatory testing program
that colleges and athletic associations have begun to adopt.
i. The Scope of the Amendment
The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures," and provides further that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause ... particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."' 94
Nothing in the language of the amendment ties its protection explicitly to
criminal proceedings. Instead, as the Supreme Court noted more than 70
years ago, the amendment's protection "reaches all alike, whether accused
194. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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of crime or not."1 95 Specifically, it protects private property, business prop-
erty, and natural persons from "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Thus,
the Court stated in Camara v. Municipal Court'96 that "except in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper
consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant. '1 97 In See v. City of Seattle, the Court extended this holding to
include "private commercial property."1 98 Various examinations of individ-
uals conducted by law enforcement personnel, including "stop-and-frisk"
pat-downs, 99 forcible detention for the purpose of undergoing fingerprint-
ing, 200 and magnetometer tests at courthouses and airports for the purpose
of detecting concealed weapons have all been characterized as searches.23 '
Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Cour has recognized that the
protection of the fourth amendment extends to searches conducted for dis-
ciplinary purposes by school officials in the nation's high schools 2°2 and
colleges. 203
Speaking generally, wherever and whenever the government, without con-
sent, enters a zone where an individual has "justifiable expectations of
privacy" 204 for the purpose of finding evidence to be used in criminal or
administrative proceedings, 20 5 including "administrative inspection pro-
grams, ' '206 the fourth amendment applies. Because the interest the amendment
protects is "privacy," its applicability is not limited to searches or seizures
directed at specific substances. Instead, as the words "persons" and "ef-
fects" indicate, the amendment's protection is broad. Considerable debate
has been occasioned by Supreme Court cases that have narrowly defined the
circumstances under which an expectation of privacy will be regarded as
"justifiable. '20 7 Yet the great majority of the courts that have recently
considered the question have held that persons subject to mandatory uri-
nalysis fall within the scope of the amendment's protection, given the per-
sonal nature of urination and the intrusiveness of testing procedures, which
often require observation to insure that the sample given is actually that of
195. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
196. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
197. Id. at 526-27.
198. 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
199. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
200. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
201. See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
202. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
203. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
204. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
205. See Camara, 387 U.S. 523.
206. Id. at 525.
207. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily News, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (how broad should the
right be to subject third parties to searches and seizures?); see also the long line of automobile
search cases, including South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), and United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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the person being tested. 203 (Similar logic has been employed to hold that the
compelled testing of blood will invoke the protection of the fourth amend-
ment.)2 Therefore in most jurisdictions, at least, if testing takes place, in
order for it to pass constitutional muster, it must be conducted pursuant to
a valid warrant (and thus have been found "reasonable" by the magistrate
issuing the warrant); or, if no warrant has been issued, it must not be
"unreasonable" and fit within a recognized exception to the warrant rule,
or must be consented to "voluntarily" by the target.
ii. The Wyman v. James Exception: "No Search"
Despite the broad scope of the fourth amendment, there is some possibility
that the drug-testing procedures at issue here will not be considered "searches"
by the courts. If so, the fourth amendment ceases to be a problem for the
institutions involved, since the existence of a "search" is a necessary predicate
to the protections the amendment affords.
The "no search" argument can be made most strongly-although not, I
believe, convincingly-if an athlete is disciplined after refusing to be tested.
Its principal underpinning is found in the Supreme Court's 1971 decision,
Wyman v. James,210 which involved a refusal by Mrs. Wyman, an AFDC
recipient, to submit to the compulsory "home visit" required by welfare
law. Loss of AFDC benefits immediately ensued, and Mrs. Wyman brought
suit challenging the constitutionality of the law on fourth amendment grounds.
The Wyman Court distinguished Camara and See, which involved suc-
cessful appeals of fines levied against individuals who had refused, respec-
tively, to permit warrantless searches of a dwelling and a place of business
by a housing code and a fire code inspector. In neither instance had the
inspecting official actually entered the premises; yet in both cases, the Su-
preme Court held that the fourth amendment imposed limitations on the
government's right to inspect without a warrant or prior consent. The Court
208. Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("In a way in which
having blood extracted could never be, being forced under threat of punishment to urinate
into a bottle held by another is purely and simply degrading. Thus, this type of search is
entitled to at least the level of scrutiny given blood tests .... ) But see Turner v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009 (D.C. 1985) ("The intrusion of a urinalysis test requires
a normal bodily function for this purpose. This is not an extreme body invasion."); McDonnell
v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Urinalysis is a search and seizure, [but] properly
administered is not as intrusive as a strip search or a blood test.").
Other cases holding that urinalysis constitutes a search include Allen v. City of Marietta,
601 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of
Educ. 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.
Supp. 1500, 1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986). For one of the few contrary results, see Everrett v. Napper,
32 F. Supp. 1481, 1484 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
209. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68.
210. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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in Wyman characterized these cases in the following manner: "Each con-
cerned a true search for violations .... The community welfare aspects, of
course, were highly important, but each case arose in a criminal context
where a genuine search was denied and prosecution followed. ' 21 The Court
distinguished the situation of Mrs. James by noting:
Mrs. James is not being prosecuted for her refusal to permit the home
visit and is not about to be so prosecuted.... The only consequence
of her refusal is that the payment of benefits ceases. Important and
serious as this is, the situation is no different than if she had exercised
a similar negative choice initially and refrained from applying for AFDC
benefits. 2 2
Under the Court's rationale, the fourth amendment never became appli-
cable because Mrs. James managed to keep the inspectors out of her home.
Thus, despite the loss of AFDC benefits, no search had been compelled by
the government: "the visitation in itself [was] not forced or compelled, and
the beneficiary's denial of permission [was] not a criminal act. ' 21 3 Absent
physical or criminal compulsion, the Court implicitly suggested, that the
fourth amendment will apply only if the investigation itself takes place. But
in Wyman, "[tihere [was] no entry of the home and there [was] no search." 214
The Court in Wyman was unequivocal in holding that there was "no search,"
although it suggested that had the "home visit" in fact occurred, a search
would have occurred. 21 5
If Wyman is good law, we can conclude that the fourth amendment will
not apply when drug-testing programs are challenged by athletes who refuse
to be tested. For even if the programs condition continuing athletic eligibility
or scholarship renewal on submission to testing, it is clear that such measures
fall far short of cutting a welfare mother and her children off from their
principal source of income.
However, the counselor evaluating the precedential effect of Wyman will
have to take seriously the forceful dissent in the case, which exposes what
appear to be genuine inconsistencies between its holding and the more gen-
erally expansive holdings of cases like Camara and See. Although Wyman
is occasionally cited (particularly in the lower federal courts), it appears to
be a case without significant progeny. The general tendency to expand the
concept of "administrative search" has continued since 1971, and has clearly
and unequivocally reached the nation's schools. In 1985, in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 216 a case involving the non-consensual search of a high school stu-
211. Id. at 325.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 317.
214. Id. at 318.
215. The existence of a search does not mean that a court will necessarily deem it unrea-
sonable. The Wyman court indicated that had a search occurred, it would have been regarded
as "reasonable." See infra notes 220-81 and accompanying text.
216. 469 U.S. 325.
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dent's purse by the school's principal, the Supreme Court held unequivocally
that the "[Fourth] Amendment's prohibitions on unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials.1 21 7 Quoting
Camara and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.,2 8 it implicitly rejected the distinction
between criminally-related and other searches that appears to lie at the heart
of Wyman's "no search" holding:
The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials....
Because the individual's interest in privacy and personal security 'suffers
whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of crim-
inal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,' it would
be 'anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior.219
Thus, it would not be safe to assume that because an athlete had refused
to be tested, no "search" (in the constitutional sense) had occurred.
It would be even less safe, given the broad scope of the protection afforded
by the amendment already noted, to assume that an athlete who has sub-
mitted to testing has not in fact been "searched." Yet despite the common
characterization of urinalysis as the sort of intrusion that brings the amend-
ment into play, it is at least possible to imagine circumstances under which
drug-testing could be conducted that support that argument. For instance,
most college athletes currently are required to submit to routine physical
exams for reasons unrelated to drug use, and are sometimes required to
submit urine samples obtained in the privacy of a doctor's office. Under
such circumstances, the process itself is not particularly intrusive, and the
requirement that the athlete cooperate (assuming that the results of the
physical are kept confidential) arguably does not infringe on any "justifiable
expectation of privacy." It is conceivable that a drug-testing program con-
ducted in this manner would raise no substantial fourth amendment ques-
tions-although it is clear, as is indicated below, that such a program would
still be required to survive direct "due process" and "equal protection"
scrutiny.
iii. The "Reasonableness" Exception
In certain situations which clearly involve a search, the courts will never-
theless find that the fourth amendment has not been violated because it
protects individuals only from "unreasonable searches and seizures." "Rea-
217. Id.
218. 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978).
219. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332.
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sonableness," as it has been analyzed by the Supreme Court, involves two
related issues, which are frequently conjoined in a single case. The first issue
goes to the justification that the institution may have for conducting the
search at all; the second, which implicates the "warrant" language of the
amendment itself, goes to determining whether such justifications (assuming
they are present in a particular case) permit waiving the general warrant
requirement.
An extensive jurisprudence has evolved establishing the parameters of
"reasonable" searches. It is always possible that new doctrines will evolve
to bring mandatory drug-testing of the sort at issue here within the range
of that jurisprudence. However, it is impossible to predict with any certainty
whether courts called upon today to evaluate the warrantless, non-consensual
urinalysis (or blood testing) of college athletes in the manner established by
the NCAA and Indiana University programs would, if they regarded the
urinalysis as a "search," find such a search either "reasonable," or immune
from the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
Analytically, the starting point for a counselor's inquiry is the conclusion
reached by the Supreme Court in Camara220 and SeeY 1 that "administrative
searches" are, in fact, subject to the warrant requirements of the fourth
amendment.m22 In characterizing these searches as "administrative," the Court
noted that the degree of "probable cause" required by the fourth amendment
to obtain a warrant need not be as extensive as those obtained in, for
example, police searches undertaken in the course of a criminal investiga-
tion.223 The decisions in Camara and See suggest that what is "reasonable"
depends heavily on a context that includes the purpose of the search, the
circumstances under which it will be conducted, and the use to which the
search results will be put. Wyman v. James224 is again favorable to institutions
that choose to test. In that case, the Supreme Court held that even had the
requirement that a welfare recipient submit to "home visits" or lose her
benefits been construed as a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, such a search, within the "specific context" of that case, would
still have been deemed reasonable. 225 Its implicit conclusion was that in the
context of the administration of a welfare program, there was no need for
the state or city to have any particularized reason to initiate the limited
search of any residence required by the mandatory "home visits." It reached
that conclusion by noting eleven factors which persuaded it generally that
the intrusion into Mrs. James's personal security was minimal, and thus not
220. 387 U.S. 523.
221. 87 U.S. 541.
222. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534; See, 387 U.S. at 545-46.
223. See, 387 U.S. at 545.
224. 400 U.S. 309.
225. Id. at 319.
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"unreasonable." Included in the list were several considerations that could
be urged on behalf of some, but not all, drug-testing plans. Thus, the fact
that the search was not to be undertaken by "police or uniformed au-
thorit[ies], ' 22 6 was not made pursuant to "a criminal investigation [and]
does not equate with a criminal investigation, ' 227 was undertaken pursuant
to a program that "affords 'a personal, rehabilitative orientation,' "228 the
fact that the Wyman program emphasized privacy,229 and that the infor-
mation it sought could not readily be obtained except through the search,230
were all cited by the Supreme Court as important indicators that a com-
pulsory home visit was not "unreasonable."
On the other hand, several factors considered important by the Wyman
Court are not likely to be accorded much weight in the collegiate drug-
testing context. First, in Wyman, "[tlhe focus is on the child and further,
it is on the child who is dependent."2' Second, there is no evidence that
educational institutions policing the drug use of college age athletes are
fulfilling the same sort of "public trust" the Court deemed welfare agencies
to be fulfilling when they sought information as to unauthorized receipt of
funds.212 (However, those administering drug tests could assert another sort
of "public trust," though, perhaps involving the broad responsibilities of
colleges to society, or the more particular responsibilities of athletic admin-
istrators to athletes and fans, which some courts might find convincing.)
Third, the inferences from statutes and state regulations drawn by the court
in Wyman in support of its argument that the search had a "rehabilitative"
purpose,23 and its emphasis on the differences between "home visits" and
criminal investigations, are not clearly supported when drug-testing pro-
grams, like those at issue here, seek information about "street drugs." Of
course, the argument can be made that upon discovery of their use, the
"educational" or "rehabilitative" components of such programs will kick
in. Yet it seems clear that inquiry into such use is linked to strong social
disapprobation and a desire to "punish" those who use "illegal" drugs, and
that testing will make that punishment much more likely. Thus, the evidence
that testing produces often will establish the necessary factual predicate for
criminal prosecution. Finally, according to the Wyman court, "[tihe means
employed by the New York [welfare] agency are important. Mrs. James
received written notice several days in advance of the intended home visit.
226. Id. at 322.
227. Id. at 323.
228. Id. at 319-20.
229. Id. at 321.
230. Id. at 322.
231. Id. at 318.
232. Id. at 318-19.
233. Id. 319-20.
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The date was specified. ' 234 While similar notice is at least generally given
by the NCAA for its pre-Bowl and pre-championship testing, randomness
and unannounced testing are clearly contemplated by many collegiate drug-
testing plans, including the one adopted by Indiana University.
Thus, despite the fact that Wyman posited the reasonableness of some
general, non-consensual, warrantless searches, its findings do not control in
the collegiate drug-testing context, although the case is clearly an important
one from the perspective of the proponents of testing.
Like Wyman, Camara and See permitted general (or "area") searches,
since the purpose of the inspection programs being challenged could not be
served by requiring that inspectors show in advance that code violations had
probably occurred, and since "the inspections are neither personal in nature
nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime.''235 Generally, though,
when a search is "personal in nature" (as urinalysis for the determination
of drug use clearly is), courts will demand a showing of some "individualized
suspicion" of misconduct before determinining that it is "reasonable" to
initiate a search in an administrative or regulatory context. 23 6 Thus, the
Wyman exception to this requirement is unusually favorable to the govern-
ment. Although other exceptions exist, they ordinarily involve institutions
with special "security" needs (such as prisons237 and the U.S. military forces238),
and situations which seem to demand general searches because of justifiable
concerns about possible actions which could endanger lives (such as the
situations that obtain when air passengers239 and visitors to "sensitive"
government facilities240 are subjected to compulsory magnetometer or "pro-
file" screening, or power plant employees are tested for recent drug use). 241
"Individualized suspicion," which is less demanding than "probable cause,"
has been part of search-and-seizure law since 1968, when the Supreme Court
decided in Terry v. Ohio242 that police officers have the authority to stop
and frisk those they "[have] reason to believe ... [are] armed and dan-
gerous ... regardless of whether ... [they have] probable cause to arrest
234. Id. at 320-21.
235. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530-31.
236. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560-61 ("[S]ome quantum of individualized suspicion
is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure [although] the fourth amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.").
237. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979) (prisons are dangerous places where
heightened security concerns prevail). McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987)
("[We] hold that urinalysis may be performed uniformly or by systematic random selection of
those employees who have regular contact on a day-by-day basis in medium or maximum
security prisons.").
238. Williams v. Secretary of Navy, 787 F.2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
239. United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d. 899 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d. 776 (11th Cir. 1985).
240. McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978).
241. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
242. 392 U.S. 1.
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the individual for a crime.' ' 243 Recently, the Supreme Court, in determining
that the fourth amendment did not bar high school officials from conducting
certain searches for drugs carried on the person, stated, "Under ordinary
circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official
will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting ... that the student has violated or is violating ... the law or
the rules of the school." 244 Explaining this holding, the Court, in a gnomic
footnote, stated:
Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally
appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal and where 'other safeguards' are available "to assure that the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the dis-
cretion of the official in the field .... ' '. Because the search of T.L.O.'s
purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had violated
school rules, we need not consider the circumstances that might justify
school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized
suspicion.'2
The possibility thus exists that a court, looking at the NCAA and I.U.
programs and laying particular emphasis on their randomness and the "con-
fidentiality" of the test results they generate, would conclude that they
impinge only on "minimal" privacy interests and invite no undue exercise
of administrative discretion. Thus, if it also concluded that the purpose of
such testing fulfilled an important governmental objective (such as the dis-
couragement of the use of dangerous drugs by athletes) and concluded that
that objective could not be met except by mandatory testing, it might then
conclude that such testing was "reasonable."
Conclusions similar to these were apparently reached by the Third Circuit,
which recently affirmed a district court decision upholding the legality of
regulations promulgated by the New Jersey Racing Commission requiring
jockeys and other race track personnel to undergo periodic, mandatory
urinalysis and breathalyzer tests to determine if they were using alcohol or
other prohibited substances. 246 In that case, the court explicitly rejected the
petitioners' contention that "individualized suspicion" was required before
testing could be mandated. 247 Focusing on the "intensely regulated" industry
of horse racing in New Jersey, the court identified a strong public interest
in "the protection of the wagering public, and the protection of the state's
fisc by virtue of the wagering public's confidence in the integrity of the
industry.'" 24 The court apparently assumed (but never explicitly stated) that
243. Id. at 20-27 (emphasis added).
244. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
245. 469 U.S. at 336 n.8 (citations omitted).
246. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
247. Id. at 1143.
248. Id. at 1142.
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these protective goals could only be achieved by a general, mandatory testing
program.
Although a number of other cases have permitted mandatory urinalysis,
the requisite "individualized suspicion" has generally been present. (Thus,
for example, the testing of bus drivers involved in accidents has been held
to be constitutional.)2 9 Absent some factor giving rise to that suspicion,
however, the recent cases-which have generally arisen in an employment
context-have almost all prohibited-or implied that they would have pro-
hibited-mandatory testing. Representative of this tendency have been cases
involving policemen and firemen,210 special security personnel,2' civilian em-
ployees of the federal government holding "critical" positions in the De-
partment of Defense and the U.S. Customs Service, 252 teachers,23 and school
bus attendants. 254 Thus, it is probably only a slight overstatement of the law
to conclude, as one district court did recently, that:
a judicial trend is finally beginning to emerge, and with each new
decision on the subject of periodic drug testing it becomes more apparent
that the testing of civilians by urinalysis, absent some form of indivi-
dualized suspicion, is in almost all cases offensive to the mandates of
the fourth amendment.25
The counselor attempting to digest the law on "reasonable" searches would
thus confront the difficulty that while there are cases at least inferentially
supporting the mandatory general testing of athletes, "individualized sus-
picion" of drug use might well be necessary before such a program could
be initiated. Under the NCAA and I.U. plans, such suspicion may well be
reasonable for those who have admitted to prior drug use, or have tested
"positive" on an earlier valid test. But no such suspicion reasonably can be
said to attach to whole athletic teams, or to everyone associated with the
athletic department or program of a college or university.
249. Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 405 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. I11. 1975),
aff'd, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Sanders v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., No. 84-3072, slip op. (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 1985).
250. See e.g., Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (both cases prohibit
testing); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also
Turner, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985) (finding requisite suspicion and permitting testing).
251. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (testing prohibited).
252. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986)
(testing was prohibited in both cases); National Treasury Employees Union v. Raab, 649 F.
Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986).
253. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888.
254. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1508-09 ("reasonable suspicion" required before bus attendants
can be tested; may not be required for drivers).
255. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (court discounted
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, characterizing it-incorrectly-as the only decision not
requiring individualized suspicion of civilians subjected to testing).
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However, even if general testing were to be regarded as "reasonable,"
the warrant problem would still demand resolution. For even in cases such
as Camara and See, which permitted "area searches" without "probable
cause" (and indeed, without "individualized suspicion"), warrants were still
required before those searches could be conducted. The range of exceptions
to the general warrant requirement of the fourth amendment remains un-
certain. Clearly, an exception will be found if the governmental intrusion is
part of the ordinary oversight of a "pervasively regulated industry." 25 6 In-
tercollegiate athletics, which traditionally have been subject to few govern-
mental controls, do not clearly fit within the definition of such an "industry,"
although a case perhaps could be made that they should.2Y7 Nor do two
other common exceptions to the warrant rule appear to be applicable to
college athletes, namely, one which permits warrantless searches because
certain individuals have very limited "reasonable expectations of privacy,"
and another, which permits warrrantless searches because of a special risk
that the public faces.
In the "special risk" situation, "exigent circumstances" must be dem-
onstrated. Thus, case law supports the proposition that searches may be
conducted without a warrant in cases of "hot pursuit" of known or suspected
criminals, 258 or when severe danger to the public may ensue because the
person to be searched may be carrying explosives or weapons. 2 9 However,
not every activity, that may pose significant threats to the public-at-large if
discovered will permit warrantless searches. Thus, in a 1979 case involving
"traffic and vehicle regulations" that would have permitted a state to ran-
domly stop traffic to check for drivers' licenses and registration, the Supreme
Court stated, "we are aware of the danger to life and property posed by
vehicular traffic," and acknowledged that, "the States have a vital interest
in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor
256. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05 (1981) (coal mines); Biswell, 406
U.S. at 316-17 (gun selling); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77
(1970) (liquor industry); Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142-43 (horse racing industry).
257. Most of the "regulation" of intercollegiate athletics is carried out by the NCAA, which,
as the analysis above shows, will probably not be regarded as a "state actor." "Private
regulation," however "pervasive"-and NCAA rules do govern much of a student athlete's
life-probably cannot assume constitutional significance in interpreting the reach of the fourth
amendment's requirements. Yet the significance of state adoption of private rules may well be
to make those rules indistinguishable from those promulgated by the state itself.
For the view that intercollegiate athletics, as presently conducted by NCAA member schools,
are at least a "business," see NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85
(1984).
258. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64-66 (1950).
259. Thus, the following cases permit warrantless searches when there is "reasonable sus-
picion" that an individual possesses dangerous weapons: U.S. v. Hairston, 439 F. Supp. 515
(N.D. Il. 1977); Stewart v. State, 681 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Rogers,
585 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App. 1979).
260. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979).
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vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licens-
ing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed." 26'
Nevertheless, the Court refused to permit the random stops, stating:
The question remains, however, whether in the service of these important
ends the discretionary spot check is a sufficiently productive mechanism
to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests which such
stops entail. On the record before us, that answer must be answered in
the negative. Given the alternative mechanisms available, both in use
and those that might be adopted, we are unconvinced that the incremental
contribution to highway safety of the random spot check justifies the
practice under the Fourth Amendment. 262
In other words, even safety concerns-which are perhaps the primary
stated justification for mandatory drug-testing-must be measured against
the "intrusiveness" of the device used to satisfy them, and must be promoted
by methods that minimize intrusion while maximizing the desired effect.
However, in the absence of significant danger, there appears to be no basis
for the warrantless intrusion at all. Thus, the testing institution, to take
advantage of the "special risk" exception, must first be able to demonstrate
that the drugs for which it is testing do in fact pose real risks to the athletes
that use them (or to other athletes coming in contact with those athletes),
and then must be able to show that such testing is exceptionally non-intrusive
and productive. Substantial risks may in fact be provable for some substances
commonly used, such as anabolic steroids. 263 However, for other substances
on the prohibited lists, such as marijuana, there appears to be no firm
medical evidence that the risks are substantial. 264 There can be no genuine
question that the testing protocol, with its initial use of an EMIT test, and
its gas chromotagography follow-up, is likely to be quite "productive" in
identifying drug users. That productivity, however, is likely to identify some
who have not used drugs recently, have not used them during practice,
261. Id.
262. Id. at 659.
263. Strong evidence exists that their use contributes to heart disease and liver cancer. See
M.D. 's Warned of Steroids, Liver Cancer Link, Amer. Med. News, Mar. 15, 1985, at 17, col.
1; Hecht, Anabolic Steroids: Pumping Trouble, 18 FDA Consumer, Sept., 1984, at 12, col. 4;
Franklin, Steroids Heft Heart Risks in Iron Pumpers, Science News, Jul. 21, 1984, at 38, col.
1.
264. As Dusek and Girdano note, "[lr]esearch concerning the effects of marijuana has been
controversial since the early 1960's." D. DUSEK & D. GMDANo, DRUoS: A FACTUAL AcCOUNT
90 (4th ed. 1987). Their chapter on the subject suggests that the "possible effect" of significant
use on the psychological development of "child and adolescent users" is a matter of "grave
concern," but in listing various physiological effects associated with use, identifies all as
transient, relatively mild, or inconclusively proved. Id. at 93-94. A much harder line is taken
by H. JONES & P. LOVINGER, supra note 8, who devotes whole chapters to marijuana's alleged
effects on "The Lungs and the Respiratory System," "Sex, Reproduction, and Offspring,"
"The Heart and the Circulatory System," "Immunity and Resistance," and "Cells and Chro-
mosomes."
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competition, the academic year, or the athletic season, and pose no present
danger to themselves or others. 265 And, as has already been noted, some,
but by no means all, courts consider urinalysis exceptionally intrusive.266
In the absence of risk or other exigent circumstances, the Court has
sometimes found that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is
so low in particular situations that official intrusion into the "zone of
privacy" raises only limited constitutional questions. Prisoners267 and indi-
viduals riding in cars stopped by the police because of patent traffic violations 268
have thus been found to have very limited privacy rights. Under a similar
theory, some courts have held that children in elementary schools and high
schools have a limited expectation of privacy in a school setting.269
Relying in part on early high school cases, a district court in Alabama in
1968, asked to rule on a non-consensual search for marijuana in a college
student's, dormitory room, asserted:
The college does not stand, strictly speaking, in loco parentis to its
students, nor is their relationship purely contractual in the traditional
sense. The relationship grows out of the peculiar and sometimes the
seemingly competing interests of college and student. A student naturally
has the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizures, and a tax-
supported public college may not compel a "waiver" of that right as a
condition precedent to admission. The college, on the other hand, has
an "affirmative obligation" to promulgate and to enforce reasonable
regulations designed to protect campus order and discipline and to pro-
mote an environment consistent with the educational process. The validity
of the regulation authorizing search of dormitories thus does not depend
on whether a student "waives" his right to Fourth Amendment protection
or on whether he has "contracted" it away; rather, its validity is deter-
mined by whether the regulation is a reasonable exercise of the college's
supervisory duty. In other words, if the regulation-or, in the absence
of a regulation, the action of the college authorities-is necessary in aid
of the basic responsibility of the institution regarding discipline and the
maintenance of an "educational atmosphere," then it will be presumed
facially reasonable despite the fact that it may infringe to some extent
on the outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights of student.20
That conclusion is not supported generally in more recent cases. In another
dormitory-search-for-drugs case, decided in 1975, another federal district
265. This conclusion follows from the scientific evidence that marijuana by-products may
remain in the body for weeks or months after use. See supra note 8.
266. See supra note 208.
267. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
268. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974); United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
269. On the privacy right of elementary school students, see, e.g. Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F.
Supp. 26 (D.C. Or. 1979). But see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 331 (fourth amendment protects school
children against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "public school officials").
270. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D.
Ala. 1968).
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court confronted a situation in which a college, in its housing contract and
its student handbook, announced a broad policy permitting the search of
student rooms whenever, "[c]ollege officials have reasonable cause to believe
that students are continuing to violate federal, state or local laws or college
regulations.' '271 After pursuing a search without consent, the college found
marijuana, and two roommates Smith and Smyth, the petitioners, were
suspended from college for one term. The Court, in granting injunctive
relief, reached the following conclusions, all of which are relevant to the
situation at issue here. First, citing Tinker v. Des Moines School District272
and Goss v. Lopez, 273 it noted that "[s]tudents have constitutional rights." 274
Second, it noted that such rights include those guaranteed by the fourth
amendment, and indicated that in determining what constitutes "a reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion, '275 the maturity of
college students is an issue:
Smith was an adult at the time of the search in question, and thus
was in general entitled to the same rights of privacy as any other adult
in our society. [College] students are in a different position from most
elementary and secondary school students who are minor and are pre-
sumptively subject to a greater degree of supervision.Y'6
Third, when searches are followed by harsh disciplinary measures directed
at those incriminated by the search, then the fact that it is a college which
imposes the discipline, rather than a law enforcement agency, will not nec-
essarily immunize the search:
While the court will not characterize the charge, conviction, and one-
term suspension of Smith as a formal "criminal proceeding," the College
proceedings certainly performed all the functions of a criminal action.
The object of a college disciplinary proceding relating to the possession
of marijuana, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission
of an offense against the law. To the extent suspension can be said to
teach the student that he should not violate the rules, any criminal
sanction accomplishes the same educational objective. 2"7
Finally, the special nature of any investigation into the possession of illegal
drugs or the use of such drugs, in the case of many of the testing programs
currently being promulgated or considered, raises special fourth amendment
concerns. As the Smyth court meticulously illustrated with specific references
271. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 782 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
272. 398 U.S. 503 (1969).
273. 419 U.S. 565.
274. Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 785.
275. Id. (quoting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968)).
276. Id. at 787.
277. Id. (citation omitted).
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to Michigan law and Supreme Court cases involving the scope of grand jury
investigations278 and the admissibility of evidence, 79
the College's resort to its own internal proceedings will not insulate either
the College from the intrusion of civil authorities into its affairs or Smith
from the formal institution of criminal proceedings against him. The
matter is entirely outside the control of the College, and the search and
seizure in question puts Smith in severe jeopardy.-
All of these factors undercut the notion that college students, as a class-
or college athletes-have limited expectations of privacy or are unprotected
by the Constitution. College athletes are generally of draft and voting age.
Their ordinary behavior does not raise the same necessity for constant
supervision cited by the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., which
based its approval of warrantless searches on the special problems of those
supervising adolescent and pre-adolescent children:
Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest
of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom
and on school grounds .... Even in schools that have been spared the
most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper
educational environment requires a close supervision of schoolchildren,
as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly
permissible if undertaken by an adult .... The warrant requirement, in
particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to
obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of
school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the
swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in schools. 281
The risk of criminal prosecution is also greater for college athletes subjected
to testing than it is for most grade- and high-school students subjected to
"informal" disciplinary procedures. The jeopardy of those whose urine tests
positive under the NCAA and IU plans is probably more limited than it
would be if the testing focused primarily or exclusively on presence in the
urine sample of illegal substances. Yet "street drugs" are tested for under
both plans, and it appears impossible to totally exclude civil officials from
access to test results, which for the reasons already noted, will sometimes
have the effect of subjecting athletes testing positive to criminal penalties.
For all of these reasons, even if a university or athletic association believes
that it might be "reasonable" to require athletes to submit to mandatory
urinalysis, it cannot safely presume that it can safely do so without first
obtaining either the athlete's "valid consent," or some sort of administrative
warrant. No provision, however, is made in either the NCAA or IU plan
278. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
279. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954).
280. Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 787.
281. 469 U.S at 334-35.
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for obtaining such a warrant. Thus, a counselor will be forced to take a
hard look at "consent" before putting his imprimatur on the testing programs
being considered here.
iv. "Consent" and the Doctrine of "Unconstitutional Conditions"
A foreseeable consequence of any drug-testing program is that an athlete
who submits to testing, is found to have used some prohibited substance,
and is disciplined will claim either that he (or she) never consented to the
test at all, that the consent that was given was "involuntary" and in some
way "coerced," or that such consent was not "informed," since the full
consequences of submitting to testing were not understood or appreciated
at the time consent was given. Alternatively, an athlete subject to such a
program may refuse to be tested at all, and may fight any attempt to sanction
his (or her) refusal on the grounds that the automatic denial of a benefit
(the opportunity to compete) entailed by that refusal was unconstitutionally
coercive. The counselor designing a testing program that resembles those
adopted by the NCAA or Indiana University well might conclude that its
"consent" provisions do not violate the fourth amendment. But that con-
clusion will be, at best, tentative, and will reflect a real concern about the
potentially adverse effect of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions."
The point of departure is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,2 2 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1973. In Schneckloth, a car was stopped by the police
because its lights were not working properly. An officer asked one of the
occupants "if he could search the car.' '283 Upon receiving an affirmative
reply, and help in opening the trunk and glove compartment, the inspecting
officer found stolen property, and that evidence was used to convict Bus-
tamonte, another of the car's occupants. Bustamonte appealed his conviction
on the grounds that the consent which had been given was not in fact
"voluntary" because none of the occupants of the car knew that they had
the right to refuse permission for the search. The Ninth Circuit reversed
Bustamonte's conviction, but was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court.
In its opinion, the Court noted that:
[t]he requirement of a "knowing" and "intelligent" waiver was articu-
lated in a case involving the validity of a defendant's decision to forgo
a right constitutionally guaranteed to protect a fair trial and the reliability
of the truth determining process .... There is a vast difference between
those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind
requiring a "knowing," and "intelligent" waiver of trial rights, or in
the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to
282. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
283. Id. at 220.
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be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures.-
Despite its conclusion that consent to a search need not be "knowing"
and "intelligent" to meet the requirements of the fourth amendment, the
Court in Schneckloth also asserted that "consent searches [must] be free
from any aspect of official coercion.'' 28 Determining what sort of pressure
constitutes unconstitutional "coercion" requires an "analy[sis] of all the
circumstances of an individual consent.' '286 The Schneckloth Court indicated
that certain "police tactics" are "inherently coercive." 2 7 Included are such
practices as obtaining consent by physical violence28 and through false as-
sertions that the investigating officer has a warrant. 2 9 Other sorts of illicit
pressure can be exerted through "subtly coercive police questions," 29 and
may be present if failure to give consent results in the automatic loss of
some "fundamental" right. 29' Clearly, however, significant non-violent "per-
suasion" by the police is permitted. 29 2
The coercion implicit in the drug-testing programs being analyzed here
inheres in the presumptive "positive" findings-and loss of eligibility-that
result automatically if the athlete refuses to be tested. Without a doubt, the
prospect of these consequences puts considerable pressure on athletes to
submit to testing. Yet as we will see below, even if an institution responds
to a refusal in a Draconian manner, denying the athlete all remaining eli-
gibility, and refusing to renew his or her athletic scholarship, that denial
will not be regarded by the courts as the deprivation of a "fundamental
right" or indeed, as the deprivation of any interest afforded constitutional
protection under the general rubric of "due process."
Yet it is clear that the affected athlete will be required to choose between
two other sorts of deprivation: the deprivation of whatever "privacy" rights
the fourth amendment affords, or the deprivation of the opportunity to
compete (and perhaps, to obtain scholarship renewal). This choice well may
lead the athlete to invoke the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions." The
284. Id. at 236-41 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966)).
285. Schnekcloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
286. Id. at 233.
287. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
288. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
289. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
290. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added).
291. The airline security-search cases suggest that the "right to travel" can sometimes be
abridged if a passenger refuses to be screened. Yet Smyth, 398 F. Supp. 777, discussed in some
detail above, indicates that college students cannot be deprived of the opportunity to attend
college because they will not sign consent forms permitting free access to their dormitory rooms
to search for drugs.
292. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
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doctrine has roots that extend back into the nineteenth century, 293 and has
been a well-established part of constitutional law since 1925, when the
Supreme Court, in a case restricting the power of states to place special
burdens on non-resident corporations, stated:
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule,
the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon
such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in
that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may
not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional
rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right
as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel the surrender
of all. It is inconceivable that the guaranties embedded in the Constitution
of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.-
Subsequent case law has made it clear that the doctrine applies even when
the only consequence of refusing to relinquish a constitutional right is the
loss of some privilege that would otherwise have been available. 295 (Indeed,
as several commentators have noted, the doctrine had its historical roots as
a response to the argument that the government was entitled to burden or
condition grants that it had no antecedent obligations to make, i.e., "priv-
ileges, ' 2 96 and is constitutionally redundant if applied-as courts sometimes
have done-"to strike down attempts to condition one constitutional 'right'
on the waiver of another constitutional 'right.' -1297) Thus, a state or ("state
actor") will not be able to defeat the doctrine by characterizing its treatment
of the student-athlete as the deprivation of a mere "privilege," or by relying
on the distinction announced in Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,298 dis-
tinguishing between constitutionally-protected "entitlements" and mere
"claims," which it determined were unprotected for the purposes of a
procedural due process action.
293. See Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. REv. 977, 1002 (1986);
see also VanAtstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in American Law, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1439 (1968).
294. Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1925).
295. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) ("The appellees are plainly
mistaken in their argument that, because a tax exemption is a 'privilege' or 'bounty,' its denial
may not infringe speech."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("It is too late in
the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial
of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.").
296. Westen, supra note 293, at 985 ("Mhe doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was
originally formulated in response to the problem of conditioned privileges, not the problem of
conditioned rights." (citing McCoy & Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining
Guilt, 32 ST. L. Rav. 887, 890 (1980))).
297. Id. at 985 ("[W]hile there is no doctrinal substitute in the area of conditioned privileges
for the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, there is a doctrinal alternative in the area of
conditioned rights: the doctrine that the state may not force a person to surrender one con-
stitutional right in return for exercising another constitutional right." (citing Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968))).
298. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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Nor will the testing institution be able to defeat the doctrine by arguing
that it does not apply to violations of the fourth amendment, does not reach
the specific issue of mandatory drug-testing, or does not pertain to the
regulation of student conduct. As the doctrine customarily has been ex-
pressed, it reaches a broad range of constitutionally-protected rights, 299 in-
cluding the right to be free from "unreasonable" and warrantless searches. 3°°
At least six recent cases have applied it against federal or state agencies or
local units of government which required their employees to submit to
mandatory urinalysis or face administrative action that threatened their jobs. 301
Although "[a]lmost any state activity can be characterized as a benefit"30 2
for the purposes of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," that
doctrine has seldom been used in the last decade to afford most of them
constitutional protection.30 3 Therefore, it is possible that these recent drug-
testing cases are something of a historical aberration, reflecting the extensive
and especially favorable treatment government employment traditionally has
been accorded under the doctrine. 304 Nevertheless, it is clear that there are
299. Westen, supra note 293, at 985.
300. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1987); Raab, 649 F. Supp. at 388; Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 568-69 (1st Cir.
1985).
301. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 736 ("It is clear that the Government cannot require the
relinquishment of an employee's fourth amendment right as a condition of employment. Thus,
if the seizure of the plaintiffs' urine, and the search thereof for evidence is found to be
unreasonable, then consent to such a search and seizure cannot be required."); Raab, 649 F.
Supp. at 387-88 ("The court rejects defendant's contention that Customs workers who are
compelled to submit to urinalysis as a precondition to advancement into so-called 'covered
positions' have voluntarily waived their constitutional rights .... The Court holds that it is
unconstitutional for the government to condition public employment on 'consent to an unrea-
sonable search.' "); Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1324-25 ("[Ihe city argues [that] by signing the
'Notice,' consent was given to [perform the urinalysis, by the policemen and firefighters]. This
argument is without substance for it is abundantly clear that such signatures were procured
under threat of disciplinary action. Consent cannot be inferred from an act so manifestly
coerced."); Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1517. Cf. McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. at 1131(district court held that "consent form" signed by prison guards did "not constitute a blanket
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights" since "[p]ublic employees cannot be bound by unrea-
sonable conditions of employment;" "Advance consent to future unreasonable searches is not
a reasonable condition of employment." Court of Appeals held that urinalysis for prison guards
was reasonable, did not reach question of consent.) (Emphasis added).
302. Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Abortion Funding Restric-
tions as an Unconstitutional Condition, 70 CALn. L. REv. 978, 986 (1982) (citing cases applying
the doctrine to denials of, or restrictions on, tax exemptions, employment, government contracts,
use of state property, and grants of probation).
303. See Van Alstyne, supra note 293. Note, Recent Developments: New Life for the Doctrine
of Unconstitutional Conditions, 58 WASH. L. Rnv. 679, 684-87 (1983) (Since the 1960's, the
erosion of the "right"-"privilege" distinction, and the development of the "equal protection"
doctrine has led to considerably less judicial reliance on the doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions.").
304. For cases limiting the right of government to condition the constitutional rights of
employees, see, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Elrod v. Burns,
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non-employment contexts involving fourth amendment rights where the doc-
trine applies,3 °0 and that college students have sometimes been its benefici-
aries. Thus, in Smyth v. Lubbers,3°6 one of the legal justifications that a
state university gave for searching students' rooms for marijuana without
first obtaining a warrant30 7 and later suspending those students from school
was the provision in its dormitory contract that:
[t]he undersigned, in consideration for the room and board provided by
Grand Valley State College, do(es) hereby agree as follows: . . . (2) To
abide by the terms and conditions of residence ... as stated in the
current housing handbook, which terms and conditions are specifically
made a part thereof [sic]. (3) That residency in Grand Valley State
College's residence halls, and this contract, are subject to all rules and
regulations of Grandview State College. 08
The relevant handbook provision stated:
ROOM ENTRY PROCEDURES. In the interest of maintaining an en-
vironment in the College residence halls which provides for the health,
safety, and welfare of all residents, it is occasionally necessary for the
College to exercise its right of room entry. The situations requiring room
entry are as follows: ...
2. Student residence halls may be entered by residence hall staff
members if any of the following situations exist:...
c. College officials have reason to believe that students are con-
tinuing to violate federal, state, or local laws or College regula-
tions .... 109
The Smyth court stated:
the College is contending that by signing the contract, Smith waived
objections, or consented, to any search conducted in accordance with
the College regulation, even if the search otherwise did not comply with
the Fourth Amendment .... This problem really belongs to the law of
unconstitutional conditions. The state cannot condition attendance at
427 U.S. 347 (1976); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977); Givhan v. Western Line Cons. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507 (1980). But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-54 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) ("appellee did have a statutory expectancy that he not be removed other than for
'such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.' But the very section of the statute
which granted him that [right] expressly provided also for the procedure by which 'cause' was
to be determined.... [We conclude] that where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining
that right, a litigant in the position of the appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.").
305. See, e.g., Blackburn, 771 F.2d 556 (strip search of prison visitor).
306. 398 F. Supp. 777.
307. It appears some "individualized suspicion" of wrongdoing existed, although the decision
does not make that fact clear. Id. at 782-83.
308. Id. at 782.
309. Id.
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Grand Valley State College on a waiver of constitutional rights.3 10
The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" thus construed undoubtedly
poses a significant problem to any state college that seeks to impose or
implement a drug-testing program that depends on "consent" to circumvent
fourth amendment problems, but obtains that "consent" by making it a
precondition of athletic participation. Given such scope, the doctrine seems
to compel the institution's counsel to conclude that the athlete's "consent"
to be tested is legally meaningless. For as Peter Westen-perhaps the doc-
trine's harshest critic-has noted, it has "considerable ... rhetorical force"3
1
'
prompting
courts and commentators alike [to] ... believe, as the doctrine states,
that it is always-or at least presumptively-unconstitutional to condition
a privilege on a person's not doing or receiving something he is consti-
tutionally entitled to do or receive in other settings.3'2
For several reasons, however, counsel well might conclude that the law as
it presently stands does not require quite such an automatically negative
outcome.
First, there is clearly a distinction between "automatic" and "presump-
tive" unconstitutionality. In certain areas-most notably those affecting
rights of speech and the free exercise of religion protected by the first
amendment-the usual judicial response has either been to declare those
rights so absolute that no condition could, as a matter of principle, be
tolerated,313 or to find such conditions tolerable only if they serve some
"compelling state interest" and are carefully tailored to promote that interest
using the least restrictive of any available alternatives.31 4 In the latter instance,
unconstitutionality is "presumptive" rather than absolute; however, the pre-
sumption is so strong that it will survive almost any representation of
overriding state interest.315 Given the rather general arguments for health,
safety, institutional reputation, and preservation of public morality that have
been used to support the mandatory general testing of college athletes, it is
certain that such testing could not survive the "strict scrutiny" that the
"compelling state interest" standard demands.
However, if we assume that courts will always "presume" unconstitu-
tionality (which, as we will see, may be an unwarranted conclusion), we
need not assume that presumption will always be a strong one. When the
310. Id. at 788 (citing Robinson v. Board of Regents of E. Ky. Univ., 475 F.2d 707 (6th
Cir. 1973)).
311. Westen, supra note 293, at 1008.
312. Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
313. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589.
314. Westen, supra note 293, at 988-99.
315. But see Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (right of teachers to create disruption by publicly
criticizing superiors is not unlimited).
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courts have considered conditions on constitutional protections other than
those afforded by the first amendment, they have not always employed
"strict scrutiny." Instead, their approach has sometimes been to "balance"
in an apparently even-handed manner the benefits which would accrue to
the state from conditioning the right against the detriments that the person
subject to the condition would suffer. Westen has argued that such an
approach is the appropriate one when the "right" at issue is not regarded
by the courts (or perhaps, by legal philosophers) as a settled and absolute
"entitlement, ' 31 6 but instead is treated as a "constitutionally protected in-
terest.'' 317 He has suggested that the sort of "privacy" interests implicated
by the fourth amendment fit within the latter category. Thus, he differentiates
them from first amendment interests, which are always granted "categorical
weight," so that the only issue is whether, in "look[ing] solely to the state-
interest side of the balance," the "state's interest in conditioning the privilege
on the waiver ... is 'compelling.' ",318 In fourth amendment cases, Westen's
argument goes, "privacy" interests are inherently situational, and are granted
conditional rather than categorical weight. 319 Therefore, "ad hoc" balancing
not only has sometimes been used, but the courts have acted "correctly"
when they have chosen to employ this method, rather than announcing
categorically that the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" applies in
some absolute sense. 32
Westen illustrates "ad hoc" balancing with a urinalysis hypothetical. In
that hypothetical, a state conditions parole from prison (in traditional terms,
a "privilege" rather than a "right") for "prisoners convicted of violent
crimes committed under the influence of drug abuse" on their promise to
abstain from using certain drugs and to "submit to a weekly urinalysis to
316. Westen, supra note 293, at 997-98.(" 'Rights' in the sense of 'entitlements' are 'abso-
lute'-absolute because A's interests in doing or receiving Y in setting Z have already been
assessed and found to override the particular interests the state may have in preventing him
from doing or receiving Y in setting Z.").
317. Westen, supra note 293, at 1002-03. See especially 1003 ("When we say that rights are
not 'absolute' because they can be 'outweighed' or 'overridden,' or that rights 'persist' even
when competing interests do not justify their exercise, or that rights have to be 'weighed' or
'balanced' against competing interests, we refer to claims that always carry some weight even
though the weight they carry may be less than an entitlement. In short, when we speak of
rights in these cases, we mean not constitutional entitlements, but constitutionally supported
interests.").
318. Id. at 988-89.
319. In support of this argument, Westen cites a number of cases, including Tennessee v.
Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1699 (1985) ("To determine the constitutionality of a seizure '[wie
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' "),
and Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37 ("[T]here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.").
Westen, supra note 293, at 990 n.23.
320. Id. at 989, 993.
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determine whether they are under the influence of drugs." 3 21 His analysis
suggests that to determine the constitutionality of the mandatory testing, a
court first should weigh the interests of the state in maintaining a parole
system and in conditioning parole on testing; then should weigh the prisoners'
interest in being paroled and in having their privacy respected; and should
make its ultimate determination on the basis of which set of interests is the
heavier.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, given the record of those to be released, the
cost of maintaining prisons, and Westen's conclusion that, "compulsory
urinalysis is less intrusive on [prisoner] A's privacy than unannounced searches
of his person or his papers because [in the hypothetical] the analysis is
scheduled at his convenience and conducted painlessly and without risk to
or a touching of his person,''13' he concludes that such a non-consensual
search would not (or should not) be constitutionally barred. Would such a
conclusion follow, though, if the urinalysis at issue was the sort contemplated
by Indiana University or the NCAA? Clearly, in the collegiate setting, the
level of intrusiveness would be approximately the same, or only slightly
greater; thus, the basic "privacy" interest of athletes and prisoners would
be similar. No obvious way appears to exist of comparing the interest in
maintaining a drug-free athletic environment with the desire of prison of-
ficials to keep their costs down. However, the parole board's interest in
using targeted testing to insure that those convicted of drug-related crimes
are not "using" again is much stronger than either IU's or the NCAA's
interest in insuring that athletes generally do not use any of a broad list of
prohibited substances. (Note, however, that the differential may vary, de-
pending on what substance is being tested for, and what the health risks or
adverse effects on competition associated with that substance are.) On the
other hand, the prisoner clearly has a much greater interest in the root
"liberty" interest of physical freedom than any athlete-including one with
dreams of a professional career-has in being able to compete.
Comparing the prisoner's situation with the situation of the college athlete
is therefore a guessing game-as is any comparison that a counselor makes
between the facts in front of him and the facts-in-books that underpin a
legal rule arguably "governing" the matter he is concerned about. Thus, it
is clear that courts have, in fact, permitted states to condition the parole of
prisoners on periodic, mandatory testing.32' Intuitively, it seems that the state
has a better argument for conditioning parole on consent to testing than
public universities or athletic associations have for conditioning athletic
competition on such testing. But even if their argument is less compelling,
it still might be compelling enough.
321. Id. at 990.
322. Id. at 992-93.
323. Cf. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 362 (11th Cir. 1982).
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To arrive at a provisional answer, the counselor must look to straws in
the wind. Several command his immediate attention. One is the always helpful
(from an institutional counselor's point of view) decision in Wyman v.
James.32 In Wyman, the Supreme Court concluded, in its first (and appar-
ently dispositive) holding, that fourth amendment considerations would have
arisen only after an actual "home visitation." Since Mrs. James had not
permitted welfare workers to enter her apartment (or "consented" to their
entry), no constitutional issue arose. 32 As Justice Douglas noted in his
dissent, the necessary and first implication of this line of argument is to
read the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" out of fourth amendment
jurisprudence:
[w]hatever the semantics, the central question is whether the government
by force of its largesse has the power to 'buy up' rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. But for the assertion of her Constitutional right [to
deny access to her home], Barbara James in this case would have received
the welfare benefit. 32
Such a result is not, of course, consistent with the other authorities on the
doctrine that have been brought to the counselor's attention. Since they are
numerous, he has to discount the Wyman decision.
But he need not ignore it. For buried in the case are two other principles
which are probably closer to the mainstream of current constitutional law.
The first of these principles is that "interest balancing" has become the
norm for constitutional interpretation involving asserted "rights" against
the state, and that such "ad hoc" balancing tends to look to comparative
utilities, rather than "primary" or (quasi-) "absolute rights" that must be
regarded as unconditional, or conditional only if a "compelling state inter-
est" is shown. Although not all recent cases conform to that norm, even
some involving first amendment claims in the realm of public employment
do. 327 Recent fourth amendment cases have, as a general matter, not only
employed a balancing test, but have applied it in a manner that gives
unprecedented weight to the asserted governmental interest. For example, in
two cases involving the application of the "exclusionary rule" for evidence
illegally obtained, the Supreme Court has refused to use the rule to bar that
evidence in federal tax proceedings 32 and in deportation proceedings. 329 In
324. 400 U.S. 309.
325. Id. 317-18.
326. Id. at 327-28 (footnote omitted).
327. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259-64. (Justice Powell,
concurring, noted that the Court employed a simple balancing test rather than "strict scrutiny:"
"Before today it had been well-established that when state law intrudes upon protected speech,
the State itself must shoulder the burden of proving that its action is justified by overriding
state interests. The Court, for the first time in a First Amendment case, simply reverses this
principle." Id. (citations omitted)).
328. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
329. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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the first case, United States v. Janis, the Court reached a conclusion that
had the effect of overruling the "silver platter," which had formerly man-
dated the automatic exclusion of such evidence. 30 In the second, INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, the Court used a "cost-benefit test" to overturn a well-
established rule permitting aliens to suppress illegally-obtained evidence: 331
Imprecise as the exercise might be, the Court recognized in Janis that
there is no choice but to weigh the likely social benefits of excluding
unlawfully seized evidence against the likely costs .... In these circum-
stances we are persuaded that the Janis balance between costs and benefits
comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation
hearings held by the INS.332
Particularly notable in Lopez-Mendoza was the failure of the Court to
give serious consideration to either of the interests of the petitioner that
were clearly implicated in the case, namely his broad interest in "privacy"
per se, which at some level the fourth amendment exists to protect, and his
specific interest in avoiding the harsh consequences of deportation. 33
To the extent that these cases are representative of a deeper judicial
current-as I believe they are-it thus appears that "balancing" (particularly
where fourth amendment rights are concerned) is an infinitely malleable
concept, capable within the "unconstitutional conditions" context of sub-
ordinating any underlying "privacy" claim of college athletes to the various
state governmental interests that are promoted by drug-testing. Or, as Yale
Kamisar has written:
[h]ow does one "balance" the interests in furthering an important gov-
ernmental objective "against a constitutional statement that the govern-
ment may not employ a certain means for the attainment of any of its
objectives"? Inasmuch as "privacy" (or "individual liberty") and "ef-
ficiency" . . . are different kinds of interests, how can they be compared
quantitatively unless the judge has "some standard independent of both
to which they can be referred"? If the standard is not to be the fourth
amendment-which embodies the judgment that securing all citizens "in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
330. 428 U.S. at 461 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
331. 468 U.S. at 1058 ("Prior to [one of the Board of Immigration Appeals decisions in
1979 giving rise to Lopez-Mendoza], neither the Board nor any court had held that the
exclusionary rule did not apply in civil deportation proceedings.... The simple fact is that
prior to 1979 the exclusionary rule was available in civil deportation proceedings .... ) (White,
J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 1041-50.
333. The Lopez-Mendoza Court did focus on another significant interest, that of providing
those who are targets of unconstitutional conduct some sort of remedy. But the remedy
proposed-suing for declaratory relief-appears to be highly speculative, given the fact that
the aliens who would have standing to bring such an action are, by definition, in the midst of
deportation proceedings that well might remove them from the jurisdiction of the American
courts. See Id. at 1045.
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and seizures" outweighs society's interests in apprehending [offenders]-
then what is it to be? 334
Yet even if "balancing" has limits that might promote the maintenance
of the doctrine in some settings to proscribe some coerced searches, it is by
no means clear that the school or college setting is the one that most courts
would choose. Thus, one of the characteristics of the doctrine of "uncon-
stitutional conditions" is that it is conclusory: every time it appears in a
majority opinion, the result is foreordained. But it has already been noted
that the doctrine has in fact found its way into relatively few majority
opinions in the last decade. In some areas (such as constitutional objections
to "breathalyzer" tests coerced by "implied consent" laws) where it would
appear to afford a natural benefit to petitioners, it has not appeared at
all. 3 5 In the specific area of student rights, Smyth v. Lubbers appears to
be the only half-way recent instance. If the general invisibility of the doctrine
is a large bundle of straw which can help us determine which way the judicial
wind is blowing, various judicial pronouncements about the interests of
educational institutions in regulating the conduct of their students are in-
dividual blades. Among those blades are Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion in Healy v. James,336 and then his dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Burger and Blackmun, in Papish v. University of Missouri Cura-
tors.337 The Court in Healy upheld the first amendment right of students to
form a political organization on campus which would be accorded the same
degree of official recognition as other similar organizations advocating more
conservative political viewpoints. Thus, its holding placed limits on the right
of a state college to interfere with the constitutionally-protected rights of its
student body. Yet Justice Rehnquist found in the majority opinion an implicit
acknowledgment that college administrators have special disciplinary powers:
I find the implication clear from the Court's opinion that the consti-
tutional limitations on the government's acting as administrator of a
college differ from the limitations on the government's acting as sovereign
to enforce its criminal laws. The Court's quotations from Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), to the
effect that first amendment rights must always be applied "in light of
the special characteristics of the ... environment," and from Esteban
v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969),
to the effect that a college "may expect that its students adhere to
generally accepted standards of conduct," emphasize this fact .... The
334. Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the "'Exclusionary Rule" Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather Than on an "Empirical Proposition?," 16 CRmIroN L. REv 565, 646-47 (1983)
(footnote omitted).
335. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) (no direct state compulsion
involved, since petitioner had the initial choice of taking the test, or refusing the test and being
made subject to the statutory presumption).
336. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
337. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
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government as employer or school administrator may impose upon em-
ployees and students reasonable regulations that would be impermissible
if imposed by the government on all citizens.1"8
In Papish, another first amendment case involving a university's expulsion
of a graduate student for the unauthorized distribution of literature con-
taining a number of well-known four-, seven-, eight-, and thirteen-letter
vulgarities, Rehnquist made a similar point:
It simply does not follow that.., because petitioner could not be crim-
inally prosecuted by the Missouri state courts for the conduct in question,
she may not therefore be expelled from the University of Missouri for
the same conduct. A state university is an establishment for the purpose
of educating the State's young people, supported by the tax revenues of
the State's citizens. The notion that the officials lawfully charged with
the governance of the university have so little control over the environ-
ment for which they are responsible ... is quite unacceptable to me and
I would suspect would have been equally unacceptable to the Framers
of the [Bill of Rights]. 339
Of course, neither of these opinions has the force of controlling law. Yet
when read in conjunction with the Supreme Court's opinions in New Jersey
v. T.L.O.,14° (which relaxed the fourth amendment "probable cause" re-
quirement in a high school setting because of the necessity of promoting
institutional discipline) and in Board of Curators of University of Missouri
v. Horowitz,341 (which relaxed the fifth amendment's "procedural due proc-
ess" requirement in a collegiate setting when the grounds for expulsion were
academic rather than disciplinary), they at least suggest to the sensitive
counselor that the present Court is not likely to conclude quickly that no
limitations can be imposed by "state actors" on the constitutionally-protected
privacy interests of college athletes.
The second principle buried in Wyman relates closely to the emerging
judicial preference for "balancing," rather than definitive findings of per
se unconstitutionality. It is suggested by the Court's perception that the
particular deprivation Mrs. James faced was somehow less meaningful-and
therefore had less legal significance-than other deprivations the state could
have imposed pursuant to a "search." Thus, just as Justice Rehnquist would
have permitted a state institution to expel a student for reasons that he
would not permit if the penalty were criminal prosecution, so the Wyman
Court did permit the State of New York to cut off welfare benefits because,
among other things,
The [home] visit is not one by police or uniformed authority.... It
does not deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpetrators of
338. Healey, 408 U.S. at 201-03 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
339. Papish, 410 U.S. at 676-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
340. 469 U.S. 325.
341. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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crime. The caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend
to one in need.
The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a
criminal investigation, and despite the announced fears of Mrs. James
and those who would join her, is not in aid of any criminal proceeding42
The comparative devaluation of Mrs. James' fears is inconsistent with the
absolute prohibition implicit in the doctrine of "unconstitutional condi-
tions." It does more, however, than to undercut the idea of "absolute"
privacy rights. By tying the constitutional claim to the nature of some
deprivation that is independent of (and additional to) the deprivation of
privacy per se, the Wyman Court also forces us to look at the consequences
of the denial of privacy. How serious, we are forced to ask, are the negative
consequences going to be if an athlete is required to submit to urinalysis,
tests positive for drugs, and loses her athletic eligibility and any realistic
prospect of scholarship renewal? Surely, it would seem, those consequences
(given the confidentiality requirements of the NCAA and IU testing pro-
grams) are going to be less damaging to most college athletes than was the
loss of the welfare benefits which Mrs. James experienced, given her reliance
on those benefits to support herself and her children. That perception will
almost certainly be strengthened when, in turning to another set of "due
process" issues-those arising directly under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments-we discover how little value the courts have generally accorded
athletic participation and the expectations or hopes it engenders.
3. Claims Brought "Directly" Under the Fourteenth Amendment
"Due Process Clause"
For the purposes of the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, certain "liberty" interests-such as the right afforded by the fourth
amendment to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures"-are con-
stitutional "givens," since they are specifically protected by the Bill of Rights,
and the "incorporation" doctrine makes them applicable against the states
or institutions that are regarded as "state actors". All of the claims the
counselor has confronted to this point are predicated on the existence of
such "liberty" interests, which derive explicitly or implicitly from the con-
stitutional text.343 However, other interests that are arguably implicated when
college athletes are tested, or are subjected to discipline after being tested,
find no textual support in the Constitution.
342. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 322-23.
343. Unlike the right to be free from "unreasonable" warrantless searches, or from the
necessity of testifying against oneself in a criminal proceeding, the "right to privacy" is not
textually committed, but has been derived from a more general reading of the Bill of Rights
and the system of "ordered liberty" it expresses. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
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Such is likely to be the case when an athlete claims, not that she has been
subjected to an illegal search, but that she has been denied an appropriate
hearing, or has been penalized on the grounds of evidence produced by
unreliable (or at least, insufficiently reliable) testing methods. The basic
constitutional challenge to the inadequate hearing or the unreliable testing
method used inevitably will be that the procedures the testing institution
used were unconstitutional, since they were "fundamentally unfair," and
therefore (in a general sense), were violative of "due process." "Unfairness"
may, in fact, be fairly easy to prove by demonstrating that the hearing the
athlete was given was conclusory, that the athlete was not permitted to
submit countervailing evidence, or that the testing method employed was
statistically suspect. However, the "due process" clause proscribes only those
acts of governmental "unfairness" that effect a deprivation "of life, liberty,
or property." Therefore, the threshold task for the athlete complaining about
the hearing she received or other alleged deficiencies in the testing procedure
will be to convince a court that the ordeal she was forced to undergo resulted
in the deprivation of something of constitutional significance. In other words,
she will be required to show that lost athletic eligibility, lost playing time,
or the athletic scholarship which the institution may have refused to renew
constitutes a cognizable "liberty" or "property" interest.
Institutional counsel will find considerable case law to support their ar-
gument that none of these things does have, except in very unusual circum-
stances, constitutional significance. Therefore they will not be required to
devote much attention to constitutional objections to the actual procedures
used by drug-testing institutions.
a. Absent Scholarship Revocation, No "Liberty" or "Property"
Interests Are Implicated by the Punitive Provisions of the Drug-Testing
Plans
Under the NCAA plan, an athlete who, prior to a football bowl game or
NCAA championship meet, registers a second "positive" for marijuana, or
a first "positive" for any other prohibited substance, will be banned au-
tomatically from that bowl game or meet. Under the IU plan and similar
plans adopted by other colleges, athletes competing in any sport who are
identified through urinalysis as repeat offenders will face the loss of some
or all of their remaining athletic eligibility. In addition, they may face the
non-renewal-or perhaps even the revocation-of their athletic scholarships.
"Liberty" and "property," as used in "due process" jurisprudence, are
fairly comprehensive terms. "Liberty" includes the right to enter into future
contracts. 344 Damage to an individual's reputation can deprive him or her
344. See Roth, 408 U.S. 564.
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of liberty if the effect of the injury is to deny the possibility of securing a
livelihood in a particular line of work. "Property" includes rights under
contracts, and those expectations of future economic benefit which are not
mere hopes, but actual "entitlements. ' 345 Suspending a star athlete from a
college team could jeopardize his prospects for securing a professional con-
tract. Those prospects might be further damaged if word got out that he
was a drug user. A few courts, including a federal court in Minnesota, have
concluded that athletes with a good chance of competing professionally have
a constitutionally-protected interest in participating on a college team. 34 Yet
the great majority have found that the economic benefits of being allowed
to participate in intercollegiate sports lie eitirely in the future, are highly
speculative, and fall far short of being entitlements. 34 7 In most jurisdictions,
the courts would find no constitutional right of participation violated by an
NCAA or institutionally-sponsored drug-testing plan.
Only the revocation of a scholarship during its term is likely to be regarded
as raising genuine constitutional issues. In such a case, the requisite "prop-
erty" interest may well be found in the "contract" between the college and
the university that arises when the college offers an athlete an athletic
scholarship with an ascertainable and immediately realizable monetary value
in return for that athlete's athletic participation. 48 However, if the university
takes a "positive" test result into account, and announces it will not renew
an existing athletic scholarship, such non-renewal will probably not be re-
garded as the deprivation of a "property" interest, since NCAA regulations
limit the terms of members' commitments to student-athletes to one year,
and treat each subsequent year of aid as, in effect, a new grant.4 9 For this
reason, the expectation of receiving a renewal is always a speculative one,
and the award for a future year is in no sense a "vested interest."
345. Id. See also, Perry, 408 U.S. 593.
346. See Hall v. University of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982); see also Duffley
v. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 446 A.2d 462 (N.H. 1982) (finding "right of participation"
under state constitution).
347. See Colorado Seminary (University of Denver) v. NCAA, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978);
see also Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).
348. Cf. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 16 N.C. App. 117, 191 S.E.2d 379 (1972) (student,
rather than university, violated contractual obligations imposed by terms of athletic scholarship);
Begley v. Corporation of Mercer Univ., 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (failure of student
to meet grade requirements in scholarship agreement excused university from obligation to
award that scholarship, since those requirements were material terms of that agreement). For
a criticism of the equation of athletic scholarships with contracts, see J. WEisTART & C. LOWELL,
TE LAW OF SPORTS § 1.06 (1979).
349. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 4(d) ("Where a student-athlete's ability is taken into account
in any degree in awarding unearned financial aid, such aid shall not be awarded in excess of
one academic year.").
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b. Minimal "Hearing" and "Test Accuracy" Rights
Even if a scholarship is revoked, however, it may still be possible to
demonstrate that the athlete was provided with all the process which was
due. That minimal amount of "due process" will require that the testing
institution afford the athlete the opportunity to be heard, and to challenge
the accuracy of the test results. Although "some kind of hearing" is a
minimal requirement of procedural "due process," the law does not appear
to require that such a hearing be particularly formal or extensive. Almost
certainly, little more will be required under the fourteenth amendment than
was required in the high school discipline case of Goss v. Lopez.350 In Goss,
the issue was what minimal hearing rights students facing short-term sus-
pension from school were entitled to. The Supreme Court required "that
there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and discipli-
narian, '351 that the student "be given an opportunity to explain his version
of the facts at this discussion, ' 352 and that "the student first be told what
he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is." ' 35 3 It did
not require that additional protections, such as the presence of counsel, the
right to produce witnesses for the "defence," or the right to cross-examine
antagonistic witnesses, be afforded. However, given the arguably harsher
consequences of losing an athletic scholarship, it is not inconceivable that
such additional process would be constitutionally required in the instant
situation. Thus, the testing institution might have to interpret its testing
guidelines expansively to insure that athletes are afforded an adequate hearing
before being disciplined.
The problem, of course, is that while a hearing might be expected to
produce evidence of mitigating circumstances, ordinarily it will not directly
refute the finding of the test procedure itself. Thus, a student might testify
that he had never used marijuana, but is unlikely to be able to prove it. In
such a case, the institution will be required to weigh a denial against a
laboratory result concluding precisely the opposite.
Can such a "scientifically" obtained result be successfully challenged?
Two technical avenues will exist in some cases. Thus, if the procedures the
institution employs to establish chain-of-custody of the urine sample are not
followed strictly, the results of the urinalysis are likely to be thrown out. 354
And if the original result is not "confirmed" according to some procedure
350. 419 U.S. 565.
351. Id. at 584.
352. Id. at 582.
353. Id.
354. See generally P. GLurmmi & E. IMWINXELRIED, supra note 8, at § 7-1.
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mandated by the testing plan, the results will also be voided. 55 Constitutional
challenges are likely to prove more difficult, since 100% reliability of test
results clearly is not an absolute requirement of procedural "due process."
Instead, the constitutional requirement is that the procedure used be "fair"
in its "specific factual context[]. '" 3 6 Thus, even a 95% accuracy level may
be sufficient since, as one court evaluating a drug-testing program observed,
"the 95%qo statistical figure, in the field of science and medicine, is recognized
to mean almost complete certainty' 35 7 The better rule, however, appears to
be the one promulgated by a Massachusetts trial court,35 and apparently
adopted in another recent U.S. district court decision, Storms v. Coughlin.3 59
In the Massachusetts case, the court specifically examined the EMIT test,
which is not only used as part of the NCAA and IU programs, but apparently
is "the urine test commonly used to detect employee drug use,'' 36 and
certainly seems to be employed widely in a variety of drug-testing contexts.
The court said: "No evidence having been introduced that warrants my
finding that EMIT has been generally accepted by toxicologists and/or phar-
macologists as producing reliable positive results in the absence of inde-
pendent confirmation, I find that it does not produce such a result absent
such confirmation." 361 This conclusion is supported by the view of" [1leading
analytical toxicologists... that positive ... EMIT findings be confirmed
by other procedures" because "the error rate [for that test] can go up to
25 percent. '362
However, given the confirmation procedure stipulated by the NCAA, and
actually employed under the Indiana program, there is no reason to believe
that the testing of college athletes, if done "by the book," will not meet
minimal "due process" requirements.
4. The Obligation to Provide "Equal Protection"
The fourteenth amendment states that "[no state] ... shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. '363 Identical
or similar language is contained in most state constitutions. A student-athlete
355. Cornish v. Coughlin, 505 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie,
628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
356. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960), (quoted in L. TIumE, AmERICAN CONS'i-
TUTIONAL LAw § 10-13 (1978).
357. Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35, 38 (D.N.D. 1984) (emphasis in original).
358. Kane v. Fair, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983) (cited in
Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1221).
359. 600 F. Supp. 1214.
360. Note, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in
California? 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1451, 1455 (1986).
361. Kane, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at 4 (quoted in Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1221).
362. P. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIMD, supra note 8, at § 23-2(3).
363. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
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subjected to drug-testing seeking to successfully assert an "equal protection"
claim need not demonstrate the existence of the sort of "liberty" or "prop-
erty" interest in athletic participation that would be required if asserting a
violation of "due process, ' '364 although the existence of such an interest
(provided it is regarded as "fundamental" by a reviewing court) will affect
the standard of review employed, and thus may have a significant effect on
the outcome of the student's legal action. Thus, it is possible for anyone
who believes that she has been adversely affected by any classification em-
bodied in a policy, rule, or statute promulgated by a "state actor" to
challenge that classification on constitutional grounds. A demonstration of
adverse effect, however, will not be sufficient. Instead, a showing will have
to be made, either directly or inferentially, that the consequences of the
regulation (or the consequences of enforcing it in a particular way)365 were
intended by those enacting (or enforcing) it to fall with particular severity
on those belonging to the petitioner's class.3 6 If the requisite intent is
demonstrated, a court will review the classification (or its enforcement) to
determine whether the "state" is justified in "discriminating" against the
members of the class affected by the regulation, rule, practice, or statute
being contested.
However, the standard of review employed in fourteenth amendment cases
is going to be quite deferential to the state or "state actor" in most cir-
cumstances. Except in those instances when a classification infringes upon
a "fundamental right" or disadvantages members of minorities who have
been granted special protection under the law,367 it will be upheld upon a
simple showing that it rationally promotes some valid public purpose.368 The
"due process" analysis of mandatory drug-testing that the counselor has
already made suggests that while a "fundamental" privacy right may be
infringed if an athlete is required to submit to testing without giving "valid
364. Unlike the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the "equal protection
clause" refers to no specific interests which are affected by the legal process, but only to the
legal process itself, and to its possible deficiency. Thus, it is possible to have a denial of "equal
protection" even when no specific "liberty" or "property" interests are implicated. See, e.g.,
Buckton, 366 F. Supp. 1152. Because athletic participation has not been regarded as a "fun-
damental right" under the fourteenth amendment, however, the level of scrutiny which courts
impose on the classification of athletes is likely to be so deferential that the athlete protesting
it will stand virtually no chance of success. See Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n v.
Barnhorst, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982).
365. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
366. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
367. Carolene Products v. United States, 304 U.S. 134 (1938) (special protection for "discrete
and insular minorities"); Loving, 388 U.S. I and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) ("strict scrutiny" in race discrimination cases); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) and
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) ("heightened scrutiny" in gender
discrimination cases).
368. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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consent," when such consent is deemed to be present, nothing fundamental
is at stake, even if the athlete stands to lose a scholarship or eligibility if
found to be a drug-user.36 9 A prospective denial of a scholarship or eligibility
to an athlete who refuses to be tested (or who refuses to consent to being
tested), under the theory expressed by the Supreme Court in Wyman v.
James,370 also will not constitute an infringement of a "fundamental inter-
est." While it is true that athletes are in some sense a "minority" of any
student body, it is clear that they have not been given, nor are ever likely
to be given, special constitutional protection as a class. Thus, when an
athlete who has "consented" to be tested seeks to challenge the testing and
any penalties imposed because of adverse (i.e., "positive") results, or when
an athlete who has not been tested seeks to challenge any penalty imposed
for refusing to be tested, the result in both cases will almost always be a
search for "mere rationality" by the reviewing court. Only in exceptional
circumstances will "stricter" scrutiny be employed. One occasion for such
"heightened" (or, in some instances, "strict") scrutiny would arise if a
testing program singled out athletes for testing on the basis of race, sex, or
nationality; subject to the "intent" requirement, another would arise if the
testing program, although facially neutral, in its implementation, tended to
discriminate against members of a particular race, sex, or nationality. Neither
the I.U., nor the NCAA program-in common with all the other collegiate
testing programs I am familiar with-discriminates overtly on the basis of
these factors. Whether any program, in its actual administration, has been,
or might be, used to discriminate against members of a specially protected
group is a fact-specific question which, to my knowlege, has not yet arisen.
Should it arise, the athletes asserting the existence of discrimination in a
facially-neutral program would bear a heavy burden of proof.
Assuming "state action" and the absence of factors that would lead to
any special scrutiny, how will an "equal protection" suit fare under coun-
selor's rules? Two types of challenges are likely to be raised, one applicable
to every mandatory testing program, the other applicable only to those
programs adopted by educational institutions. The first type of challenge
will focus on the particular drugs being tested for, and will argue that the
list is either "underinclusive," or contains items that the testing agency has
no business looking for. Even the NCAA doesn't test for everything: alcohol,
for instance, is not on its list. Alcohol is included on the IU list; but its
other generic categories arguably do not prohibit everything prohibited by
the NCAA. And, of course, neither list prohibits the use of substances such
as saccharine or cyclamates, although both have been identified officially
with a heightened cancer risk. What if a steroid user objects that the program
369. See supra text accompanying notes 344-49.
370. Wyman, 400 U.S. 309.
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which identifies and penalizes him is constitutionally defective because it
does not identify or punish those who drink or use artificial sweeteners?
Fourteenth amendment doctrine is clear: when courts are looking for "mere"
or "minimal rationality," the fact that a classification does not cover every-
one who is in some sense similarly situated will not invalidate that classi-
fication, provided that some plausible reason can be offered for "drawing
the line" at the point the classifying agency chooses. Or, as the Supreme
Court noted in 1976:
Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is
drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or
alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory
discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest .... Legislatures may
implement their program step by step,... adopting regulations that only
partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination
of the evil to future regulations.371
The challenge, in other words, will fail.
However, a second objection to the list of prohibited substances focuses
on "overinclusiveness" rather than "underinclusiveness." In its strongest
form, it objects to the imposition of a penalty upon an athlete found to
have used a particular substance on the ground that the testing institution
has insufficient justification to test for that substance. Underlying this ob-
jection is a premise that the "legitimate interests" an institution must have
to support a classification are not unlimited, and are to some extent con-
trolled by the social role or "purpose" of the institution. Testing for some
substances arguably might promote that social role or purpose; testing for
others would be, in essence, ultra vires. Two significant problems attend
this line of argument. First, the formal doctrine of ultra vires has largely
fallen into disuse, although it clearly has more vitality at the state than at
the federal level. Second, to the extent that "legitimate interests" (or "le-
gitimate state interests") have been analyzed in "equal protection" cases,
the focus has been almost exclusively on practices that under contemporary
fourteenth amendment law promote inherently impermissible (or at least,
"suspect") objectives, such as racial172 or gender 73 segregation for their own
sakes. Nevertheless, there is support for the proposition that athletic asso-
ciations (at least when acting as the alter ego to a State Board of Education)
have only limited authority to supervise or regulate the activites of student-
athletes, particularly if the activities being supervised or regulated occur "out
of season" or after the conclusion of the school year, and cannot be tied
directly enough to the operation of the schools.374 Further inferential support
371. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
372. See Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
373. See Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. 718; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
374. Bunger v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555, 563-64 (Iowa 1972).
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for the proposition that the authority to test is limited is contained in cases
that, in the course of testing the constitutionality of regulations, have looked
specifically at the tasks ordinarily performed by the regulating agency, and
the relationship of the contested classification to the performance of those
tasks. 7 5
However, even if the general authority of an athletic association or a
school to regulate is limited, a challenge to the testing of any substance on
the NCAA or IU list other than one of the banned "street drugs" is not
likely to succeed. Thus, for most of the items on both lists of proscribed
substances, a rational explanation of how their inclusion will promote the
University's or the NCAA's valid purposes will be readily available. For
instance, most of the substances listed by the NCAA are tested for because
of a documented belief that their use will affect either an athlete's perform-
ance, his health, or both, or are likely to give the athlete using it a special
competitive edge.3 76 Health and safety concerns deriving from the heavy toll
of football injuries that occurred when intercollegiate athletics went largely
unregulated were the principal reasons why the NCAA was created,3 7 and
the organization has long promoted the ideal (if not the fact) of rough
equality of competition through its promulgation of dozens of generally
applicable rules unrelated to drug-testing. 78 The stated purposes of the IU
plan have already been discussed.3 79 As that discussion should indicate,
concerns about harmful physical effects were the principal reason why most
of the proscribed substances on the IU list were banned.38 0
Yet the NCAA and many of the state universities which have adopted
their own drug-testing plans-including Indiana University-have also chosen
375. See employment cases, supra note 301; cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
103 (1976) (purpose of civil service rule, when testing for "fit" between that rule and the
government's objective, to be inferred from "normal responsibilities" of Civil Service Com-
mission).
376. NCAA PAMP-LET, supra note 52, at 1 ("This list is comprised of drugs generally
purported to be performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful to the health and safety
of the student-athlete.").
377. J. FALLA, TtE NCAA: THE VoicE OF COLLEGE SPORTS 13-15 (1981) (1905 college football
season marked by 18 deaths and 149 serious injuries; President Theodore Roosevelt summoned
football leaders to White House to discuss "two choices facing the college game-reform or
abolition." NCAA formed as a "fledgling organization (whose members faced) the common
problem of finding a way to save football from falling off the precipice of violence toward
which it has been careening.").
378. For instances of "pro-competitive" rules unrelated to drug-testing, see id. at 143-48
("Academic Standards"); id. at 148-56 ("Recruiting and Financial Aid Regulations"); id. at
229-34 ("Competitive and Legislative Reorganization").
379. See supra text accompanying notes 61-73.
380. It is less clear what the justification for testing for intoxicants or depressants might be.
However, if it can be plausibly argued that their use significantly affects an athlete's performance
or that significant health hazards are associated with their use in an athletic contest, the requisite
"rational basis" for a drug-testing program which identifies the users of such substances will
probably be met.
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to test for various illegal substances, including such "street drugs" as heroin,
cocaine, and marijuana. Arguably, some of those "street drugs" also have
stimulative effects, or pose health risks, that could account for their banning.
Cocaine, for instance, is banned by the NCAA as a "psychomotor stimulant"
and as a "street drug.""'' The potential constitutional problem lies in the
fact that "street drugs" comprise a separate category that includes other
substances (such as marijuana) that are not classified as stimulants, and are
not labeled in any other way as health hazards or "performance enhancers."
What purpose does this extra category serve? An argument could be made
that it is a catch-all classification for drugs that might adversely affect an
athlete's performance, pose long-term health risks, or pose risks to other
competitors; it would probably be difficult to find a football or basketball
coach in America who does not believe that marijuana is a debilitating or
dangerous drug, and does not have anecdotes to back that conclusion up.
Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the prohibition of "street
drugs" as a category-and marijuana as a particular substance within that
category-is attributable primarily to moral concerns, to a general sense of
those responsible for governing college athletics that those athletes they are
responsible for should not be permitted to "break the law," particularly if
such law-breaking is likely to become public knowledge and create institu-
tional embarrassment.
Counselors will find it difficult to argue that the protection of college-
age students from immoral influences, in the absence of any "reasonable
suspicion" of illegality, is within the powers of a public university or an
intercollegiate athletic association or conference. Clearly, a general desire to
maintain the right "moral" tone does not permit such an institution to ride
roughshod over the constitutional rights of any student, athlete or not.382
The prudent counselor, therefore, will probably advise his institutional client
to remove any overt references to moral concerns or law-enforcement goals
from drug-testing plans, and may also suggest that "street drugs" be dropped
as a separate category. He may feel he stands on firmer ground, though, if
one of the purposes of the plan is defined as a desire to avoid institutional
embarrassment. Thus, it well may be true that a college dependent upon a
state legislature for its funding has a rational-although hardly compelling-
interest in taking prophylactic efforts to avoid damaging publicity. 383
The potentially diverse effects of adverse publicity might also provide a
college with a rational justification for treating athletes as a sub-class within
the student body on the theory that the school will be hurt more by revelations
381. NCAA P~mePET, supra note 52, at 9-10 ("NCAA Banned Drug List 1986").
382. Smyth, 398 F. Supp. 777.
383. Assuming arguendo that the NCAA is a "state actor," it is by no means clear that it
would have the same reputational interest at stake in the absence of a testing plan as would
its member institutions.
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that its All-American basketball player is using cocaine than by similar
revelations about the typical undergraduate. Like arguments keyed to special
concerns about the health or safety of athletes, this argument is predicated
upon the belief that athletes are differently situated from the rest of the
student body, and therefore can be subjected reasonably to different stan-
dards. Clearly, the NCAA can only concern itself with athletes. But when
colleges and universities decide to test only athletes in an environment which
includes many non-athletes, these schools must provide some explanation
why athletes should be singled out as a special class. As long as an institution
can show that athletes are more likely to use a particular substance, or face
special health hazards because they use it, or can obtain a performance-
enhancing effect from using it-or are likely to cause special institutional
problems, such as serious embarrassment and a threat of reduced state
funding (or even alumni contributions)-then singling them out for special
treatment may be legally defensible.
In sum,. the counselor, examining mandatory drug-testing from the per-
spective of the federal "equal protection" clause (or one of its state equiv-
alents), ought to feel some special concern about the legality of his client
testing for "street drugs," particularly marijuana. But as a general propo-
sition, his concerns about "equal protection" problems need not be nearly
as great as his concerns about "due process." For if mandatory testing
constitutes the sort of intrusion into areas or "expectations" of privacy
protected by the Constitution, and if it is conducted coercively and without
valid consent, then concerns about "due process," broadly defined, will put
a heavy-and perhaps insuperable-burden on the NCAA and the colleges
to justify their testing programs. Aside from their interest in privacy and in
being treated in a manner consistent with "fundamental fairness," however,
athletes are unlikely to be regarded by the courts as possessing anything
"fundamental" which testing interferes with, and which as a result, calls
"heightened" or "strict scrutiny" into play. Instead, since the courts have
quite consistently refused to recognize that college athletes have a "liberty"
or a "property" interest in athletic participation, or even in scholarship
renewal,3 8 4 a "mere rationality" test is likely to be applied whenever "equal
protection" is invoked. And in the present social and political climate, it
seems "rational,"-if not necessarily wise-to search for signs that athletes
have been using virtually any substance on the NCAA or IU list. It seems
hardly less "rational" to require them to submit to urinalysis in order that
this search can be carried out.
5. Prudential Considerations: The Risk of Damaging Lawsuits
We have assumed that in a world of unlimited time, money, and legal
resources, college and athletic association counsel would undertake the pains-
384. See supra text accompanying notes 344-49.
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taking constitutional analysis described in the preceeding pages. In the world
where choices about drug-testing programs are actually made, it is unlikely
that any actor would have quite so much information or analytical guidance
available. Nevertheless, the assumption that institutions will expend consid-
erable resources seeking guidance makes sense if we can demonstrate that
they have good reason to believe that by violating the constitutional rights
of athletes, they risk lawsuits that are not only likely to be "losers" from
the institutional point-of-view, but are also likely to prove costly. Thus, it
is at least arguable that a university will consider or even adopt a drug-
testing program that it believes rests on shaky constitutional foundations if
it also believes that the risk of having that program overturned in court will
be outweighed by such benefits as happier coaches and alumni, better athletic
performance, and generally favorable publicity because the institution is
"doing something about drugs." If, however, the likely consequences of
losing include a significant drain on the university (or state) treasury, then
the balance will shift strongly against testing.
Thus, another issue counsel must consider is potential institutional liability
for damages to the athlete. To the extent that this issue is presented because
the athlete has chosen to sue a state or "state actor," or one of its agents,
in federal court, it raises a final set of constitutional questions that must
be addressed.
Typically, these questions will arise when the athlete files a claim for
damages in U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her
civil rights have been violated because of some punitive action taken against
her by the defendant, pursuant to the terms of the "unconstitutional" drug-
testing program.
Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of a student athlete's civil
rights is relevant to the NCAA only if it is determined that the NCAA is a
state actor. In such a case, a finding that mandatory drug-testing has resulted
in the denial of "due process" could result in a money judgment for which
the NCAA would be liable. Most state universities will be immune from the
requirement that they pay statutory damages by virtue of the protection
afforded by the eleventh amendment. However, their officers, at least to
the extent that their actions are undertaken in a "personal" rather than an
"official" capacity, can be held liable. Municipal colleges and universities
ordinarily will not possess the same immunity, but will benefit from a "good
faith" doctrine which ordinarily will have the effect of minimizing the
amount of an adverse judgment.
The special obligation of "state actors" to provide "equal protection"
and "due process" carries with it a special potential for liability arising out
of the violation of the rights guaranteed by those constitutional provisions.
Thus, if it were determined, for example, that a student had been subjected
to an illegal search, or had been deprived of her athletic scholarship because
of the application of a rule which denied her "equal protection," she might
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well seek money damages from her university, and from those of its em-
ployees responsible for requiring or administering the test. Section 1983 of
title 42 of the United States Code has been construed to permit damage
suits against state actors, including educational institutions and their em-
ployees, under certain circumstances, and subject to certain conditions.
The limitation and conditions associated with a section 1983 Civil Rights
action are important to any institution which may be a state actor and is
involved in drug-testing. The fourteenth amendment places limits on the
authority of "states" to deny "due process." Yet the eleventh amendment,
subject to a number of important exceptions, immunizes states from suit in
federal court.38 5 Section 1983 partly resolves the conflict by permitting suits
in federal court against "persons" who, it is claimed, have denied federally-
protected rights "under color of state law." Under this formulation, when
the issue is the enforceability of a regulation or state law which may be
unconstitutional, a plaintiff will ordinarily have no difficulty securing a
review of that regulation or statute by suing the state or local governmental
officials charged with its enforcement. Thus, in seeking injunctive or de-
claratory relief against a state university, plaintiffs will ordinarily sue the
members of the board of regents and individually-named defendants in the
university and athletic department administration.38 6 In some instances, it
will also be possible to name the institution itself as a defendant. Thus, if
the courts determine that a particular "state actor" is sufficiently independent
of direct state control, and is not an "arm of the state" or the state's alter
ego, the eleventh amendment will confer no immunity.3 87 Ordinarily, athletic
associations (if they are deemed "state actors") will fall into this category,
as will some municipal and community colleges.
If, however, a plaintiff sues for money damages, the importance of im-
munity under the eleventh amendment becomes clearer. The general rule is
that states, those agencies which are regarded as "arms of the state," and
employees of the state and of such agencies, if they are acting in the course
of their official duties, are immunized against any judgment requiring pay-
ment directly or indirectly out of the state treasury. 88 This immunity will
not protect all "state actors." Yet state agents who can be sued to secure
injunctive relief are thus in many instances not subject to suit under section
1983 for money damages. Only by suing them in their individual, rather
than their official capacity, and by showing that their actions exceeded the
385. U.S. CONST. amend XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State .. "
386. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
387. For application of the principle to educational institutions, see CIv. ACTIONS AGAINST
STATE GOVERNMENT § 4.31 (1982).
388. See id. at §§ 4.26, 4.35.
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authority the state granted them, will a plaintiff stand any chance of col-
lecting from such defendants.
If the threshold of eleventh amendment immunity is crossed, then even
an unintentional denial of "due process," based on a misunderstanding of
the applicable law, can result in liability, provided that a court determines
that the official responsible, "reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the con-
stitutional rights of the student affected. . . ."8a On the other hand, absent
a showing that the deprivation of "due process" has resulted in actual,
quantifiable damage to the plaintiff, the recovery permitted from the defen-
dant will be only nominal.39
Here, the general unwillingness of the courts to construe future financial
aid or the expectation of a remunerative professional career as cognizable
"property" interests may have the additional effect of denying their dep-
rivation the status of "actual" damage. Reputational harm standing alone
will not constitute the sort of "actual harm" needed to trigger a damage
claim.3 91 Nevertheless, to the extent that the testing institution insures the
confidentiality of test results, it will also make it difficult for the athlete to
claim that such reputational harm has in fact occurred. Thus, should there
be "actual," calculable damage of another sort (perhaps because a current
scholarship has been revoked), it may be difficult for an athlete dismissed
from a squad without publicity and without any institutional statement of
reasons to demonstrate that she has suffered additional, consequential dam-
age to her reputation as a result of her ineligibility.
In summary: the NCAA or similar athletic associations, if deemed "state
actors," would probably have good reason to fear a suit for damages,
although the "good faith" exception and the athlete's difficulty in showing
actual or significant "consequential" damages would probably limit recovery.
Most state universities would appear to have even less to fear. Assuming
that university employees carried out the drug-testing plan in accordance
with the university's official testing policy, they would almost certainly be
deemed to be acting in their official capacity, and would be immune from
personal suits for damages. Thus, in the great majority of cases, the prospect
of violating a student's rights through a drug-testing program of doubtful
(but, it is important to note, still judicially indeterminate) constitutionality
probably would not cause the institution to abandon or cease testing.
C. Non-Constitutional Issues
In addition to the potential problems posed for the NCAA and for public
educational institutions by the Constitution, difficulties can arise as a result
389. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
390. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
391. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 706 (1976).
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of the application of common law doctrines of contract law and tort liability,
and of state and federal statutes designed to protect the privacy of students.
Additional difficulties also may arise if civil rights actions are brought against
athletic associations or colleges under state, rather than federal, law. In
general, these difficulties are more likely to affect colleges and universities
than the NCAA. Thus, the NCAA, unlike its member schools, is not bound
by the provisions of the Buckley Amendment and similar state "educational
privacy" statutes. Consequently, it risks no cut-off of aid for unauthorized
disclosure of test results. Even private colleges risk such a cut-off, however,
if they publish test results without the affected athlete's consent. But the
NCAA, like its members, can be potentially liable for defamation if infor-
mation about an athlete is released, and that information proves incorrect.
Such potential liability is likely to be negligible if the drug-testing program
is carefully designed to detect errors, is scrupulously administered, and takes
due regard of the athlete's privacy concerns.
1. The Violation of Contract Terms
Contract is generally regarded as the basis of a legal relationship between
students at private educational institutions and the institutions themselves.
The obligations of school and athletes stated in the college catalog, and in
other college publications will usually take priority. However, where those
terms are vague or incomplete, courts will usually permit colleges to assert
broad regulatory powers, so long as those powers are generally related to
the institution's stated policies. As a consequence, it is unlikely that any
private institution with a pre-existing drug policy would be prevented from
unilaterally imposing a testing program. Nevertheless, when disciplinary rules
have been imposed without prior notice, or have been applied unevenly and
arbitrarily, the targets of such regulations have sometimes been afforded
relief by the courts. That relief can include restoration of an academic
scholarship which has been revoked. Thus, although it is unlikely that a
private school will be forced to abandon its drug-testing program under a
contract theory, it should be prepared to publicize the provisions of that
program in materials distributed to athletes before the beginning of the
school year, and should take care to administer the program evenhandedly
and in accordance with clear procedural rules.
2. The Violation of Federal and State Privacy Statutes
Colleges and universities frequently will incur a special obligation to main-
tain the confidentiality of "student records" coming into their possession.
That obligation ordinarily will derive from three sources: the so-called "Buck-
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ley Amendment"3 92 of 1972, providing for "family educational and privacy
rights" with respect to "education records"; analogous state statutes, such
as Article 5 of the California Education Code, which provides for "Privacy
of Pupil Records"; and more general privacy statutes or common law doc-
trines, which may in some instances give the victims of false but non-
defaniatory publications an independent right of action.
The "Buckley Amendment" is applicable only to institutions receiving
federal aid;3 93 whether those institutions are "public" or "private" is of no
significance. The liability it imposes is limited to the cutting off of federal
funding, "to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or
practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally iden-
tifiable information contained therein ... ) of students without the written
consent of their parents."3 94
The rule of nondisclosure contains a number of specific exceptions. Thus,
students who have reached the age of eighteen can give their own consent,
and educational institutions can make limted nonconsensual use of records
for such purposes as effecting a student's transfer to another school, eval-
uating financial aid requests, meeting the requirements of accrediting agen-
cies, meeting state and federal financial account requirements, and fulfilling
the requirements of a "judicial order, or ... a lawfully issued subpoena,
upon condition that parents and the students are notified of all such orders
or subpoenas in advance of the compliance therewith by the educational
institution or agency." '395 In addition, "subject to regulations of the Secretary
[of Education], [a school may release information] in connection with an
emergency [to] appropriate persons if the knowledge of such information is
necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other persons." '396
However, a special provision in the statute, by restricting the definition
of "education records," effectively prohibits the release to anyone of in-
formation which in most states would fall within the "physician-patient"
privilege. Specifically covered are:
records on a student who is eighteen years of age or older, or is
attending an institution of post-secondary education, which are made or
maintained by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other recognized
professional or paraprofessional acting in his professional or paraprofes-
sional capacity, or are assisting in that capacity, and which are made,
maintained, and used only in connection with the provision of treatment
to the student, and are not available to anyone other than persons
providing such treatment.... ,,11
392. Codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1972).
393. Id. at § 1232(g)(a)(3).
394. Id. at § 1232(g)(b)(1).
395. Id. at § 1232(g)(b)(2)(B).
396. Id. at § 1232(g)(b)(1)(I).
397. Id. at § 1232(a)(4)(B)(iv)(emphasis added).
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It should be noted that drug-testing results would not appear to fall within
this definition if they are intended to be used for any purpose other than
"treatment of the student," or are released to anyone other than the student
himself, or a physician or similar professional of his choice.
Since many private colleges receive some federal aid, and since the "Buck-
ley Amendment" is not "program specific," that is, it threatens the receipt
of federal funding in areas other than the specific program where a violation
of privacy may have occurred, the Amendment's privacy requirements are
likely to affect most drug-testing institutions. Additional problems will arise
for some, however, because of the concurrent applicability of state statutes
imposing similar restrictions on the release of "education" or "student
records." Many states now have such statutes. Most appear to reach only
public educational institutions within the state, and the majority probably
affect only elementary and secondary schools. However, it is clear that in
some states, statutes and regulations will also have the effect of requiring
that state colleges and universities guarantee "educational privacy." Clearly,
a search of the applicable law in each jurisdiction will be necessary.
It should be emphasized that the protection afforded educational records
has nothing to do with the truthfulness of those records. They are private
whether or not they are accurate, and their unauthorized release cannot be
justified by contending that they are "true." On the other hand, in the
absence of statutory or regulatory protection of such records, the release of
"true" information about a student, including a student-athlete suspended
as a result of positive drug-testing results, should not give rise to any valid
constitutional tort claim for "invasion of privacy."
3. Defamation Arising Out of Publication of Incorrect
Information
Publication may require making information available to an audience wider
than the athlete and university officials having free access to the student-
athlete's records.
Even an incorrect test result leading to suspension will not support a
defamation action if the results of the test in question are never published,
and the testing agency never states or implies that the suspension in question
was a response to its tests.
Public institutions may be protected by tort claims acts, which in virtually
every state have replaced the common law doctrine of "sovereign immunity."
These acts may bar defamation actions altogether; may impose a standard
of misconduct higher than mere negligence; may impose dollar limits on the
amount receivable; and will impose strict requirements with respect to how
and when defamation actions are filed. If the only damage an athlete alleges
in a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is loss of reputation, the
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availability of a defamation suit in state court as an alternative may preclude
bringing the civil rights suit altogether. 38
The legal standards for imposing liability vary depending upon whether
the plaintiff-athlete is a public figure. If the plaintiff is a public figure, the
governing standard is "actual malice," that is, knowledge that the published
information was false, or "reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." 13 " The standard for imposing liability when the plaintiff is not a public
figure is something more than "liability without fault." 4°° There will be no
"recovery of presumed or punitive damages... [without] a showing of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."4'4
Public figures are persons "of such persuasive power and influence that
they are deemed public figures for all purposes" or persons who "have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order
to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Simple notoriety, as
demonstrated by public interest in a scandalous news story, is not sufficient
to make one a public figure. 40 2 It should be noted that a football coach at
a major university who was accused of "throwing" a game was treated as
a public figure. 4°3
A key element in determining whether a public figure plaintiff is entitled
to any damages, or whether a non-public figure plaintiff is entitled to punitive
damages is the degree of fault which is assigned to the publisher of the false
story.
Determining the existence of "actual malice" or a "reckless disregard for
the truth" ordinarily involves a factual inquiry into the techniques of in-
terviewing, investigation, and record-keeping employed. It also depends upon
the discovery of evidence of intent to highlight, cover up, ignore, or mis-
represent facts which were available to the publisher or would have been
available had care been taken.
In the context of drug-testing, where the "facts" are the results of chemical
or spectroscopic analysis, and where the publisher of those results is the
institution commissioning or conducting that analysis, "malice" and "reck-
lessness" will in part be determined by the court's finding as to the reliability
of testing procedures used, the care employed in running particular tests,
and the "reasonableness" of relying on the testing procedures chosen. When
a test is reliable to a high degree of certainty, is administered so as to
minimize the likelihood of obtaining "false positive" results, and is inter-
398. Paul, 424 U.S. 693.
399. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
400. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
401. Id. at 349.
402. Times, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See also Wolston v. Readers' Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
403. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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preted by experts using clement, formal procedures, accurately publicizing
test results will probably not be regarded as negligence and certainly will
not be regarded as either "malicious" or "reckless." However, if a test
cannot state with virtually total certainty that a particular individual has
used specific drugs, yet the test results are published in a manner which
states or strongly implies that a particular athlete is a drug-user, that athlete
will stand a good chance of proving negligence and may be able to show
"reckless" conduct as well.
4. Sovereign Immunity and State "Civil Rights" Claims
The problems posed by the eleventh amendment do not apply if the athlete
sues the testing institution under either federal or state civil rights statutes
in the state where the alleged unconstitutional testing occurred. Thus, for
example, it might be possible for an Indiana athlete to sue the NCAA or
Indiana University in the Indiana courts. In such a case, the basis of the
claim will be the existence of a so-called "constitutional tort." As far as
Indiana University or its officials are concerned, however, whether that tort
will be actionable or not, and if so, what recovery will be allowed, will
depend on the relevant tort claims act in Indiana. Clearly, Indiana University
is protected by the provisions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act.4°4
However, the NCAA, or any similar athletic association, is in a somewhat
more difficult position. If it is not a "state actor," then 42 U.S.C. § 1983
does not apply. But other state civil rights statutes, which do not require
"state action," might. In such a case, the limited sovereign immunity granted
public entities would offer no protection at all. Yet even if an athletic
association is regarded as a "state actor" for some purposes, it does not
necessarily follow that it will be regarded as a public entity for the purpose
of any state tort claims act. In other words, by acting as the alter ego of
the state, it is at least possible that the NCAA could take on all of the
state's potential liabilities, without assuming any of the state's constitutional
or statutory protections.
III. THE LITIGATOR'S ROLE
The litigator representing an athlete must perform several basic tasks.
First, he must analyze the relevant law, probing for weak spots in the legal
theories that the institution might use to justify its testing program. Second,
to the extent that the litigator detects a weakness that does not appear to
be absolute, but instead is contingent on the existence of certain facts, he
404. IND. CODE § 34-4-16.5-2 (1974) (a "State college or university" is defined as a "political
subdivision" of the State for the purposes of the act).
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must develop those facts as best he can, and construct a plausible argument
that those facts are determinative in his client's case. If, after examining the
law and the facts of the particular case, he determines either that there
appears to be no controlling precedent at all (i.e., that there is a doctrinal
"gap" in the law), or that the testing institution has strong precedent on
its side, he must advise his client of that fact. Should the athlete wish to
continue her lawsuit, the attorney will then be required to "fill the gap,"
or to challenge some or all of that precedent on grounds of "policy" or
"principle."
When a testing program is attacked, all of its legally questionable features
must be brought to the fore. Failure to raise a relevant issue in the early
stages of legal proceedings will probably bar the athlete from raising that
issue later on. Thus, the litigator will inevitably duplicate much of the
analytical work of institutional counsel. The same basic legal issues will be
"mapped" to determine whether the testing is amenable to constitutional,
statutory, or common law challenge. Unlike institutional counsel, the ath-
lete's lawyer will not necessarily be aware of the theory that the college,
university, or athletic association may have developed to justify its testing
program. On the other hand, the athlete's lawyer will not be concerned
initially with why the institution believes it can test; instead, his first goal
will be to construct alternative theories of unlawful conduct and potential
liability, and then identify fundamental flaws in the testing program which
will establish a strong-and perhaps irrebuttable-inference that the pro-
gram, as designed or implemented, is either patently unconstitutional, or
otherwise illegal. Thus, it is important to remember that the athlete, as the
moving party, has the initial opportunity to frame the legal issues. The
institution will be required to meet those issues before presenting its own
theory as to why testing is justified.
A. "First Level" Arguments
Assuming that the athlete's lawyer has reached similar conclusions about
the relevant law as institutional counsel, the litigator's initial-or "first
level"-argument will not focus heavily on issues such as compelled self-
incrimination or a broad right of personal privacy unrelated to the specific
protections of the fourth amendment. Nor, except in the rare instance when
unauthorized disclosure of test results has occurred, will he focus on statutory
or common law "confidentiality" issues. Existing precedent suggests that
under ordinary circumstances, all of these issues will be "losers" for the
athlete. The litigator's initial arguments will be devoted to issues that either
make a prima facie "winning" case for the athlete or might be regarded by
a court as doing so.
As earlier sections of this Article have suggested, the strongest of these
arguments-at least when public colleges and universities are involved, and
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the action is brought under a claim of right derived from the U.S. Consti-
tution-turn on the fourth amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable
searches and seizures." Assuming for the moment that "state action" exists,
and that the athlete is contesting the institutional use of a "positive" test
result, the litigator's "first level" argument almost certainly will be framed
this way:
1.) the institution is obliged to refrain from "unreasonable," warrantless
searches;
2.) urinalysis constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment;
3.) in the absence of "valid consent," the institution will be permitted
to conduct a warrantless search only if
a.) the intrusion is justified by a judicially-created "exigency"
exception to the fourth amendment; or
b.) the institution has "probable cause" to believe that some
crime or violation of rules has occurred; or
c.) within the specific context of an "administrative search,"
the institution has at least some "individualized suspicion" of a
rule violation;
4.) in the instant case, no "valid consent" was obtained, because the
"waiver forms" signed by the athlete were coerced by a threat to deny
eligibility and future scholarship aid, and such coercion constitutes an "un-
constitutional condition";
5.) no general "exigency" exception exists that permits general, war-
rantless searches of college students;
6.) neither "probable cause" nor "individualized suspicion" has been
demonstrated by the institution conducting the testing; and
7.) therefore, because the urinalysis actually conducted was unconstitu-
tional, the institution should be enjoined from continuing it, and the athlete's
eligibility and future scholarship opportunities should be reinstated.
The same basic argument, truncated somewhat, will probably be made if
the institution penalizes an athlete for refusing to be tested. In such a case,
by relying on the decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court,4°5 and See v.
Seattle,4°6 and treating the decision in Wyman v. James,407 as an anomaly,
the athlete's lawyer will argue that fourth amendment rights attach at the
moment the search is coerced by threatened deprivation of benefits. Con-
sequently, the doctrine of ".unconstitutional conditions" will apply even
though no urinalysis has in fact taken place.
No comparable argument for the prima facie unconstitutionality of drug-
testing by the NCAA can be made after Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 408 Blum v.
405. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
406. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
407. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
408. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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Yaretsky,409 and Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 410 since these cases, as I have argued
above, compel the conclusion that the NCAA, despite dozens of older cases
to the contrary, will ordinarily not be regarded as a "state actor" for
purposes of federal constitutional law. Given the results in those cases, it is
unclear whether there are any circumstances under which the quantum of
cooperation between the association and its public institution members would
be sufficient to bring "state action" doctrine into play. But it is certain that
the sort of collective influence exercised when various public institutions
participate in. the sort of membership vote which resulted in the adoption
of the current NCAA drug-testing program does not constitute the sort of
"nexus" or "symbiotic relationship" that case law now demands.
However, two other avenues of argument are open to the litigator who
chooses to attack NCAA rules. Thus, as was suggested above, a claim under
state constitutional law may not require "state action." Further, various
state constitutional provisions may afford substantive rights to individuals-
such as a broad right to "privacy"-that extend beyond those guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution. In such a case, it might be possible to demon-
strate-as Stanford University athlete Simone Levant recently did-that the
NCAA testing program violated state-protected rights.
Alternatively, the litigator might look to the nature of the relationship
between the NCAA, its member institutions, and the student-athletes whose
conduct is governed by NCAA rules. Under the NCAA Constitution, only
"[c]olleges, universities, and other institutions of learning, athletic confer-
ences or associations[,] and other groups related to intercollegiate athlet-
ics ... are eligible for membership." '41' The principal "condition and
obligation" of membership is that all such members," administer their
athletic programs in accordance with the constitution, the bylaws, and other
legislation of the association. ' 412 This obligation is subject to the general
"principle of institutional control and responsibility": "The control and
responsibility for the conduct of intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised
by the institution itself and by the conference, if any, of which it is a
member." 43 Specifically included within the responsibility of particular mem-
ber institutions are decisions to exclude from "intercollegiate athletic com-
petition" individual athletes who do not meet NCAA eligibility criteria.414
Failure of such members to exclude ineligible athletes from competition is
grounds for the NCAA to impose sanctions on the member institutions
409. 457 U:S. 991 (1982).
410. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
411. NCAA CONSr. art. IV, § 1.
412. Id. at § 2(a).
413. Id. at art. II, § 2.
414. Id. at art. III, § 9 ("An institution shall not permit a student-athlete to represent it in
intercollegiate athletic competition unless the student-athlete meets the following requirements
of eligibility ... ").
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themselves. 415 Thus, although the NCAA Constitution and bylaws list nu-
merous requirements that an athlete must meet in order to be "eligible" to
compete in intercollegiate athletics or in "NCAA championships," and also
list a variety of circumstances (including testing "positive" on an NCAA-
administered drug test) which will result in "ineligibility," direct responsi-
bility for barring an athlete from actual competition lies with the institutions
themselves. 416 This fact is a necessary corollary of the NCAA's status as a
voluntary association, deriving its powers from the mutual consensual ob-
ligations which its members have assumed to abide by the association's rules.
Institutions, because they are members of the NCAA and have agreed to
administer intercollegiate athletics in accordance with its rules, are obligated
to apply those rules when athletes fall to meet NCAA eligibility criteria.41 7
Athletes, because they are not (and cannot be) members of the NCAA, have
no direct obligations to the NCAA, and cannot be directly regulated by the
NCAA absent individual contractual undertakings with the association itself.
Instead, their obligations stem from their decisions to enroll at particular
educational institutions and abide by the rules those institutions promulgate.
NCAA control over the conduct of student-athletes is thus indirect, since it
is exercised through the actions of NCAA member institutions, and is en-
forced through NCAA sanctions on those members who permit ineligible
athletes to participate in violation of NCAA rules.418
415. See id. at art. IV, § 2(c) ("The members of this Association agree ... [t]o establish
and maintain high standards of personal honor, eligibility, and fair play"); id. at § 6(b) ("The
membership of any active or allied member failing to maintain the academic or athletic standards
required for membership or failing to meet the conditions and obligations of membership may
be terminated or suspended or the member otherwise disciplined by a vote of two-thirds of
the delegates present and voting at an annual Convention .. ."); see also NCAA Bylaw 9-5
("Discipline of Members"); 1986-87 NCAA MANUAL 206-21 (1986) ("Official Procedure Gov-
erning the NCAA Enforcement [hereinafter "Enforcement"]).
416. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 355 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977) ("The Association does not itself declare student-athletes in-
eligible, but its rules require member institutions to take such action in specified circumstan-
ces.").
417. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 95 Nev. 389, 396, 594 P.2d 1159, 1164 ("[Tlhe NCAA may claim
a contractual right to bind the university to enforce the NCAA's decisions by sanctions it
deems appropriate.").
418. See "Enforcement," supra note 415, at 9-(a): "When the (Committee on Infractions)
or NCAA Council finds that there has been a violation of the constitution or bylaws affecting
the eligibility of the individual student-athlete or student-athletes, the institution involved...
shall be notified of the violation ..... it being understood that if the institution fails to take
appropriate action, the involved institution shall be cited to show cause under the Association's
regular enforcement procedures why it should not be disciplined for failure to do so." (emphasis
added); see also id. at 10 ("If a student-athlete who is ineligible under the terms of the
constitution, bylaws or other legislation of the Association is permitted to participate in inter-
collegiate competition contrary to such NCAA legislation but in accordance with the terms of
a court restraining order or injunction operative against the institution attended by such student-
athlete or the Association, or both, and said injunction is subsequently voluntarily vacated,
stayed, reversed or finally determined by the courts that injunctive relief is not or was not
justified, the Council may take [disciplinary] actions against such institutions in the interest of
restitution or fairness to competing institutions .. " (emphasis added)).
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The significance of this structure of mediated control is that when NCAA
drug-testing rules are applied against athletes, they are in a strict legal sense-
if not always in fact-applied by the institutions those athletes attend. Thus,
if that institution is a "state actor," its enforcement of the NCAA drug-
testing program will be subject to exactly the same constitutional scrutiny
as the enforcement of its own, home-grown testing program would be.
Athletes attending public colleges who are subjected to testing mandated by
the NCAA will thus be able to challenge that testing by suing their home
institutions under either of the fourth amendment theories described in this
section of the Article.
B. "Second Level" Arguments
The purpose of the litigator's "first level" arguments is to establish as
conclusively as possible that as a matter of law the drug-testing of college
athletes is forbidden. Yet if the basis of those arguments is an asserted
fourth amendment protection from the sort of search the institution is
promoting, they are unlikely to be accepted as unconditional by any court.
Instead, to a greater or lesser degree, they will depend on a showing that
under the facts of the particular case, the testing institution's program is
violative of the asserted right. A similar showing will always be required if
the athlete's claim is based exclusively on the "due process" clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Assuming that he can show that the requisite "lib-
erty" or "property" interest exists, the athlete's attorney will still be required
to demonstrate that, on balance, his client will be hurt more by the insti-
tution's testing procedures than the institution will be benefited by retaining
them. Only if "first level" arguments are based on an asserted right of
"privacy" under a state constitution will there be some chance that a judge
might treat testing as absolutely impermissible. Even then, it is more likely
that the circumstances of the intrusion will be taken into account.
Almost inevitably, then, the litigator will feel bound to supplement ar-
guments that testing is prima facie unconstitutional with more limited, "sec-
ond level" arguments which attempt to demonstrate that, even within the
context of the "balancing" framework sometimes favored by the courts, the
interests of the athlete outweigh the interests of the testing institution. He
will do so even though he probably realizes that "second level" arguments
of this sort are in some sense concessive, since they always undercut his
more absolute first position. 419
419. Thus, the characteristic form of the two arguments when combined is: "Testing is
always wrong for reason X; but even if X does not always apply, it applies now, given
circumstances Y, which currently obtain."
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1. Fourth Amendment "Privacy" and Fourteenth Amendment
"Due Process" Claims: The General Argument
Contextual arguments are always necessary when the constitutional issue
at stake is protection under the fourth amendment. For as has already been
demonstrated, whether the particular question being litigated is the existence
of a "search," the permissibility of dispensing with the warrant requirement,
the level of "individualized suspicion" necessary before an institution can
begin searching without a warrant, or the degree of coercion that will be
permitted before consent is invalidated, virtually every relevant issue arising
under the fourth amendment appears to turn ultimately on what the court
believes to be "reasonable under all the circumstances."
Thus, the adage frequently recited by the Supreme Court that "the fourth
amendment bars only 'unreasonable' searches and seizures" 420 has the po-
tential of validating a great many intrusive practices in the world of college
athletics, including mandatory drug-testing. A significant part of the liti-
gator's job is to limit that potential by demonstrating as specifically as
possible why such testing imposes significant costs on the athlete while
yielding few concrete benefits to the institution. To support this assertion,
he will place heavy emphasis on the presumptive existence of the right to
be left alone, the intrusiveness of the testing, and its likely harsh conse-
quences. He will also argue that such testing is unnecessary, and will con-
tribute little or nothing to the welfare of the athletic team, the athletic
association, or the school mandating urinalysis.
Because "context" is, by definition, specific to a particular lawsuit, we
can only hypothesize about the "facts" he is likely to emphasize, and the
way he is likely to weave them into his argument. It is possible, however,
to offer a few representative examples of his probable approach.
Consider, for example, our female athlete who has been required to submit
to testing, and has tested "positive" for marijuana. Assume that the testing
occurred immediately after she completed running a marathon, and that the
testing was conducted in a locker room under the supervision of a female
trainer and female laboratory technician. Assume also that because she was
dehydrated after the race, it took her more than two hours to produce the
necessary urine sample. Her attorney would probably first look at the de-
cisions discussing "intrusiveness, ' 421 and make the best use he could out of
420. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 147 (1925).
421. See Caruso v. Ward, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (Identifying "the
degree of intrusiveness" as "the first factor in the reasonableness test," noting that "[a] person's
perception as to the scope or degree of any governmental intrusion is ordinarily dependent
upon what his legitimate expectation of privacy is in the area intrided upon," and concluding
"a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids.").
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them, given their contradictory results. 422 He would thus focus on those
factors discussed by judges who believed that testing was particularly intru-
sive, because, among other things, "the subject ... would be required to
perform before another person what is an otherwise very private bodily
function which necessarily involves exposing one's private parts, an expe-
rience which even if courteously supervised can be humiliating and de-
grading," ' 423 and if required to submit to testing, the subject would be forced
to reveal a great deal of otherwise personal information:
One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances
making it available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover
the personal physiological secrets it holds, except as part of a medical
examination. It is significant that.., urine can be analyzed in a medical
laboratory to discover numerous physiological facts about the person
from whom it came, including but hardly limited to recent ingestion of
alcohol or drugs.42
Having isolated the qualities of urinalysis that appear to make it most
suspect in the eyes of the law, i.e., its potential for inflicting humiliation
and the virtually limitless information it provides about the person being
tested, the athlete's attorney would then highlight those aspects of our
hypothetical case that suggest that his client was in fact humiliated, and that
the testing actually employed in fact revealed a great deal about her. Thus,
he would probably lay particular stress on the semi-public location of the
testing, its timing and duration after an exhausting race, the fact that it was
supervised, the difficulties of producing the urine sample and its attendant
embarrassments, and the fact that whatever the institution's intentions, in-
suring the confidentiality of test results would be virtually impossible. 425 In
all likelihood, he would also emphasize that in this case, the subject of the
testing was a woman, who under customary social norms, had a greater
expectation of privacy with respect to urination than would a male peti-
422. See supra notes 171-87 and accompanying text.
423. Caruso, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 793, (citing Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (D.C.
Wis. 1985)).
424. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa). It should be noted, however,
that the Eighth Circuit later validated the mandatory urinalysis of prison guards at issue in
the case, holding that although privacy interests were implicated, "[u]rinalysis -properly ad-
ministered is not as intrusive as a strip search or a blood test." McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d
1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987).
425. The prospect for extensive publicity was revealed in the aftermath of the December,
1986 testing conducted by the NCAA prior to the holiday season bowl games. Many of the
athletes who tested "positive"-including University of Oklahoma linebacker Brian Bosworth-
were exposed to instant and wide-spread negative publicity. See, e.g., Suspension of 21 Football
Players from Bowl Games for Taking Steroids Renews Debate over Purpose of Drug Tests and
Appropriate Penalties, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 7. 1987, at 34, col. 2; NCAA Suspends 5
Who Failed Drug Test, Chron. Higher Educ., Dec. 17, 1986, at 31, col. 1. More recently, the
results of drug-testing conducted during the March, 1987 NCAA Basketball Tourney have
received similar publicity, although no one apparently failed the randomly administered test.
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tioner. 426 Additionally, the attorney would point to the wide range of sub-
stances whose use is explicitly discoverable under the NCAA and prototype
Indiana plans, and would make two additional observations: first, other
substances not specifically being searched for by the testing institution, yet
capable of causing embarrassment, could easily be revealed (e.g., by-products
of birth control pills and blood sugar levels associated with diabetes); and
second, even with regard to substances on the list, the evidence of use is
not likely to be 100% conclusive, or is not likely to be able to prove
conclusively that the use that probably did occur occurred recently or often.
427
The second observation moves the litigator's argument beyond the "pri-
vacy" component of fourth amendment jurisprudence, suggesting that the
athlete has an additional interest which ought to be taken into account,
namely, an interest in not being penalized on the basis of evidence that is
questionable or is of questionable relevance to the testing institution. Clearly,
this contention lies at the heart of the litigator's procedural "due process"
argument, which is formally-but not analytically-independent of his fourth
amendment argument. Thus, if the litigator wants to confront testing pro-
cedures head on, he will first have to prove the existence of some affected
"liberty" or "property" interest, and then convince the court that, under
the "balancing" test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,428 that interest, when
weighed against the competing interests of the testing institution, requires
greater procedural protection than that institution is in fact providing. As-
suming for the moment that the athlete possesses an interest of constitutional
magnitude, the court would be required to compare it with "[tihe Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. 429
Presumably, if the athlete's interest were considered great, and the gov-
ernment's minimal, then the court would be more likely to take seriously
"the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the athlete's] interest through the
[testing and hearing] procedures used,''430 and would also be more likely to
426. Thus, it is virtually universal for men to use urinals in public, which are far less
"private" than the closed toilet stalls that are almost always made available for women. If
proponents of testing argue that the difference in these arrangements reflects differences in
physiology, and not a recognition of-or greater respect for-female privacy expectations, they
supply their opponents with a strong counter-argument. For it is precisely these physiological
differences that make the production of a nicely-bottled urine sample by a woman a more
difficult and messier affair-and hence, make such production arguably much more humiliating.
427. According to one account, "9 delta THC [the principal active ingredient in marijuana]
localizes in body fat.., and disappears slowly." D. DusEK & D. GnUANo, supra note 264,
at 92 (citing W. Arono & J. Cassidy, Effect of smoking marijuana and of a high-nicotine
cigarette on angina-pectoris, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND ToraAPEUtncs, 17(5): 549-54 (1975)).
428. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
429. Id.
430. Id. (revised to reflect the drug-testing context).
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recognize "the probable value ... of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards .... ,,411 On the other hand, if the government's interest were
considered great and the athlete's minimal, then despite a recognition that
the procedures used were "less than perfect," the court would be more
likely to say that they were "good enough."
The practical burden on the athlete's attorney arguing denial of procedural
"due process" would therefore be three-fold. First, he would have to dem-
onstrate that the testing or hearing procedures employed, considered sepa-
rately or together, in fact invited significant and unacceptable error. This
argument appears to be strongest when some reasonable and readily available
alternative exists that will guarantee a superior level of accuracy. If, for
example, an institution treated "positive ' EMIT results as dispositive without
confirmation via a second analysis of the sample using another laboratory
method, improvement would clearly be possible. In such a case, th& insti-
tution might still question the necessity of engaging in a second, expensive
procedure. Clearly, if the cost of confirmation was astronomical, and the
marginal increase in accuracy it afforded was statistically slight, a court
might conclude that the confirmation was not in fact "reasonable" or
"readily available."
Thus, it is incumbent on the litigator to demonstrate that in the world
where testing actually occurs, there are certain implicit standards of accuracy
that are generally accepted by testing institutions, and certain generally
accepted methods of insuring through confirmation that such accuracy is in
fact achieved. If, for example, he can show that most institutions admin-
istering EMIT tests require confirmation through a second chemical assay,
or through gas chromatography or mass spectroscopy, the burden will prob-
ably shift to the institutional defendant to explain why it should not be
required to do likewise. If, however, the institution in fact conducted its
testing under guidelines compatible with the NCAA or IU plans, both of
which in fact employ the extremely reliable technology of gas chromatog-
raphy to confirm initial "positives, ' 43 2 then the litigator would have to argue,
using the best statistical evidence available, that a latent danger of a "false
positive" still existed, and that the court should treat that danger as signif-
icant enough so as to bar testing altogether.
Similar arguments could, of course, be made if the issue being litigated
were the sort of notice, hearing, or procedural record afforded the athlete,
rather than the sort of testing method being employed. Thus, if the question
is, "what is reasonable under all the circumstances?," those circumstances
431. Id.
432. See P. Gr;taELui & E. IMWEMELRED, supra note 8, at 232 (gas chromatography highly
effective as a means of separating components in a sample and isolating small amounts for
analysis; less reliable as a qualitative device, since more than one substance can reveal same
test pattern; if used in conjunction with mass spectroscopy, virtually infallible).
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will necessarily include the sorts of hearings provided by other, similarly
situated institutions when they look into alleged drug violations by students
or other disciplinary breaches. Certainly, the litigator will want to familiarize
himself with the practices of other testing institutions, and all of the relevant
case law he can find that suggests that such institutions are required to do
such things as create a reviewable record, 433 or give adequate notice to the
athlete, before testing is imposed, of what the controlling rules of conduct
are.434 It is worth noting, however, that Goss v. Lopez43 not only establishes
minimal hearing and notice requirements in an academic setting where student
"liberty" or "property" interests are at stake, but also comes close to
establishing the maximum content of procedural protection.43 6
Let us return, then, to the testing procedures themselves. There, we quickly
discover that there is no magic formula that tells a court how much of a
risk of inaccuracy is too much. If urinalysis is wrong thirty times out of a
hundred, is that "too much?" Probably. If urinalysis is wrong two times
out of ten thousand, is that "too much?" Probably not. But how is a court
to decide where to draw the line? The "balancing" approach suggests that
the only possible approach is to look at the respective interests of the athlete
and the testing institution, and to intuit the appropriate answer after taking
"all the circumstances" into account. Such an approach does not add up
to a mathematical formula. Instead, it gives the court considerable leeway
to be convinced by the arguments of opposing counsel-and a considerable
opportunity to be guided by the preconceptions of its members. The litigator
may not be able to overcome those preconceptions. Thus, if a judge believes
that the interests of a state institution in maintaining "discipline" are, as a
general matter, more significant than those of an athlete seeking to compete,
she has plenty of opportunity to discount the hardships a disqualified athlete
may face, and to inflate the dangers that unchecked drug use may pose to
a school or an athletic program. Nevertheless, the second and third parts
of the litigator's practical burden are to demonstrate as factually and graph-
ically as possible how important to the athlete competition is, and how
relatively unimportant detecting drug use is.
Within the context of the "due process" argument, meeting the second
part of the burden requires an emphasis on deprivations of "right" other
than those arguably protected by the fourth amendment. Thus, for example,
the litigator will attempt to convince the court that the athlete facing dis-
433. See, e.g., Duffley v. New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 446 A.2d 462 (N.H.
1982).
434. Cf. Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974) (Coach could not
be fired for violating athletic association rule since the rule, as published, did not give adequate
notice of the severity of the penalty for scheduling early practice.).
435. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
436. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 681-82 (1977); cf. id. at 692-700 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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qualification faces a variety of other things as well: a possible revocation
or non-renewal of scholarship; a lost opportunity to compete for a spot on
the U.S. Olympic Track Squad; a loss of commercial endorsements that the
athlete, as a successful marathoner, probably would have earned had she
been able to compete in the Olympics; and, perhaps, because of reputational
damage, a diminished opportunity to find gainful employment outside of
sports. (It must be emphasized, however, that all of these arguments, with
the exception of those involving possible revocation of an existing scholar-
ship, are likely to fall on deaf ears. Even if reinforced with statistical evidence
about probable loss of earnings, the courts have, with rare exceptions, 437
been unwilling to treat economic claims as anything more than "specula-
tive. ' 438 Thus, the same sort of analysis that has supported the view that
athletic competition is not a "liberty" or "property" interest at all would
also support a finding that if such a protectable interest in fact existed, it
would not be a particularly important one.)
In meeting the third part of his "due process" burden, however, the
litigator will necessarily attempt to refute at least some of the same assertions
of governmental interest that he will also have to address within the context
of the fourth amendment. Thus, part of the governmental interest in adopting
a drug-testing program with particular testing and hearing procedures is to
regulate student conduct while incurring minimal "fiscal and administrative
burdens. ' 439 Under the Matthews v. Eldridge "balancing test," these are
valid considerations. Procedural "due process," in other words, can be
conditioned at least on the resources of the testing institution, and the
demands that are put on them. If the college or athletic association is
financially strapped, working with a minimal staff, and intent on dealing
with a large number of athletes, it theoretically might be able to offer fewer
or less substantial protections than if it were well-to-do, overstaffed, and
concerned about the status of relatively few athletes.
As Eldridge makes clear, however, the primary determinant of the insti-
tution's interest is the institutional "function involved" in the testing pro-
gram. "Function" here means something like "institutional purpose" or
"institutional goal." So defined, it has essentially identical significance for
the litigator whether he is arguing his client's case directly under the "due
process" clause of the fourteenth amendment or according to a fourth
amendment theory. For in both instances, the athlete's attorney will be
compelled to argue that the goal in fact is not valid or important, or is not
well-served by the testing program actually adopted. Each of these arguments
437. Hall v. University of Minn., 350 F. Supp. 104 (). Minn. 1982); Duffley, 446 A.2d
462.
438. Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976).
439. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
440. Id.
19871
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
is to some extent fact-dependent. For example, the argument that finding
evidence of marijuana is not a "valid concern" of a state university will be
enhanced if the attorney can show that tests given incoming freshmen athletes
are so discriminating that they will reveal casual marijuana use which oc-
curred long before the athlete ever set foot on the university's campus.
Similarly, the argument that marijuana testing is not an "important concern"
will depend on the factual evidence that suggests either that marijuana is a
particularly toxic substance likely to affect both an athlete's health and his
behavior on the playing field, or suggests that, on the contrary, it is ap-
proximately as dangerous to the athlete as tobacco, is unlikely to precipitate
incidents involving other athletes, and, at least if smoked in moderation well
in advance of competition, is also unlikely to affect the athlete's performance.
Assuming that an institution might have good reason to be concerned if its
athletes are using marijuana-or cocaine, or steroids, or any other prohibited
substance-the attorney for an athlete still might argue that mandatory
testing should be deemed illegal because it is not truly consensual, is clearly
intrusive, and is likely to produce very little information that could not be
obtained in some other, less constitutionally-suspect way. Here, the factual
determinants of the legal argument are likely to be the physical or behavioral
signs of drug abuse which, athlete's counsel will probably argue, should be
visible to a competent coaching or training staff, and should be sufficient
to permit appropriate remedial or punitive action.
2. "Unconstitutional Conditions:" The Litigator's Response
As has already been suggested, it is clearly in the litigator's interest to
present the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" via a "first level"
argument. Indeed, to the extent that the doctrine has been given force by
the courts, it has almost always been characterized as an absolute rule. Yet
the litigator also has to be aware that the rule is not always applied in
situations where it would seem analytically appropriate, and that when it is
not applied, the reason appears to be the often-unstated judicial belief that
a "balancing" of the interests of the state and of the individual is preferable
to a per se prohibition which would prevent the state from ever curtailing
a "privilege" whenever that curtailment would abridge a constitutional
"right."'
441. By not attacking the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" head-on, judges who
are apparently uncomfortable with it are sometimes moved to engage in amazing feats of
judicial prestidigitation. In Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir.
1986), for example, two drivers were lawfully stopped and asked to submit to breathalyzer
tests. They refused to be tested, and were penalized under the provisions of the Alaska "implied
consent" statute. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that "the administration of a breath test is
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore subject to the requirements
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Therefore, to stand a better chance of claiming the benefits of the sup-
posedly "absolute" doctrine, the athlete's attorney is probably in fact going
to be forced to make a concurrent "second level" argument. His claim,
however, will be based on facts identical to the one described in the preceding
paragraphs. Thus, he will probably argue that given the strength of his
client's interest in the "privilege" of athletic competition (e.g., the possibility
of competing in the Olympic games, obtaining endorsements, etc.), and the
inconsequentiality of the institution's interest, the court should be particularly
mindful of her fourth amendment rights, and should not countenance any
institutional attempt to force her to relinquish them.
3. Arguing "Privacy" under State Law
Even if an attorney encounters state constitutional law that creates a broad
and seemingly absolute "right to privacy," questions will always exist as to
what activities fall within that right. In California, for instance, until Feb-
ruary, 1987, no court had been asked to consider whether the mandatory
drug-testing of athletes violated the provisions of the state constitution,
although state courts had previously decided that mandatory drug-testing in
an employment context might, under certain circumstances, violate privacy
rights guaranteed by the California Constitution.442 As was noted above, to
determine if governmental (or covered non-governmental) action infringes
upon privacy rights in California, a court must first determine if the interest
in question is one in which an individual has "a... personal and objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy," 443 and then, if such a privacy interest
exists, the Court must determine if the state has the requisite "compelling
public need" to abridge the privacy right."4 Both parts of this analytical
process are contextual. Thus, neither the existence of a "personal expecta-
tion" of privacy with respect to urinalysis nor the "objective reasonableness"
of that amendment." Id. at 1449. It also acknowledged that "the government may not impose
conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights." Id. at 1450. Yet it rejected
the petitioners' argument that because the implied consent statute conditioned use of the Alaska
highways on submission to a breathalyzer test, an "unconstitutional condition" had in fact
been imposed. Instead, it asserted: "[n]o rights were relinquished here, however, because there
is no Fourth Amendment right to refuse a breathalyzer examination." Id.
That conclusion begs the question. The whole point of the fourth amendment is to prevent
"unreasonable searches and seizures," and the entire rationale for the doctrine of "unconsti-
tutional conditions" in the fourth amendment context is to prevent the end-run around the
"reasonableness" requirement which would resultif a coerced waiver of fourth amendment
rights were permitted. Here, the state attempted to coerce such a waiver. Therefore, the court
was logically obligated to address the "reasonableness" of the search that would have been
conducted had the petitioners submitted to breathalyzer tests.
442. See Bishop, supra note 191, at 29-32.
443. People ex rel. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Ct., 164 Cal. App. 3d 526, 540-41, 210
Cal. Rptr. 695, 703-04 (1985).
444. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (1975).
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of that expectation can be determined without examining the circumstances
of the testing. And it is clear that "compelling public need," if it can be
shown at all, will depend on a concrete illustration of the dangers posed by
drugs and facts to support assertions that testing is an effective way to
forestall these dangers, and is in fact the only practical way of doing so.
It seems inevitable, therefore, that suits brought under state "privacy"
provisions will address the same factual issues as suits brought under the
fourth amendment, although the weight those facts assume will vary, de-
pending on the nature of the action. Thus, in her recent successful suit,
Simone Levant made good use of the open-endedness of testing, convincing
the court that the procedures used by the NCAA had the potential to reveal
a wide range of things about her personal life (such as her birth control
practices), that either were none of the NCAA's business, or not of such
nature that the NCAA had any compelling need to know them.
C. "Third Level" Arguments
Sometimes, the athlete's attorney will confront a legal environment in
which arguments helpful to his case will not exist because of "gaps" in the
law. As an example, we can imagine a litigator trying to base his client's
claim on the proposition, apparently untested on the college level in any
state, that a university's testing of its athletes is ultra vires.
I will characterize an attempt to convince a court that it should adopt a
new theory for deciding a case as a "third level" argument. However, since
I believe (for reasons that will become clearer in the concluding section of
this Article) that such theories are unlikely to play a major part in drug-
testing litigation, I will offer only a brief description of their characteristic
elements.
These elements, ordered in the way that I believe they would be generally
presented, include:
1.) the presentation of a theory of law that, by definition, has never
been used within the jurisdiction to address the sort of claims at issue in a
drug-testing case, and therefore, has never been used to support the sort of
conclusion desired by the athlete's attorney or by institutional counsel;
2.) a logical demonstration that this new theory of law is not contradicted
by, or inherently inconsistent with, other theories of law that have been
applied in the jurisdiction. For example, prior "due process" cases in the
jurisdiction, in the course of addressing procedural aspects of a testing
program, may have assumed, sub silentio, that as a matter of substantive
law, it was within the authority of a state university to test. In fact, earlier
decisions may have identified interests of institutions conducting testing that
the courts have treated as "weighty" or "substantial." The identification
of such "weighty interests" in the "due process" setting would necessarily
undercut the ultra vires argument;
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3.) a positive assertion that the new theory is consistent with other
authoritative theories within the jurisdiction, and serves similar policy pur-
poses. For example, if the ultra vires doctrine has been employed in com-
mercial litigation to prevent corporations from undertaking certain sorts of
business ventures inconsistent with their charters, the athlete's attorney well
might argue that colleges are governed by similar charters; that these charters,
while admittedly broad, have as their common central feature the promotion
of "education," but not the promotion of a particular state-sponsored "mo-
rality" or of the long-term "safety" of the student body; and that since the
primary justifications traditionally offered for testing are in fact moral or
health-related, colleges lack the requisite authority to test. This formal anal-
ogy between the ultra vires doctrine in a business and educational-athletic
setting probably can be reinforced with a policy analogy. Thus, the litigator
well may claim that the doctrine in its ordinary setting uses state power to
serve the important purpose of protecting shareholders from impetuous
actions of the corporation's directors that were never envisioned when the
corporation was formed, and that it is at least as important for the state to
use its power to protect student-athletes from ill-conceived, faddish testing
programs; and
4.) an application of the new theory to the particular case. Thus, to
demonstrate that a college's testing program was in fact ultra vires, the
athlete's attorney would probably look to sources as diverse as the state
educational code, the college's student handbook, and any statements made
by those responsible for instituting the program, suggesting in the last in-
stance that their reasons for establishing it contemplated an exercise of power
extending beyond that authorized by legislation or any contract that could
be implied between the institution and its student body. In other words,
facts sufficient to bring the university's conduct within the ambit of the
favorable rule would be adduced.
D. "Fourth Level" Arguments
It is probably always easier to imagine legal theories that are contradicted
directly by existing precedent than it is to imagine the existence of "gaps"
and original ways of filling them. Certainly, this seems to be true when we
consider mandatory drug-testing. As this Article indicates, there are numer-
ous well-established ways of confronting the testing issue. Some clearly are
not advantageous to athlete's counsel. For example, the litigator might want
to argue that his client has a "property" right in competing, or that the
NCAA should be treated as a "state actor." As earlier sections of this
Article. have noted, both of these arguments fly in the face of powerful
recent precedent.
How can the litigator deal with such precedent? Clearly, his task is not
easy. Three principal methods suggest themselves. The first is to argue that
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the negative rulings are old, and do not reflect contemporary reality. Un-
fortunately for the athlete, however, the principal case that suggests that the
NCAA should not be regarded as a "state actor" dates only from 1984, 44
and the policy that case conveys seems entirely consistent with the views of
much of the federal judiciary, including the majority of the present Supreme
Court. 446 The conclusion that college athletes do not have a "liberty" or
"property" interest in their athletic participation seems to be similarly sit-
uated in the mainstream of current American law.
Nevertheless, the litigator can still make a second, more limited argument
based on "policy." With respect to the NCAA and precedent indicating
there is no "state action," for example, he can focus, as some commentators
recently did, 447 on the scope of the power delegated by state institutions to
the NCAA. His argument will probably have two aspects:
a.) a claim that the sort of delegation that public colleges engage in when
they commit the regulation of intercollegiate athletics to the NCAA is es-
sentially different from, and involves more control than, the sorts of close
public-private arrangements that have recently been construed by the courts
as not manifesting a sufficient "nexus" to justify the application of con-
stitutional standards to the "private" entity. Thus, in arguing that "the
alleged infringement of federal rights 'was fairly attributable to the State,"' 48
the litigator could-assert that, "[t]he organization receives from its member
institutions delegated powers of a breadth and scope unknown to one small
urban school [the "private party" in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn449] or physician's
committee [the "private party" in Blum v. Yaretsky40], important though
their work may be." ' 45' To emphasize the "scope" of these delegated powers,
emphasis would probably be laid on the completeness of NCAA regulations,
and on the total surrender of institutional right to act contrary to those
regulations .452
b.) A claim that in the absence of a finding of "state action," the breadth
of these delegated powers will make it very difficult-and perhaps impos-
sible-to contest effectively the actions taken by the state school she attends:
[w]ithout a restraint, the potential for evasion of difficult but important
constitutional duties would otherwise be too appealing. The matter of
445. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d 1019.
446. See, e.g., the decisions on which Arlosoroff is explicitly based-Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S.
830, and Blum, 457 U.S. 991.
447. See Martin, The NCAA and Its Student-Athletes: Is there Still State Action?, 21 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 49 (1986); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 114, § 1.14, at 8 (Supp. 1985).
448. Martin, supra note 447, at 71.
449. 457 U.S. 830.
450. 457 U.S. 991.
451. Martin, supra note 447, at 71.
452. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1976); University
of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d 1159 (Nev. 1979).
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drug testing among college athletes provides a useful example. If the
state undertakes to test its students itself, it should be made to comply
with whatever constitutional controls are applicable. Avoidance of these
duties should not be as simple as appointing the NCAA as the testing
and enforcing entity.11
Turning this assertion into an effective legal argument will demand some
factual showing that it is easier and more likely to be effective to sue the
NCAA than to sue those state institutions which cooperate with the NCAA
in implementing its rules. 454
Similar "policy" arguments can be made with respect to the existence of
a constitutionally-protected "liberty" or "property" interest. Thus, despite
the strong historical trend against finding such an interest in athletic par-
ticipation or even in future professional employment, 455 it is still possible to
assert, as one federal judge did, that for a particular college athlete enrolled
in a particularly undemanding curriculum at an institution engaged in "big-
time" college athletics, "the underlying reason for the plaintiff's desire to
be enrolled at the defendant University is the enhancement of his chances
to become a professional basketball player. ' 45 6 And out of this conclusion,
it is possible to aduce a "protectable" interest in a future professional career
by taking evidence that the athlete has the talent to play professional ball 4 57
and arguing that "the private interest at stake, . . . although ostensibly
academic, is the plaintiffs ability to obtain a "no cut" contract with the
National Basketball Association .... The plaintiff would suffer a substantial
loss if his career objectives were impaired." 458
To a considerable degree, these "policy" arguments are arguments based
on "fact," since they derive their potential persuasive force from their ability
to convince a judge that the situation before him is significantly different
from that covered by prevailing doctrine, and that the generality of that
doctrine must therefore be cut back to accommodate the particulars of the
instant situation in a reasonable way. Yet part of the problem with unfa-
vorable precedents is that they are sometimes very much "on point." Thus,
the litigator's final argument when he seeks to avoid unfavorable precedents
by securing an overt change in doctrine is to assert that those precedents
are fundamentally flawed, that they are basically unfair, that as a matter
of principle, they should be revoked or altered. Virtually always, he will
make this final argument in conjunction with the one preceding. Thus, his
453. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 114, § 1.14, at 8 (Supp. 1985).
454. For reasons indicated in the "state action" segment of this Article, this argument does
not appear to be very convincing. See supra notes 86-149 and accompanying text.
455. W. Buss, Due Process in Enforcement of Amateur Sports Rules, in LAw AND AMATE R
SPoRTs 1, 12-14 (R. Waicukauski ed. 1982).
456. Hall, 530 F. Supp. at 106.
457. Id. at 106.
458. Id. at 109.
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strategy will resemble that pursued by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education4 9 and its successors: demonstrate that the existing doctrine (in
Brown, "separate but equal") does not "work," given the facts before the
court; and argue that the practical flaws are accompanied by some philo-
sophically-definable "injustice."
Justice Douglas exemplified the argument from principle in his Wyman
dissent. Rejecting the majority's thesis that the warrantless search of Mrs.
James' home was 'reasonable' merely because she is dependent on gov-
ernment largesse, ''460 Douglas argued that the fourth amendment was un-
conditional in its application:
[t]he bureaucracy of modern government is not only slow, lumbering,
and oppressive; it is omnipresent. It touches everyone's life at numerous
points. It pries more and more into private affairs, breaking down the
barriers that individuals erect to give them some insulation from the
intrigues and harassments of modern life,461
and
constitutional rights-here the privacy of the home-are obviously not
dependent on the poverty or the affluence of the beneficiary. It is the
precincts of the home that the fourth amendment protects; and their
privacy is as important to the lowly as the mighty.42
CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL CHOICES
The IU and NCAA drug-testing programs confront the courts with a
fundamental choice: will they permit wide-scale, random intrusions into the
lives of hundreds of thousands of athletes, expecting to discover that a small
percentage are using illegal drugs? Or will they forbid testing on the ground
that although some athletes will be hurt by drug use, and strongly-held social
conventions will continue to be flouted, the danger to liberal ideals posed
by indiscriminate testing is more important than the health and safety risks-
and the risks to institutional reputation-that scattered drug use poses?
The first section of this Article suggested that this choice does not-
indeed, can not-present itself in "philosophically pure" terms. Instead, it
inevitably arises within a particular institutional and political context. Pres-
sures for testing thus reflect the interests and pragmatic needs of colleges,
athletic associations, and politicians, as well as the concrete fears of those
who encounter drug abuse personally or through the media. Pressures against
testing are less well-organized, and perhaps more generally "ideological" in
nature. Thus, it is clear that some athletes will object to testing as an
"invasion of privacy." But as the shortage of lawsuits to date suggests, the
459. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
460. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 331.
461. Id. at 335 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
462. Id. at 332-33.
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great majority are probably willing to "go along with the program."
Barriers to "the program" have emerged slowly; yet to the extent that
they have emerged at all, they have been attributable to the concerns of
those responsible for instituting testing that to do so would be "wrong"-
and in all likelihood, illegal. In other words, judges deciding cases about
"privacy" under state law and about the fourth amendment under the U.S.
Constitution, have provided the principal counterweight to official hysteria
about the danger that drugs pose to our society. Nowhere has this been
clearer than in the judicial response to President Reagan's proposal to
institute widespread testing of various classes of federal employees. Virtually
all of the reported cases to date have summarily rejected the call for random
testing without "individualized suspicion.
' 463
The second section of this Article chronicled an idealized effort of an
institution's attorney to work his way through the maze of largely-negative
precedents in order to find a "winning hand," that is, a justification for a
testing program that would be compatible with the requirements of existing
law. In his search, he discovered that it is considerably easier to find law
favorable to his cause when defending the NCAA than when defending the
programs of public colleges and universities. A strong set of recent holdings,
denying that the NCAA is a "state actor," suggested that federal consti-
tutional norms do not directly govern the activities of "private" athletic
associations, although they do govern the activities of public institutions that
cooperate with such institutions in implementing their drug-testing programs.
On the other hand, even the NCAA appears to be bound by state consti-
tutional norms protecting the "right to privacy." As the recent trial court
decision in Levant v. NCAA46 indicates, in California at least, those norms
are probably more protective of individual rights than are similar norms
generated by the federal Constitution, and certainly reach parties not covered
under the "due process" or "equal protection" clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.
Counsel's arguments for a testing authority in public colleges are more
strained, since it is clear that such institutions, as "state actors," are obligated
to abstain from warrantless and "unreasonable" searches. The concept of
what is "reasonable" has been given considerable substance in hundreds of
cases, many of which are more or less directly applicable to the drug-testing
situation. Under certain extreme circumstances, such as those that might
obtain in prisons4 5 or military installations, 46 it is reasonable to test without
a warrant and without any "individualized suspicion." Within the context
463. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
464. See supra note 141.
465. See McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (urinalysis permissible as a
means of keeping drugs out of prison).
466. See, e.g., Williams v. Secretary of the Navy, 787 F.2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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of school searches, however, such individualized suspicion (or even "probable
cause' '467) appears to be a general requirement.461 Only with some ingenuity
can an argument be made that these fourth amendment cases do not prevent
testing. One line of attack depends on the decision in Wyman v. James,469
and argues on the basis of that case that "no search" in fact takes place
when the purpose of the governmental intrusion is "remedial" rather than
"punitive." For the reasons indicated above,470 given the actual testing pro-
grams that Indiana University, the NCAA, and most other educational
institutions use, such a characterization of testing appears to be profoundly
misleading. Another line of attack, also based on Wyman, argues that at
least in those situations involving a student who refuses to be tested, "no
search" takes place because no urine sample has in fact been taken. The
weakness of this argument is that it flies in the face of the "doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions."' 47' A final line of attack available to the liti-
gator, less specifid in its focus but perhaps more promising, is based on the
general idea that fourth amendment protections, like virtually everything else
comprehended by the "due process" clause, should not be regarded as
"absolutes," but must be derived on a case-by-case basis, in which the
interests of the state are weighed (or "balanced ' 472) against the hardships
imposed by the search. 473 This approach in effect demands that the hard
lines of precedent in a variety of fourth amendment areas be relaxed to
accommodate the perceived dangers of drug use among athletes.
To the extent that the "balancing" approach is already well-established
in the law, it serves as an example of what the third section of the Article
refers to as a "second-level argument." Such arguments frame doctrine in
the light of contingencies, relativizing assertions of generalized individual
rights to accommodate the particular claims of the state. Since those claims
are substantial in the drug-testing arena, part of the conflict between the
litigator representing an athlete and institutional counsel is a battle of char-
acterization, in which the former tries to frame every issue in terms of an
already-recognized "absolute" right, and the latter seeks to exploit the in-
evitable differences between issues decided "absolutely" in the past, and
variations of those issues that demand a more "balanced" approach in the
present. Due to the nature of rights discourse (in other words, those rep-
resenting athletes tend to be "absolutists," given to presenting "first level,"
universal arguments in favor of "privacy" and "liberty," while their op-
467. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
468. See New Jersey v. T.L.0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
469. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
470. See supra text accompanying notes 210-19.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 282-342.
472. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
473. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984).
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ponents are almost always pragmatists) "new" issues tend to be framed in
these antithetical terms when they first arise, assimilated on the one hand
to existing doctrines favoring the athlete's unlimited right to choose, and
on the other, to existing arguments proclaiming the state's interest in over-
riding "rights" with claims of "public necessity." Only occasionally does
this pattern of argumentation vary significantly. Thus, in a few instances,
established doctrine (such as the current law addressing the question of
whether an athlete has a "liberty" or "property" interest in present or future
athletic competition 4 4) is clearly antithetical to the interests of the athlete.
In such cases, the athlete's attorney is likely to argue first on pragmatic
terms that the existing rule of law is too harsh, and is being applied too
rigidly, and then is likely to argue that the proposed alternative rule of law
is more consistent with underlying principles of "privacy."
In the end, the decisions that courts reach about drug-testing will reveal
where they stand on the privacy issue. Exactly where they end up standing,
however, cannot be determined in the abstract, according to some timeless
formula. Nearly seventy years ago, Munroe Smith wrote:
[i]n their effort to give the social sense of justice articulate expression
in rules and principles, the method of the lawfinding experts has always
been experimental. The rules and principles of case law have never been
treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested
in those great laboratories of the law, the courts of justice. Every new
case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable
yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered. It may
not be modified at once, for the attempt to do absolute justice in every
single case would make the development and maintenance of general
rules impossible; but if a rule continues to work injustice, it will be
eventually reformulated. 7 5
Even the doctrines of a rights-based jurisprudence are not resistant to such
change. Thus, as concepts of justice change from time to time, and as the
relative values assigned to "liberty" and to "freedom" in the popular con-
sciousness and the political order shift, we can expect shifts in the willingness
of the judiciary to take claims of "personal autonomy" or "privacy" se-
riously. Those shifts may scarcely be visible, masked by the inevitable judicial
tendency to cloak new doctrine in the trappings of the old, to label new
and protean rules of law as minor exceptions to established precedent. But
as Benjamin Cardozo once said: "The glacier still moves. '476
The recent movement of the glacier where the fourth and fourteenth
amendment is concerned has certainly been toward more "balancing," and
away from the unusually absolutistic conceptions of "right" which flourished
474. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
475. M. SMrM, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909) (quoted in B. CAnozo, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDIcIAL PROcEss 23 (1921)).
476. B. C-ARozo, hupra note 475, at 28.
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during the era of the Warren Court, and have gradually been eroded over
the last sixteen years. The drug-testing of athletes, although earth-shattering
to some of those involved, and of general symbolic significance to a society
interested in protecting individual privacy, is a relatively marginal issue.
Thus, if the courts continue, as they did in Lopez-Mendoza and Leon to
"balance" the personal interests of aliens and criminals in avoiding war-
rantless searches against the efficiency interests of the government in con-
ducting them, it is only a matter of time before the courts, by relaxing the
definition of "search," or by expanding the definition of what is "reason-
able," permit colleges to conduct warrantless and random searches of their
student-athletes.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that currently existing doctrine makes
such a result difficult to justify. The strategy of the institutional counsel
described above is first to understand and then to attempt to circumvent
existing patterns of precedent. Similarly, all of the litigator's arguments have
as their starting point a perception of the present state of the law, although
the way that state is described sometimes entails a demand for change.
Almost exactly two centuries ago, Alexander Hamilton located the essential
conservatism of the judiciary in its ultimate dependence on the "political
branches" of government, noting that "it is in continual jeopardy of being
overpowered, awed, or influenced, by its coordinate branches, 47 7 and so
would be unlikely to risk the relative freedom conferred by "separation of
powers" by substituting its unhindered "will" for the historical directives
of the constitution.478 More recently, Judith Shklar, following in the footsteps
of Max Weber, has located it in "internal professional ideology, ' 479 which
has "wedded" lawyers and judges to conceptions of "formal justice" and
"to all the interests that relied on permanence and predictability in social
procedures. ' 48 0 Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish have located it in still
another source: the common, historically-derived language that judges inev-
itably use when they define present obligations and limits in the light of the
past. 48 ' Finally, in a recent, rather surprising article, Duncan Kennedy has
located it in the formal and psychological constraints on argument that an
existing set of legal doctrines inevitably impose on even the most radical of
judges:
[Part] of the normative power of the [existing] field [of decision] comes
from the fact that all these judges (and others) have left us more thanjust a record of their fact situations and outcomes. They wrote opinions
477. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
478. Id. at 465-66.
479. J. SmaAR, LEGALiSM: LAw, Mopus, AND POLiTicAL TRIALS 16 (1986).
480. Id. at 15.
481. See Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 527, 542-43 (1982); Fish, Working
on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 551, 553-58 (1982).
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full of overtly normative explanations of outcomes obtainable by ref-
erence to rules and policies .... The second order normative power of
the field comes from the fact that I identify with these ought-speakers.
I respect them. I honor them. When they speak, I listen. I even tremble
if I think I am going against their collective wisdom. They are members
of the same community working on the same problems. They are old.
They are many. They are steeped in a tradition of serious ethical inquiry
whose power I have felt on countless occasions, a tradition that seems
to me a partially valid great accomplishment of the often cruddy civi-
lization of which I am a tiny part.482
Whatever the source of this conservative professional vision, though, it
elevates existing doctrine about "privacy," the fourth amendment, and re-
lated constitutional concepts into icons that can be gradually reshaped, but
not shattered without peril to the one who does the shattering. In terms of
the maze, then, judges can re-shape it by cutting through overgrown walls
as they trace new dimensions to old doctrines like "state action" and "un-
constitutional conditions." But in terms of the game, they are forced to slog
through the mass of existing precedents, constructing reasonably plausible
rules as they go.
482. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint on Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 549-50 (1986).
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